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"[f]he instant decision •.. tends to bring adjudications of this
tribunal into the same class as a restricted railroad ticket, good for
this day and train only. I have no assurance ... that the opinion
announced today may not shortly be repudiated and overruled by
justices who deem they have new light on the ·subject.''
Justice Owen Roberts 1
"A judge looking at a constitutional decision may have compulsions to revere past history and accept what was once written. But
he remembers above all else that it is the Constitution which he
swore to support and defend, not the gloss which his predecessors
may have put on it."
Justice William 0. Douglas2
1. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 669 (1944) (Roberts,]., dissenting).
2. William 0. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 CoLUM. L. REv. 735; 736 (1949).
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Introduction
The dramatic end of the 1990-1991 Supreme Court Term focused
national attention on a perennial question in constitutional law: to
what extent do the Justices follow precedents with whose reasoning
or holdings they disagree. Justice Thurgood Marshall's abrupt resignation on the last day of the Term underscored his frustrations
over the Court's overruling of two criminal procedure precedents
on that same day in Payne v. Tennessee, 3 and over the possibility that
"scores of established constitutional liberties are now ripe for reconsideration."4 In the aftermath ofJustice Marshall's resignation,
including the contentious confirmation proceedings for Justice Clarence Thomas,5 many Senators and concerned Americans expressed
their frustration over the prospect of the Court's dismantlement of a
significant number of precedents recognizing protection for individual liberties in such varied areas of constitutional law as abortion,
affirmative action, separation of church and state, and criminal
procedure.6
The anxiety generated by these events is complex. It includes
concerns not only about the potential loss of specific liberties but
also about the Court's abandonment of the institutional values normally associated with fidelity to precedent, 7 including the neutral,
impartial, consistent application of the rule of law8 as well as the
3. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991), ovenuling South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989) and Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987). See infra notes 3839 & 44 and accompanying text for a discussion of Payne.
4. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2619 (Marshall,]., dissenting).
5. For a general commentary on justice Thomas' confirmation proceedings, see
Michael]. Gerhardt, Dividedjustice, 60 GEo. WASH. L. REv. (forthcoming Apr. 1992) (dis·
cussing what the Thomas hearings revealed about justice Thomas, the confirmation process, and the Supreme Court).
6. For a list of such precedents, see Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2623 & n.2 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); infra note 44.
7. As used in this Article, "precedent" refers to the facts, procedural posture, reasoning, and/or holding of the decision in which a court has resolved a particular legal
dispute. CJ infra note 18 (discussing stare decisis). But see Henry P. Monaghan, Stare
Decisis and Constitutional Atijudication, 88 CoLUM. L. REv. 723, 763-67 (1988) (suggesting
that there is no clear definition of precedent but that whatever definition people choose
should include the rule or standard set forth in a case).
8. See, e.g., ARTHUR]. GOLDBERG, EQ..UALjusncE 75 (1971) (suggesting that fidelity
to precedent "fosters public confidence in the judiciary and public acceptance ofindividual decisions by giving the appearance of impersonal, consistent, and reasoned opinions"); RICHARD A. WASSERSTROM, THE jUDICIAL DECISION 56-84 (1961) (identifying
certainty, consistency, fairness, equality, efficiency, and predictability as justifications for
adherence to precedent); Geoffrey Stone, Precedent, the Amendment Process, and Evolution in
Constitutional Doctrine, 11 HARV.J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 67, 70 (1988) (explaining that a "doctrine of precedent" promotes efficient judicial decisionmaking, "predictability in our affairs," more attention to the "stakes" of resolving a particular legal dispute, caution in
judicial decisionmaking, and chances that a justice can make lasting contributions. "If a
justice disregards the judgments of those who preceded him, he invites the very same
treatment from those who succeed him. A justice who wants to preserve the value of his
own coin must not devalue the coin of his predecessors."). Although similar institutional values or values such as stability and continuity are promoted when a court follows a precedent in common law and constitutional adjudication, those .values can be
outweighed in constitutional adjudication by a justice's normative views of the Constitution. See infra notes 215-27 and accompanying text (discussing how different Justices
factor such values into their decisionmaking). For commentary on the role of precedent
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legitimation of our system of government under which the Court
and the other branches should be bound (at least in some meaningful way) by the rule oflaw.9
If the Justices were to adopt a low level of deference to precedent
(for example, overruling a precedent merely deemed erroneously
reasoned}, then they will have increased the chances that a subsequent Court will take the same route. Future Justices could rely on
past decisions as expressing a theory of precedent that supports
them in overruling precedent based solely on disagreement with the
underlying reasoning of those precedents. The inevitable consequence of all this would be chaos, lack of certainty regarding the
durability of a number of individual freedoms, and/or proof positive
that constitutional law is nothing more than politics carried on in a
different forum.
A pervasive problem with trying to allay these concerns, however,
is that it is difficult to determine how much the Supreme Court respects precedent as a source of decision. The subject often does not
generate candor (or full explication) because it encompasses the attitudes someone may have but not be fully prepared, inclined, or
even encouraged to disclose about constitutional law. to For example, the Justices infrequently debate openly and ~lly or reach any
consensus on the reasons and criteria for affirming or overruling
precedents. The Justices also have differed and not fully clarified
when it would be appropriate for them to adopt a common law (or
doctrinal) approach to constitutional adjudication, under which the
Court moves incrementally, evolving its views over time and
grounding them in experience, 1 1 or some other approach that
would give more weight to their underlying views· on constitutional
in common law adjudication, see Larry Alexander, Constrained By Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1 (1989) (analyzing three separate models of common law stare decisis); Frederick
Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REv. 571, 595-602 (1987) (arguing for the development
of "a rule of precedent" because respect for precedents strengthens judicial decisionmaking, increases social welfare, and ensures fairness by treating like cases alike).
9. See Monaghan, supra note 7, at 744-53 (arguing that precedents perform several
functions other than providing stability in decisionmaking, including limiting the
Court's agenda, illuminating the areas in which the Court has been consistently or perennially divided, and legitimating judicial review).
10. Cf. Steven Stark, Comment: Why Lawyers Can't Write, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1389, 1392
(1984) (arguing that legal writing is unclear because lawyers try to obscure what they are
really doing).
11. See generally PHIUP BoBBITT, CoNSTtTUTIONAL FATE: THEORY AND CoNSTtTUTION
39-58 (1982) (describing the evolution and significance of the doctrinal approach to
constitutional acljudication); HARRY {!. WELLINGTON, INTERPRETING THE CONSTlTUTION:
THE SuPREME CouRT AND TilE PROCESS OF ADJUDICATION 77-158 (1990) (maintaining
that the common law method of judicial review best explains American constitutional
law and is normatively superior to other approaches); Thomas C. Grey, The Constitutio11
as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1, 23 (1984) (advocating a common law approach to constitutional interpretation).
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interpretation than to the values commonly associated with fidelity
to precedent.
Similarly, commentators have not explained the process by which
the Court reviews precedents, how it might be improved, or the reasons for their failure to do either of the above. Nor have commentators always acknowledged the relationship between their efforts to
explain constitutional interpretation and their attitudes regarding
certain precedents. For example, conservatives criticize the Warren
Court's disregard for precedents, 12 but not the Rehnquist Court's
assault on liberal precedents. 13 Likewise, liberals denounce the
Rehnquist Court's attacks on their icons, 14 but not the Warren and
Burger Courts' overrulings of conservative precedents. 15 Thus, the
Court's review of its constitutional precedents remains the least understood of the processes by which such decisions can be limited or
overruled. 16
12. See, e.g., RoBERT H. BoRK, THE TEMPTING oF AMERICA: THE PoLmcAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAw 130, 348-49 (1990) (characterizing the Warren Court's disregard for
precedents as one example of its unprincipled activism); Charles]. Cooper, Stare Decisis:
Precedent and Principle in ConstitutionalAcijudication, 73 CoRNELL L. REv. 401, 404-06 (1988)
(suggesting that the Warren Court's lack of respect for precedents was a product of its
preference to do the convenient rather than the principled thing); see also RAouL BERGER,
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
344-46 (1977) (critiquing the Warren Court's disregard for precedents as evidence ofits
unprincipled decisionmaking); PHIUP B. KuRLAND, PoLmcs, THE CoNSTITUTION, AND
THE WARREN CoURT 37-38,90-91 (1970) (suggesting that the Warren Court's overruling
of precedents more often than any other Court threatened the legitimacy of the Court's
decisionmaking};Jon D. Noland, Stare Decisis and the Overruling of Constitutional Decisions in
the Warren Year.s, 4 VAL. U. L. REv. 101, 112-31 (1969} (surveying precedents overruled
by the Warren Court and rationales on which the Court relied}; cj. Earl M. Maltz, Some
Thoughts on the Death of Stare Decisis in Constitutional Law, 1980 Wis. L. REv. 467, 467 (expressing one conservative commentator's concern over the Warren and Burger Courts'
failure to respect precedents}.
13. See infra notes 38-44 & 125-30 and accompanying text (discussing the views of
the Rehnquist Court and of recent Justices toward Warren Court precedents).
14. See, e.g., William W.Justice, The New Awakening: judicial Activism in a Conservative
Age, 43 Sw. LJ. 657, 666-67 (1989) (accusing the Rehnquist Court ofmischaracterizing
the issues in fundamental rights cases to avoid being bound by precedent}; Note, Constitutional Stare Decisis, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1344, 1344, 1359-61 (1990) (critiquing the Rehnquist Court's disregard for precedents involving abortion rights). But see Envin
Chemerinsky, Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARv. L. REv. 43, 103-04 (1990)
(claiming that criticism of the Rehnquist, Burger, and Warren Courts' disregard for
precedents is misguided because respect for precedent ultimately turns on the degree to
which one agrees with the values underlying particular decisions).
15. For example, no liberal commentator has criticized Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963}, in which the Warren Court held that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments require the States to provide legal counsel for indigent defendants, overruling
Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), or Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), in which
the Burger Court held that a prosecutor cannot, consistent with equal protection, use
peremptory challenges to exclude black jurors solely on the basis of their race, overruling Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
16. The other processes by which such decisions are traditionally narrowed or reversed include constitutional amendment, congressional modifications of the Court's jurisdiction, the President's power to nominate Justices who might agree with her
criticisms of certain precedents, the Senate's power to advise and consent to judicial
nominations, and impeachment. See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT & THOMAS D. RowE, JR.,
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: ARGUMENTS AND PERSPECTIVES (forthcoming 1992) (summarizing the ways in which the political branches can respond to the Court's precedents);
GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw 71-84 (2d ed. 1991) (discussing various
mechanisms of political control of the Supreme Court).
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This Article offers a series of reflections on the role of precedent
in constitutional decisionmaking and theory. 17 It examines the ways
in which precedents operate as a stabilizing influence and source of
indeterminacy in constitutional law, are factored into eachjustice's
decisionmaking, and pose problems for Justices and·theorists that
stricdy adhere to some unifying principle that easily can be applied
to strike down contrary views embodied in precedents.
This Article offers support for the traditional view that precedents
should be overruled only when the prior decision was wrongly decided and there is some other important disadvantage in respecting
that precedent. It also proposes a novel framework for understanding the Court's review of its precedents as a dynamic (dialogic) process in which the justices individually" try to balance their respective
views on how the Constitution should be interpreted and certain social or institutional values such as the need for stability and consistency in constitutional law. This process is undermined or violated
(and stability and consistency are sacrificed) when a majority ofjustices dogmatically adhere to a single constitutional vision in its decisionmaking because such an approach aims to perpetuate or
reinforce itself but not to mediate (as the dialogic process does)
among different constitutional visions.
The first two Parts of this Article provide background for evaluating how much precedents matter as a source of decision to the
Court and for determining whether a coherent body of case law or
doctrine exists with respect to the Court's review of its precedents.
In particular, Part I examines the ways in which precedents provide
a stabilizing influence on constitutional decisionmaking. Precedents
perform historical and structural fun~tions that frame the Court's
agenda in the certiorari process, shape governmental institutions
and programs, and sometimes even immunize prior decisions from
overruling. These functions illustrate many of the conditions under
which the Court defers to, or at least seriously considers, precedents
in its deliberations.
·
Part II explores four ways in which the creation and interpretation
of precedents produce unpredictable constitutional decisionmaking.
17. See also GERHARDT & RoWE, supra note 16; Michael]. Gerhardt, Critical Legal Studies and Constitutional Law, 67 TEX. L. REv. 393, 395 (1988) (reviewing MARK TusHNET,
RED, WHITE AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1988)) (defining
"grand" or unitary constitutional theory as the systematic effort to explain constitutional
law or to defend constitutional decisions in terms of some overarching or unifYing principle or set of principles from which certain conclusions flow logically); see also Michael].
Perry, Why Constitutional Theory Matters to Constitutional Practice (and Vice Versa), 6 CaNST.
CoMM. 231, 249 (1989) (arguing that, inter alia, "constitutional theory is an effort to
justify a constitutional practice-to justify, that is, a particular interpretive style and judicial role").
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First, the Justices necessarily leave the scope of some decisions unclear, because they often gloss over their differences for the sake of
forming coalitions. Second, the Justices have latitude in dealing
with the ambiguities or ideas found in precedents and in choosing
the level of generality at which they will state the rule of law of a
case. Third, the Court's use of more than one technique to treat
precedents generates confusion as to the status of, and the Court's
real intentions regarding, those decisions. Last, there is no predictable pattern to the Court's explicit overrulings because the Justices
do not consistently follow the same approach in making such decisions. Each of these sources of indeterminacy allows the Justices to
be flexible (if not manipulative) when confronting new ideas and
arguments.
Part III suggests that the Court's inconsistent rulings on precedents make sense in light of public choice theory, chaos theory, and
legal pragmatism-all of which posit that multimembered institutions, such as the Court, inevitably render incoherent and inconsistent ju_dgments despite their individual members' efforts to make
principled decisions. This Part proposes that an effective way to
measure the role of precedent in constitutional decisionmaking is to
examine the degree to which each Justice consistently applies a coherent approach to constitutional stare decisis. 18
Accordingly, Part III describes several themes gleaned from areview of how the Justices individually factor precedents into their
decisionmaking. It shows, for example, that whenever the Court reviews its precedents, the Justices try to balance their views on how
the Constitution should be interpreted with their recognition of the
practical need to submerge those views for the sake of such social or
institutional values as stability and continuity in constitutional law or
consensus.
Part III also shows that the Court's conservative majority is split
18. "Stare decisis" has been defined variously as "to stand by the decisions and not
to disturb settled points," Robert A. Sprecher, The Development of the Doctrine of Stare Decisis and the Extent to Which it Should Be Applied, 31 A.B.A.J. 501-02 (1945) (quoting jAMES
KENT, CoMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAw 477 (Lacy ed., 1889)); "let the decision stand
and do not disturb things which have been settled," GoLDBERG, supra note 8, at 74; and
"stand by the precedents and do not disturb the calm," Stanley Reed, Stare Decisis and
Constitutional Law, 9 PA. B.A.Q; 131, 131 (1938) (Reed was then Solicitor General of the
United States). Hence, the phrase "constitutional stare decisis" refers to the settled
doctrine about the respect the Court should have for its own decisions interpreting the
Constitution. CJ. supra note 7 (defining "precedent").
This Article does not, however, address the degree of respect the Court should have
for stare decisis in cases involving statutory interpretation. For discussions on the deference the Court should show its prior statutory decisions, see William N. Eskeridge,Jr.,
Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEo. LJ. 1361 {1988) (criticizing the "super-strong presumption of correctness" accorded to statutory precedents and urging a more flexible
approach incorporating changes in policy); Lawrence L. Marshall, "Let Congress Do It":
The Case for an Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 MICH. L REv. 177 (1989) (suggesting that an absolute rule mandating respect for stare decisis in statutory cases is
justified under separation of powers analysis, which would give the Congress the final
word on questions of statutory interpretation); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Stability and
Relrability in judicial Decisions, 73 CoRNELL L. REv. 422 (1988) (suggesting that constitutional precedents deserve greater deference than statutory ones because the latter can
be changed more easily through the political process).
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between nvo views on the appropriate standard for overruling decisions. One view (followed in large part by ChiefJustice Rehnquist
and Justice Scalia) urges the overruling of virtually any precedent
that they consider erroneously reasoned, while the other view (advanced at various times by Justices White, O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Souter) bases the overruling of a precedent on its erroneous reasoning and some other substantial consideration. Part m argues that
the latter view tracks the practice of an overwhelming majority of
Justices to overrule precedents based on some extraordinary showing of need, while the former view, if adopted by a majority of the
Court, would wreak havoc on constitutional law, because it would
become a rule oflaw on which future Justices could rely to overrule
any decision with whose reasoning they could find a flaw.:
Part IV provides a descriptive analysis of, and normative 'response
to, the conflict benveen precedents and unitary theory (an'-~pproach
that prefers that the Court rigidly apply only one unifying principle
of constitutional interpretation). Part IV suggests "that this conflict
results because the Court's review of precedent takes place as part
of the more general dialogue in which the Justices debate whether
the Court should perpetuate the values it previously has endorsed
for the operation of government, while a unitary theorist usually
seeks to cut off this dialogue, or at least, to restrict it to the terms of
a single constitutional vision. Consequently, because so many
precedents are based on, or, at least can only be explained as the
result of the rejection of any one view of theory, this tension frequently presents a proponent of a rejected unitary theory with the
dilemma of choosing to overrule the bulk of constitutional doctrine,
or to abandon or modifY the unifYing principle dominating her theory in numerous substantive areas to provide constitutional law with
stability and continuity. Moreover, theorists often fail to appreciate
the relationship between their attitudes toward precedents and their
proposed solutions to this dilemma. This dilemma also raises the
question whether the public's respect for the Court depends on its
aversion to any single theoretical approach to interpretation and
adjudication.
This Article concludes with a normative proposal for reconciling
theory and nonconforming precedents by treating the Court's review ofits precedents as a dialogue in which theJustices each consider the "substantially countervailing considerations" 19 for no
longer preserving the values their predecessors previously have endorsed for controlling the operation of government. This kind of
decisionmaking is necessary to protect the rule oflaw, and the institutions and expectations built around it, and to allow some flexibility
19. See Monaghan, supra note 7, at 757.
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and deviation from the past when there are substantial or important
reasons to do so. The Article concludes that the Court's primary
mission is to preserve and to enhance this dialogue in which the
Justices take seriously precedents and the social values associated
with their preservation.
·

L

Precedent as a Stabilizing Influence in Constitutional
Decisionmaking

Precedents commonly are regarded as a traditional source of constitutional decisionmaking, 20 despite the absence of any clear evidence that they ever have forced the Court into making a decision
contrary to what it would rather have decided.2I Although some
constraint is desirable because it ensures stability in constitutional
law, 22 it is widely accepted that the Court should be able to review
and, if necessary, to overrule its constitutional precedents because
they are too difficult to overturn in the political process.23
Yet the apparent lack of consistency in the Justices' standards or
reasons for overruling precedents has led many commentators to
argue that precedents make little real difference to the Court.24
Critics have tried to prove this point by measuring explicit overrulings because they believe such decisions provide the clearest instances in which the Court has expressed its lack of regard for
20. The other traditional sources of constitutional decisionmaking include constitutional text, history, structure, and theory. See GERHARDT & RowE, supra note 16; see also
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100
HARV. L. REv. 1189 (1987) (attempting to construct a unified theory of constitutional
interpretation through coordinating the traditional sources of decisionmaking).
21. But see KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAw SYSTEM IN AMERICA 4 (Paul Gewirtz
ed. & Michael Ansaldi trans., 1989) (1933) (claiming that in the American common law
system precedents "constrain" judicial decisionmaking by providing historical
perspective).
22. For purposes of this Article, "stability" refers to predictable and continuous application of previously formulated rules of law. See Monaghan, supra note 7, at 749
(viewing a critical function of precedents as providing predictability and "continuity by
ensuring the survival of [important] governmental norms"); see also id. at 744-53 (arguing that precedents perform several functions other than providing stability in decisionmaking, including limiting the Court's agenda, illuminating the areas in which the Court
has been consistently or perennially divided, and legitimating judicial review).
23. The classic statement of this view is by Justice Brandeis, dissenting in Burnet v.
Coronado Oil & Gas Co.:
Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule oflaw be settled than it be settled right ....
But in cases involving the Federal Constitution, where correction through
legislative action is practically impossible, this Court has often overruled its
prior decisions. The Court bows to the lessons of experience and the force
of better reasoning, recognizing that the process of trial and error, so fruitful
in the physical sciences, is appropriate also in the judicial function.
285 U.S. 393, 406-08 (1932) (Brandeis,J., dissenting).
24. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 12, at 402 (suggesting that "stare decisis has always
been a doctrine of convenience, to both conservatives and liberals"); Note, supra note
14, at 1345-47 (criticizing the Court for routinely failing to take a principled approach to
precedent); James C. Rehnquist, Note, The Power That Shall Be Vested in a Precedent: Stare
Decisis, Tlze Constitution, and the Supreme Court, 66 B.U. L. REV. 345, 371-75 (1986) (arguing
that precedents have never barred the Court from doing what it would prefer to do); cJ.
Chemerinsky, supra note 14, at 103 (suggesting that it is the values underlying prior
decisions and not the precedents themselves that carry weight in constitutional law).
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precedents.25 If the rules of law precedents embody do not constrain, then they do not function as a conventional source of decision. The public is more likely .to re~ain <;onfid~~ce in the
impartiality and consistency of the Court's decisionmaking if the
reasons for the Court's choices are persuasive and if the Court generally adheres to principles t~at will reliably safeguard popular
~
precedents.26
Focusing only on what the Court already has decided expressly,
however, overlooks the degree to which precedents actually influence constitutional decisionmaking. By looking at what the Court
has said, and not said or not decided regarding its prior judgments,
one can discern that precedent contributes to the predictability and
continuity of constitutional law. The·weight of precedent performs
historical and structural functions that help to frame the Court's
agenda in the certiorari process, to shape government institutions
25. See, e.g., Charlotte C. Bernhardt, Supreme Court Reversals on Constitutional issues, 34
CoRNELL L.Q, 55, 60 (1948) (omitting cases in which the Court qualified, distinguished,
or expressed disapproval of precedents); Albert P. Blaustein & Andrew H. Field, "Overruling" opinions in the Supreme Court, 57 MicH. L. REv. 151, 156-59 (1958) (noting the
practical difficulties of analyzing "instances of erosion" as opposed to explicit overrulings);jerrold H. Israel, Gideon v. Wainright: The "Art" ofOverruling, 1963 SuP. CT. REV.
211, 214 n.15 (offering a limited definition of"directly overruled" cases); Maltz, supra
note 12, at 494 (listing only explicit overrulings in appendix to article criticizing disregard of precedent); Noland, supra note 12, at 118 (commenting on the value ofan objective measure of respect for precedent available through examination of explicit
reversals); cf. Henry Ellenbogen, The Doctrine ofStare Decisis and the Extent to Which it Should
Be Applied, 20 TEMP. L.Q, 503, 506-12 (1947) (not distinguishing the ways in which the
Court can weaken precedents); Albert Kocourek & Harold Koven, Renovation of the Common Law Through Stare Decisis, 29 ILL. L. REV. 971 passim (1935) (treating implicit and
explicit overrulings as the functional equivalents).
26. See, e.g., john M. Farago, Intractable Cases: The Role of Uncertainty in the Concept of
Law, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 195, 237-38 (1980) (arguing that the purpose of the judiciary is
to clarify and to fill in the gaps in the law, so that its interpretations of the law should be
as significant and weighty as the text of the law); Maltz, supra note 12, at 472-84 (lamenting that the decline of stare decisis contributes to several problems in constitutional law,
including uncertainty, unpredictability, and inconsistency); MichaelS. Moore, A Natural
Law Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 277, 372 (1985) (suggesting
that fidelity to precedent promotes the values of"equality, liberty, fairness, and utility"
and that these values should be of sufficient weight to prevent the Court from completely abandoning precedent in favor of the "moral or natural" value found in directly
interpreting the Constitution's text); Note, supra note 14, at 1356-57, 1361-62 (arguing
that the need for stability, predictability, and legitimacy in the Court's decisionmaking
require absolute deference to precedent, which should be modified only through constitutional amendment). But see Bernhardt, supra note 25, at 70 (suggesting that precedents
should last as long as reasonably possible but must ultimately give way to changes in
social and economic conditions); Blaustein & Field, supra note 25, at 183 (stressing that
it is more important for the Court to be right than consistent); Cooper, supra note 12, at
404 (observing that the two major drawbacks to constructing a doctrine on stare decisis
in constitutional law are that any such doctrine can be easily manipulated to hide the
actual reasoning underlying certain decisions and that it shields mistakes from repair);
Rehnquist, supra note 24, at 371-76 (suggesting that because the justices will always do
what they want when reviewing precedents the Court could better maintain the public's
respect if it were to reject any formal rule dictating its level of respect for precedents).
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and programs, and sometimes even to immunize prior decisions
from overruling. These functions illustrate the Court's respect for
its past practices and traditions.

A.

The Role

of Precedent in the Certiorari Process

Behind the scenes, precedents perform a crucial role in constitutional decisionmaking by framing the Court's decisions on whether
to grant certiorari. After the virtual abolition of mandatory jurisdiction, 27 the Court has nearly complete discretion over its docket
through the certiorari process. At the outset of each case, the Court
in effect determines whether the questions brought to it have been
settled through prior decisions or whether those decisions require
clarification or reconsideration. It is practically impossible for the
Court to decide any constitutional issue without first trying to determine the scope of prior decisions. The Justices' respect for the
Court's precedents and historical practices is most evident in their
choices of which matters not to hear. Thus, in the certiorari process, the Justices often demonstrate most clearly their desire to adhere to the precedents they might not have decided the same way in
the first place.2s
For example, the Court no longer considers whether the liberty
component of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause applies the Bill of Rights (in whole or in part) to the states.29 Nor do
27. See Act of june 27, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-352, 102 Stat. 662 (eliminating the
Supreme Court's mandatory appeal jurisdiction).
28. At the very least, it is clear that precedents are important because the Supreme
Court does not grant certiorari when it does not want to (or feels it cannot) change the
law. See, e.g., Turner v. California, 111 S. Ct. 768, 768 (1991) (Marshall,J., dissenting
from the Court's denial of certiorari) (dissenting from the Court's refusal to reconsider
his argument, rejected in previous cases, that the Court should recognize that "comparative proportionality review" is constitutionally required in capital cases); Teague v.
Tennessee, 473 U.S. 911,911-12 (1985) (Marshall,J., dissenting from the Court's denial
of certiorari) (dissenting from the Court's repeated rejection of his argument that the
Eighth Amendment prohibits requiring "a capital defendant to prove that any mitigating
circumstances he has established outweigh any aggravating circumstances the State has
proved"); Snead v. Stringer, 454 U.S. 988, 989 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from
the denial of certiorari) (protesting the Court's adherence to a line of precedents that, in
his opinion, have culminated in the Court's failure to reverse a lower court's erroneous
construction of the Sixth Amendment as mandating a new criminal trial for a defendant
who by telephone, but without consulting counsel, volunteered a statement to a prosecutor); see also H.W. PERRY, jR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SE'ITJNG IN THE UNITED
STATES SuPREME CouRT (1991) (discussing how the justices make initial decisions in the
certiorari process about the precedents they wish to leave alone and those they want to
clarify, narrow, expand, or reverse); infra notes 29-37 & 73-87 and accompanying text.
29. See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (incorporating the Fifth
Amendment's prohibition on double jeopardy); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968) (recounting the Court's decisions from 1897 through 1967 incorporating most of
the guarantees of the Bill of Rights through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause and holding the Sixth Amendment's right to a jury trial applicable to the States
through the same clause); Pointerv. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (incorporating the Sixth
Amendment's right to confrontation of opposing witnesses); Robinson v. California, 370
U.S. 660 (1962) (incorporating the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment); see also Michael J. Gerhardt, The Ripple Effects of Slaughter-House: A
Critique of a Negative Rights View of the Constitution, 43 VAND. L. REV. 409, 420 & n.46
(1990) (describing the relationship between the Court's precedents on incorporation
and the history of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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the Justices try to revisit the Warren Court decisions on reapportionment30 or the precedents recognizing equal protection-fundamental rights or interests.s 1 In the First Amendment area, the
Court shows no interest in reconsidering its highly protective test
for political expression in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 32 or the basic New York
Times v. Sullivan 33 standard for the protection of public figures
against libel suits. In addition, the Court exhibits no inclination to
revisit its opinions defining the scope of Congress' spending, war,
and taxing powers.34 The justices also do not rehear many significant Warren Court precedents subjecting state criminal procedures
30. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (striking down an Alabama apportionment scheme); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) (stn'king down a Georgia
apportionment scheme); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (holding that malapportionment presented a justiciable political question).
31. Equal protection-fundamental riglits generally are regarded as those interests
that are sufficiently important that distinctions regarding such rights and interests require compelling interest justification. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969) (striking down state and federal provisions denying welfare benefits to individuals who had resided in the administering jurisdictions for less than one year); Harper v.
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (striking down a Virginia poll tax); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex reL Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (using the Equal Protection
Clause to strike down an Oklahoma law providing for the sterilization of persons convicted of two or more "felonies involving moral turpitude" but expressly exempting
from the terms of the statute offenses such as embezzlement and violations of revenue
acts); see also Gerhardt, supra note 29, at 421-22 (describing the relationship between
equal protection-fundamental rights and the history of the Fourteenth Amendment).
32. 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (holding that a state may not "forbid or proscribe
advocacy of the use of force or oflaw violation except where such advocacy is directed ·to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
action").
33. 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding that a public official must prove "actual malice" to
recover for defamation). But see Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472
U.S. 749, 770-71 (1985) (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that public
figures should have to prove falsity only, and not actual malice, to recover for
defamation).
34. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (upholding a federal statute
passed pursuant to Congress' spending power that directed the-Secretary ofTransportation to withhold a portion offederal highway funds from states that do not prohibit the
purchase of alcohol by people under the age of21); United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S.
22 {1953) {upholding occupational tax on gamblers as long as the congressional measure was revenue producing on its face); Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138
(1948) (upholding use of Congress' war powers to remedy effects of war even after the
conflict is over).
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to federal standards. 35 In the controversial area of implied fundamental rights, the Court does not reopen several previously questionable rulings, 36 including the much-criticized decision in The
Slaughter-House Cases. 3 7
Certiorari decisions also reveal the Court's present agenda toreconsider precedents in specific areas. For example, the Court
clearly has tried to redefine several aspects of criminal procedure
law. This intent is evidenced by its consideration three times within
the past four years of the admissibility of victim impact statements in
the sentencing phase of capital trials, 38 culminating in the overruling of the Court's first•two rulings on that subject in Payne v. Tennessee. 39 The Court's desire to undo or limit criminal procedure
precedents is also apparent in its implicit overturning of a decision
that automatically invalidated the criminal conviction of a defendant
whose coerced confession had been admitted into evidence,40 and
its limiting of the scope of the exclusionary rule.41 The Court also
35. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that statements obtained from a defendant during incommunicado interrogation in a police-dominated atmosphere, without full warning of the defendant's constitutional rights, were
inadmissible as having been obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (using the Equal
Protection Clause to require a state to provide counsel for all indigent defendants challenging their criminal convictions as of right); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963) (incorporating the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel and requiring the States
to provide counsel to indigent defendants); Griffin v. Illinois 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (holding that a state must furnish an indigent criminal defendant with a free trial transcript if
such a transcript is necessary for "adequate and effective appellate review" of his conviction). But see irifra notes 38-41 and accompanying text (discussing some of the Court's
recent overrulings and narrowings of criminal procedure precedents).
36. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (recognizing a fundamental right of married couples to use contraception); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1925) (establishing a substantive due process fundamental right to send one's child
to a private school); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (establishing a substantive
due process fundamental right to teach one's child a foreign language).
37. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges
and Immunities Clause as merely protecting interests already protected by other federal
constitutional and statutory provisions). This may be an especially good example of a
previously controversial decision that the Court will not revisit despite its transparently
dishonest reasoning and shaky doctrinal result. See generally Gerhardt, supra note 29, at
417-19,426-30 (critiquing The Slaughter-House Cases).
38. See Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991); South Carolina v. Gathers, 490
U.S. 805 (1989) (holding that a prosecutor had engaged in an improper argument during the sentencing phase when he read from a religious tract that the victim had been
carrying and commented on personal qualities he had inferred from the victim's possession of the tract and a voter registration card); Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987)
(holding that the introduction of a victim impact statement at the sentencing phase of a
capital murder trial violated the Eighth Amendment).
39. 111 S. Ct. 2597, overruling Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 and Booth, 482 U.S. 496.
40. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991) (ruling that the use of a coerced confession in a criminal trial is not grounds for the automatic reversal of a conviction), implicitly overruling in part Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (identifying
coerced confession, biased judge, and deprivation of counsel as errors so serious as to
invalidate a criminal conviction automatically, and noting that the errors were not subject to harmless-error analysis); see also McNeil v. Wisconsin, 111 S. Ct. 2204 (1991)
{holding that neither the Fifth nor the Sixth Amendment prohibited police from questioning a man jailed for armed robbery about an unrelated murder charge without his
lawyer in the robbery case present).
41. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (holding that the Fourth
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has invited and considered various challenges to precedents involving abortion rights42 and the separation of church and state.4 S This
trend lends some credence to Justice Marshall's admonition in his
Payne dissent that the Court is prepared to weaken, if not overrule,
as many as seventeen constitutional precedents.44
Although more explicit overrulings have occurred in this century
Amendment exclusionary rule should not be applied to bar the prosecutor's use of evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on an invalid search warrant
issued by a magistrate).
·
42. For a discussion of the Court's recent rulings cutting back on precedents involving abortion rights, see infra notes 125-30 & 154-58 and accompanying text.
43. The Court's precedents regarding the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause have been in flux for years. The Court's tripartite test for evaluating Establishment Clause guarantees has been challenged.since it was first set forth in Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (upholding a law under the Establishment Clause only if
(1) it has a secular legislative purpose; (2) its principal or primary effect is neither to
advance nor inhibit religion; and (3) it does not foster an excessive.government entanglement with religion). For cases challenging Lemon, see Lee v. Weisman, 908 F.2d 1090
(1st Cir. 1990) (directly challenging the Lemon test), cerl. granted, 111 S. Ct. 1305 (U.S.
March 19, 1991) (No. 90-1014); Board of Education v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356, 2377
(1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (proposing, as an alternative to the Lemon test, that
government cannot give direct benefits to religion to such a degree that it effectively
establishes a state religion, and government cannot coerce any student to participate in
religious activity); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (examining
whether the government's practice had the purpose or effect of endorsing religion);
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984) (re~sing t9 endorse "any single test or
criterion in this sensitive area"). Before Lemon, the Court varied in its approach to Establishment Clause challenges. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968)
(upholding a state program to loan secular textbooks to parents of children attending
private schools); Aoington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (holding unconstitutional a state law requiring that ten verses from the Bi~le be rea4 aJoud at the opening of each school day); Everson v. Board ofEduc., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (upholding a New
Jersey statute authorizing local school boards to reimllucie the cost of. bus transportation to parents with children in private schools, most of which were Catholic parochial
schools).
The Court's two-part test for evaluating free exerCise of religion claims also has been
under attack from the time it was first set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963) (upholding a law under the Free Exercise Clause only if it does not substantially
burden the free exercise of religion, or if the government has a compelling reason for
doing so). For precedents challenging Sherbert, see Employment Division, Department
of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990) (holding that an Oregon criminal
statute prohibiting peyote use did not violate the Free Exercise Clause); Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (holding that the Forest
Service's plan to permit logging and road construction in areas of forest used by Indian
tribes for religious rituals did not violate their free exercise of religion); Bowen v. Roy,
476 U.S. 693 (1986) (rejecting a free exercise challenge to government welfare programs requiring social security numbers, even though the claimants believed that the
use of the number would impair their child's spirit). Before Sherbert, the Court varied in
its approach to free exercise claims. See, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961)
(rejecting a free exercise challenge by Orthodox jews claiming that a state law requiring
stores to be dosed on Sundays put them at a competitive disadvantage because their
religion required closing their stores on Saturday); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296 (1940) (reversing the disturbing the peace conviction ofaJehovah's Wimess who
played a record attacking all organized religions).
44. Payne v. Tennessee, Ill S. Ct. 2597, 2623 & n.2 (1991) (Marshall,J., dissenting)
(stating that the following 17 precedents are "endangered': based on the criteria the
Court used in Payne: Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990) (upholding the
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than in the previous one, and consequently seem to be on the rise,45
the Court is not necessarily showing less regard for its precedents.46
During this same period oftime, the Court's case load has increased
at a rate even higher than that of explicit overrulings.47 It stands to
authority of the federal government to set aside broadcast licenses for minority applicants); Rutan v. Republican Party, 110 S. Ct. 2729 (1990) (holding that the First Amendment prohibits denial of public employment on the basis of party affiliation); Peel v.
Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n, 110 S. Ct. 2281 (1990) (First Amendment right to advertise legal specialization); Grady v. Corbin, 110 S. Ct. 2084 (1990)
(holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause forbids repeated prosecution for the same
criminal conduct); Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990) (finding a due process right
to procedural safeguards aimed at assuring voluntariness of decision to commit oneself
to a mental hospital); James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307 (1990) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment demands exclusion of illegally obtained evidence introduced for impeachment of defense witness); Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988) (holding that the
Eighth Amendment requires jury instructions that do not preclude consideration of
nonunanimous mitigating factors in capital sentencing); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S.
378 (1987) (holding that the First Amendment protects public employees when expressing views on matters ofpublicimportance); Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987) (holding that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments support a right of a criminal defendant to
provide hypnotically refreshed testimony on her own behalf); Gray v. Mississippi, 481
U.S. 648 (1987) (rejecting applicability of harmless error analysis to Eighth Amendment
right not to be sentenced to death by "death qualified" jury); United States v. Paradise,
480 U.S. 149 (1987) (right to promotions as remedy for racial discrimination in government hiring); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (holding that the Eighth Amendment forbids execution of the insane); Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (reaffirming right to abortion); Maine v.
Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 (1985) (holding that the Sixth Amendment is violated by introduction of statements made to government informant-codefendant in course of preparing defense strategy); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) (finding that the
Establishment Clause forbids certain governmental assistance to parochial schools);
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (rejecting theory that
Tenth Amendment provides immunity to the States from federal regulation); Pulliam v.
Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984) (holding that injunctive relief is available for constitutional
violations committed by judicial officers)).
45. See generally Appendix (listing all explicit overrulings).
46. Even though the cases in which the Court grants certiorari present especially
difficult constitutional issues, this does not mean that the Court is more likely to overrule itself. For one thing, the statistics do not support this proposition. See infra note 47;
see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REv. 802, 805-07
(1982) (explaining that the Court has agreed to consider an increasing number of difficult cases, which inevitably divide the Court); Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Stare Decisis andjudicial
Restraint, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 281, 284-85 (1990) (suggesting that explicit overrulings are the rare exception rather than the rule in constitutional decisionmaking);John
P. Stevens, The Life Span ofa judge-Made Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 3-5 (1983) (attempting
to dispel the myth that stare decisis no longer matters to the Court).
47. The Court has explicitly overruled itself only about 100 times. See Appendix; see
also CoNGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., LIBRRARY OF CoNGRESS, THE CoNSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, S. Doc. No. 16, 99th
Cong.,1stSess.2115-27 (1987 &Supp.1988) [hereinafterCoNSTtTIJTIONREPORT]. The
relatively small number of explicit overrulings may be explained partially by the fact that
explicit overrulings represent the most extreme kind of decisive action, which is difficult
to achieve in controversial cases. See supra note 46. Moreover, explicit overrulings have
not increased at the same rate as the Court's case load. For example, during the decade
1960-70, the Court had an average case load per year of 2660.82 cases and averaged
4.09 explicit overrulings per year; however, during the decade 1980-90 the Court had its
case load increase to an average of 4354.44 cases per year but explicitly overruled an
average of 2.22 cases each year. See CoNSTITUTION REPORT, supra (listing all overrulings
through june 29, 1988); The Statistics, 75-103 HARV. L. REv. (1960-1990) (providing annual surveys of the Supreme Court's case load); see also Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2610 n.1
(observing that the Court had overruled 33 cases in 20 Terms); Powell, supra note 46, at
284 (suggesting that there are only two or three overrulings each Term despite the
Court's increasing case load); Stevens, supra note 46, at 4-5 (pointing out that even
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reason that if the Court is being asked to hear an increasing number
of cases, there will be more questions about the scope of prior decisions, and the greater number of such issues, the greater opportunities for overruling precedents. Yet Justice Marshall remains the
only modern Justice to suggest that the Court in recent years has
been targeting a greater proportion of its cases for
reconsideration.48
Precedents clearly do matter to the Court in setting its agenda.
When considering which cases to hear, the Court has its first and
most important chance to deliberate on the degree to which it intends to be constrained by a prior opinion. Once the Court chooses
to decide an issue, however, there arise more nuanced questions as
to the degree to whic~ precedents still constrain or matter to the
Court. I consider these nuances next.

B. Precedent as a Source of Stability for Constitutioruzl Law
Precedents perform historical and structural functions that help
stabilize the branches' operations and interactions.49 This Section
considers each of these functions in turn, and then examines the
special conditions under which they can help to immunize certain
decisions from reconsideration.

1.

The Historical Functions of Precedent

Precedents can serve two historical functions. First, the Court's
though the Court's case load has been increasing the Court still explicitly overrules itself
no more than two or three times each Term).
48. Several other modem justices have noted the importance of following precedent. See Williamj. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS LJ. 427, 437 (1986)
(acknowledging that a Justice has a "general duty" to follow precedents); Antonin
Scalia, TheRuleofLawasaLawofRules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175, 1177 (1989) (suggesting
that the real work of the Court consists of distinguishing, clarifying, and interpreting
precedents); see also Powell, supra note 46, at 285; Stevens, supra note 46, at 4-5. In
addition, in his press release announcing his resignation from the Court, justice Brennan expressed his belief that many of the precedents he helped construct would survive
the test of time. See Linda Greenhouse, Brennan, Key Libera~ Q!lits Supreme Court: Battlefor
Seat Likely, N.Y. TIMES, july 21, 1990, at 1 (quoting justice Brennan's press release).
Some might argue, however, that changes in personnel on the Court may lead some
justices to avoid calling attention to their own disregard for precedent by overruling or
narrowing precedents in more subtle and less principled ways. See supra note 24. This
argument overlooks the critical fact, discussed at irifra notes 119-77 and accompanying
text, that the justices may choose to forego explicit overrulings for a variety of defensible reasons.
49. Neither the historical nor structural functions of precedents receive adequate
attention from other commentators. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note.20, at 1260-62 (describing precedent's relative status vis-a-vis other sources of decisionmaking but not considering the historical and structural functions performed by precedents); Stephen R.
Munzer &James W. Nickel, Does the Constitution Mean What It Always Meant?, 77 CoLUM. L.
REv. 1029, 1044 (1977) (suggesting that the authority of a precedent turns solely on the
degree to which it can be linked to the constitutional text).
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decisions often are intertwined with historical events to such an extent that it is not possible to understand those events without considering the degree to which precedents contributed to their
development. A famous illustration of this function is Dred Scott v.
Sandford, 50 which divided the Court and the nation on whether the
Constitution had an answer to the moral, social, and political dilemma posed by slavery and set the stage for the Civil War and the
Reconstruction Amendments.5 1 Dred Scott is important to the Justices (and others) as the precedent overturned by the Reconstruction Amendments and as an important symbol for the consequences
of the Court's reliance on questionable historical analysis and interference with socially divisive issues. 52
Second, the Justices can be the constitutional historians for their
successors as well as for the elected branches. Because the Court is
a critical interpreter of and player in historical events,5 3 its precedents preserve, illuminate, and provide a perspective on the nation's
social, political, and legal traditions.54 The Court often defines the
relevant past for itself and the other branches so that the Court's
assertions about history can matter to present and future Justices
and other government decisionmakers even more than anything the
Framers may have said. Consequently, there are a number of areas
in which the Court and the elected branches are likely to consult the
Justices' historical commentary, as reflected in New York Times v. Sullivan 55 regarding the original understanding of the scope of the
First Amendment's protection of the press from libel actions and,
more recently, in Harmelin v. Michigan 56 regarding the extent to
which the Framers meant for the Eighth Amendment to guarantee
proportionality of punishment.57 The more each of the branches,
50. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856) (holding that neither slaves nor their descendants
could be citizens of the United States).
51. See generally Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the
Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 863, 894-95 (1986) (discussing the role of
Dred Scott in influencing the development of the Reconstruction Amendments).
Precedents can also reflect the attitudes of a particular historical period. For example,
the development of the civil rights movement in this country was intertwined with the
long line of cases in which the Supreme Court restricted government's use of race as a
classifying trait in legislation. See generaUy RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE jUSTICE 82-83, 88,
118-19, 122-23, 134-35, 219-20, 239-46 (1975) (discussing the relationship between
various Supreme Court decisions and the development of the civil rights movement).
52. See, e.g., BoRK, supra no~e 12, at 28-33 (describing Dred Scott as illustrating substantive due process at its worst); William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REv. 693, 700-02 (1976) (pointing to Dred Scott as an example of the
damage judicial activism can wreak).
53. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443,540 (1953) (Jackson,J., concurring) (observing
that Supreme Court justices "are not final because [they] are infallible, but [they] are
infallible only because [they] are final"); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177
(1803) (stating that it is the province of the Court to "say what the law is").
54. See Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE LJ. 1029, 1051-55
(1990) (arguing neither precedent nor tradition in our past should be ignored because
our legal precedents and traditions have shaped our current attitudes and practices).
55. 376 u.s. 254 (1964).
56. 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991).
57. Other examples of precedents whose historical analysis may be consulted subsequently by the Court and the other branches include Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 786,
786-92 (1983) (reconciling the history of the Establishment Clause with the practice of
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-.
including the Court, accepts the Court's historiography, the more
entrenched the precedents become structurally and the less likely
_
the Court will revisit or overrule them.ss
The Court's mediations of past events59 can be more reliable than
the histories compiled by the elected branches because the latter
traditionally do not have to explain the reasons for their positions
on historical questions as fully and openly, as does the Court. 60
Moreover, the adversaries in each case closely scrutinize the information submitted to the Court. A premise of the adversarial system
is that strong advocacy on each side of a dispute '\viii expose the
flaws of the historical material submitted to the Court. If the
Court's historiography is self-serving and, therefore, cannot be relied upon by subsequent Justices or the other branches,61 then one
must concede that the adversarial system works less thari ideally.

2. The Structural Functions of Precedent
Precedents perform two kinds of structural functions. First,
opening legislative sessions with prayer); jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409,
422-44 (1968) (recounting the history of the Congress' power to pass appropriate legislation to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68,
92-123 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting) (providing an appendix detailing the original understanding of incorporation of the Bill of Rights via the Fourt~enth Amendment); see
also LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS POLITICAL PROCESS
45, 115, 186-87 (1988) (showing, inter alia, how the other branches consult precedents
to obtain information on the ways in which past conflicts over foreign affairs have been
resolved). In addition, the Court's choice to join one side in a historical-debate is itself a
matter of historical concern. See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 297. U.S. 1 (1936) (agreeing with Hamilton's rather than Madison's interpretation of tHe Congress' spending
power); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (siqing With Hamilton's
rather than Madison's construction of the Necessary and Proper Clause); see also HAROLD
HoNGJU KoH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CoNSTITUTioN: SHARING PowER AFTER THE IRANCoNTRA AFFAIR 135-49 (1990) (detailing the regularity with which the Court has sided
with the President on separation of powers issues).
58. See infra notes 72-86 and accompanying text (discussing th!! conditions immunizing precedents from overruling).
59. Written history usually is recorded by someone other than the primary historical
actor. For one discussion of the consequences of this, see Akhil R. Amar, Our Forgotten
Constitution: A Bicentennial Comment, 97 YALE LJ. 281 (1987) (observing that the text of
the Constitution we use today is not the actual one originally ratified by the States).
60. On the need for, and practice of, the justices to discuss the reasons for their
judgments, see itifra notes 209 8e 356-59 and accompanying text.
61. See R.G. COLLINGWOOD, THE IDEA OF HISTORY 9-12 (1946) (noting that history
furthers self-knowledge only if it contains the interpretation of evidence; mere recounting of facts is useless); LEO MARX, THE MACHINE IN THE GARDEN 4 (1964) (stressing the
need to understand the relationship between a reader, the text she is trying to interpret,
and the cultures in which she lives and in which the text was·written); Quentin Skinner,
Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas, 8 HIST. THEORY 3, 30-35 (1969) (criticizing the failure of many readers to appreciate the strategies authors employ to disguise
their true meaning); see also Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and tlze Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965
SuP. CT. REv. 119 (criticizing the Court's historiography as having been written solely
for the purpose of supporting results that the justices wanted to reach). But cf. DAVID L.
HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 45, 50 (1977) (suggesting that courts are
better equipped to find "historical" rather than "social" facts).
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precedents help to establish and maintain government operations
and relationships.62 For example, the Court's decisions on separation of powers have defined the relationships among the three
branches of the federal government, 63 and those on the nature of
the rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment have clarified
the relationship between the federal and state governments in certain areas.64
Second, the Court's decisions inform the choices or agendas of
the other branches.65 For example, two precedents set the terms
and illuminated the roles of the elected branches in the recent controversy whether flag burning should be protected as political protest under the First Amendment. No sooner had the Court held in
Texas v. johnson 66 that a state law prohibiting desecration of the flag
violated the First Amendment, than much of the public denounced
the ruling, prompting President Bush to try to overturn it through a
constitutional amendment.67 Congress responded that a constitutional amendment would be premature, and instead tried to draft a
statute that would preserve the flag's integrity without conflicting
withjohnson. Hence, Congress passed a federal statute68 that sought
to protect the flag on a content-neutral basis.69 Mter the Court
struck down the statute in United States v. Eichman, 7° Congress debated, but rejected, the President's renewed proposal to amend the
Constitution. 71 In short, the flagburning dispute shows how the
62. See generally Easterbrook, supra note 18, at 431-32 (maintaining that some precedents can have immutable structural effects on governmental operation); Monaghan,
supra note 7, at 730-34, 749-52 (demonstrating how precedents have shaped governmental structure).
63. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (holding that Congress
may delegate the authority to create mandatory sentencing guidelines to an independent
commission located in the judicial branch); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (upholding Congress' power to delegate to the judiciary the appointment of an independent prosecutor charged with investigating certain high-level executive officials); INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (holding that Congress violated the Presentment and Bicameral Clauses of the Constitution by enacting a one-house veto over the decisions of
certain executive officials); see also Michael]. Gerhardt, The Constitutional Limits to Impeachment and Its Alternatives, 68 TEX. L. REv. 1, 50-65 (1989) (discussing many of the precedents that have laid the foundation for the modern understanding of the separation of
powers).
64. See generally Gerhardt, supra note 29, at 421 & n.50 (describing the precedents
exploring the nature of the rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment).
65. Another function of precedents is reflected in the influence they wield in setting
the Court's own agenda. See supra notes 27-48 and accompanying text.
66. 497 u.s. 397 (1989).
67. President Bush's proposed amendment provided that "The Congress and the
states shall have the power to prohibit the physical desecration of the flag of the United
States." See Tom Kenworthy, Flag Amendment Fails in Decisive House Vote; Year-Long Fight on
Desecration Put to Rest, WASH. PoST, june 22, 1990, at A18.
68. Flag Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-131, 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N (103 Stat.)
777 (providing criminal penalties for desecration of the American flag).
69. But cf. Frank Michelman, Saving Old Glory: On Constitutional Iconography, 42 STAN.
L. REV. 1337, 1339 (1990) (arguing that the statute was an attempt to slow down the
amendment process).
70. 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990) (striking down the federal flag protection statute as content-based regulation of political speech).
71. 136 CoNG. REc. 4035-88 (daily ed.June 22, 1990); 136 CoNG. REc. H400b-29
(daily ed.June 21, 1990); see also Kenworthy, supra note 67 (reporting the House's 254177 defeat of President Bush's proposed amendment). Interestingly,jo/mson framed the
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Court's decisions can shape the elected branches' agendas. 72

3. The Immunization of Precedents from Overruling
Part I thus far has suggested but not yet shown how some precedents become immune to overruling. In fact, there are times when
the Court does not reconsider previously adjudicated issues because
the relevant issues have become practically immutable. Furthermore, there are cases that the Justices decide a particular way because there is a secure ruling on point, even though they might have
decided the question another way had they been doing so in the first
instance.
A precedent does not achieve permanency solely because it performs a historical or structural function. Rather, it achieves such
issue for every government decisionmaker except that of the Eichman dissenters. In writing for the latter, justice Stevens did not show any deference to johnson, nor even try to
distinguish it. In his only reference to johnson, justice Stevens explained that deferring
to it "would not honestly reflect my considered judgment concerning the relative importance of the conflicting interests that are at stake. I remain persuaded that the considerations identified in my [dissenting] opinion in Texas v. johnson are of controlling
importance in this case as well." Eichman, 110 S. Ct. at 2412 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
72. Once they have acted in pursuit of the agendas or choices shaped by the Court's
precedents, the other branches may effectively nullifY or obviate the need for the Court
to revisit those decisions. For example, Congress effectively nullified the specific result
in The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873), through its subsequent
enactment of antitrust legislation in the latter part of the nineteenth and in the early part
of the twentieth centuries, and The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), through its
enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Similarly, after the Court in Goldman v.
Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986), rejected a free exercise challenge to an Air Force
regulation prohibiting the wearing of headgear while jndoors as applied to an orthodox
Jewish officer who was disciplined for wearing a yarmulke, Congress passed a law that
provides: "[A] member of the armed forces may wear an item of religious apparel while
wearing the uniform of the member's armed forces [unless] the wearing of the item
would interfere with the performance of the member's military duties [or] the item of
apparel is not neat and conservative." Yet another example is Congress' passage of
legislation to prohibit third-party searches of newspapers, Privacy Protection Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-440, 94 Stat. 1879 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000aa to 2000aa-12
(1988)), a practice the Court had upheld in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 55053 (1978}. For further discussion of how the political branches can take action to buttress (rather than undermine) precedents, see infra notes 73-87 and accompanying text.
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status when its structural function combines with its age (or historical purpose), 73 social or institutional reliance,74 or political acceptance. 75 Although these factors do not all need to apply
simultaneously for precedents to become secure, immutability is
most likely to result when all three apply.
For example, all three elements have helped to insulate The Legal
Tender Cases 76 from reconsideration. The decision is over one hundred years old; financial and other important social institutions have
been built on expectations that decision will not be overruled; and,
even though it has been criticized as a deviation from original understanding, 77 it has been accepted by a wide range of political interests such that there is no well-organized political force working to
undo it. 78 It is hard to conceive of circumstances in which the Court
would even consider overruling it.
When all three factors do not apply simultaneously, the most important source of permanence is institutional reliance based on
political acceptability (or at least on the absence of any serious political opposition). The precedents upholding the New Deal79 and the
73. The combination of structure and age can be seen as the intersection between
structural and historical functions. Indeed, it is rare for history standing alone to immunize a precedent from reconsideration. Cf. Kronman, supra note 54 (arguing for greater
deference to precedents because we are obligated to, and constrained by, the past and
because we want later generations to show respect for our judgments).
74. See BoRK, supra note 12, at 155-59 (suggesting that substantial institutional reliance on a precedent can protect it from overruling even if it deviated from original
understanding); Cooper, supra note 12, at 409-10 (suggesting that institutional reliance
is the only justification for following a precedent that conflicts with original understanding); Easterbrook, supra note 18, at 431 (discussing legislative and administrative reliance as a powerful factor in immunizing a precedent from overruling).
75. See BERGER, supra note 12, at 412-13 (conceding that precedents that at one time
should have been properly overruled as wrongly decided become entitled to recognition
as authoritative after the passage of enough time and after the citizenry has come to rely
on them); see also Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfoct Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353, 382
(1981) (noting the role expectations should play in mitigating the degree to which original intent should control constitutional decisions).
76. Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871) (upholding the constitutionality of
paper money), overruling Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1870) (holding it
unconstitutional to make paper money legal tender for antecedent debts).
77. See BORK, supra note 12, at 156-57; Cooper, supra note 12, at 410; Kenneth W.
Dam, The Legal Tender Cases, 1981 SuP. CT. REv. 367, 389.
78. But all three factors did not prevent the Court from eventually reconsidering
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 {1896), discussed in more detail at irifra notes 143-48
and accompanying text, or from rendering several decisions, see infra note 80, upholding
congressional legislation effectively nullifying The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 {1883).
The nullification of these two well-established precedents not only caused profound social disruption but also demonstrated the Court's willingness to buck considerable criticism for the sake of endorsing certain values. The critical thing to keep in mind,
however, is that during the substantial period of time that passed prior to their nullifications, support for those decisions diminished and opposition to those decisions increasingly developed social and political respectability and power.
79. See, e.g.• Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. Ill {1942) (upholding federal legislation
regulating the production of wheat for personal consumption on the family farm); NLRB
v.jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. I (1937) {upholding the constitutionality of
the National Labor Relations Act); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 {1937)
(upholding state regulation of minimum wage laws for women); Nebbia v. New York,
291 U.S. 502 (1934) (upholding New York's regulation of milk prices).
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Great Society8° exemplify this poin_t, because they have become immune to reconsideration even though they are less than half as. old
as The Legal Tender Cases. These <lecisions were secured by reasonably swift81 and sufficiently widespread political support for New
Deal and Great Society programs, despite ongqing academic skepticism about the legitimacy of the relevant precedents82 and the opposition of some politicalleaders.83 Today, these precedents form
the bedrock of the administrative state, which is so well entrenched
that it could be done away with only by constitutional revolution.
The failure to overrule precedents that initially were controversial84 has not turned simply on the perceived correctness of, or on
the degree of textual support for, those decisioi'ls.85 Rather, the .
permanency of such decisions has rested on the degree to which
initially hostile political forces cease to have much influence.B 6 The
longer such groups take to weaken a Court ruling, the greater
80. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (upholding Congress'
amendment of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 allowing citizens of New York-primarily
from Puerto Rico-to vote even though they could not read English); Heart of Atlanta
Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding Congress' power to pass the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 under its Commerce Clause power); Katzenbach v. McClung,
379 U.S. 294 (1964) (holding that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 could be applied, through
the Commerce Clause, to small, local establishments).
·
81. Within ten years of the Supreme Court's endorsement of the New Deal, and
within half a decade of the Court's endorsement of the Great Society, the institutions
that they sanctioned became widely accepted by both Republicans and Democrats. See
Easterbrook, supra note 18, at 431-33 (discussing the degree to which certain precedents
have influenced the structure and agenda of government).
82. See, e.g., Bonx, supra note 12, at 56-61, 129-30, 156 (criticizing the precedents
upholding the New Deal and Great Society as deviating from original understanding);
CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY, 1950-1980 8-9, passim
(1984); Raoul Berger, The Activist Legacy ofthe New Deal Court, 59 WASH. L. REv. 751,75556 (1984) (denouncing various precedents upholding the New Deal for having deviated
from original intent).
83. See, e.g., Sidney Blumentlial, Stirring Populist Emotions for a Country Club Cause,
WASH. PoST, june 2, 1985, at Cl (noting President Reagan's opposition to the programs
comprising President Franklin D. Roosevelt's second New Deal); William]. Eaton, Congressional Liberals Switch to the Offensive, L.A. TIMES, May 1, 1988, Part I, at 1 (describing
President Reagan's fundamental disagreements with, and attacks on, federal programs
spawned by the New Deal and Great Society); jon Margolis, Party Labelsjust Aren't Sticking
to Voters Anymore, CHI. Tn.IB., Aug. 31, 1986, at 1 (observing that the Reagan administration had failed to persuade a majority of lawmakers and their constituents into abandoning New Deal and Great Society policies).
84. Controversy here is measured by the Justices' contemporaneous and subsequent
attitudes toward tlie original precedent, the academic and political reaction to the decision at the time it was decided, and the degree to which lower courts seem to have
1
problems applying or interpreting the· precedent.
.
85. But see Munzer &: Nickel, supra note 49, at 1044 (arguing that the "autliority" of a
precedent depends on its textual support or how well it fits the purpose and meaning of
tlie constitutional text).
'
86. For example, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), became secure
after many soutliern Democrats and Republicans, who had initially resisted it, accepted
it as the law of the land. Similarly, by acquiescing in many of the New Deal and Great
Society programs they initially had opposed, the southern Democrats and Republicans
reduced any political support for criticisms of the precedents upholding them. The
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chance the ruling has to become entrenched. The more entrenched
precedents become, the more difficult it is to undo them. And there
is a point at which precedents can be so ingrained that they become
a permanent baseline for any constitutional dispute about the values
that should guide government operation.87

II.

Precedent as a Source of Indeterminacy in Constitutional
Decisionmaking

Ideally, precedents should contain identifiable rules of law and
have some measurable degree of influence on subsequent decisionmaking. 88 But unless the instant case is on all fours with some prior
decisions, the Justices have significant latitude in how they view, define, and apply the inconsistencies and ambiguities in such prior decisions.89 The Justices may conscientiously disagree over the scope
and reach of a P.rior decision and may even make some decisions
intentionally vague as a result of their conscious choices to gloss
over their differences of opinion for the sake of forming coalitions.
The creation and interpretation of precedents, however, involves
an unavoidable degree of indeterminacy.90 In particular, it is difficult, if not impossible, to predict how the Justices will deal with the
ambiguities in prior decisions, the ideas new Justices get looking at
old decisions, and how those decisions will influence the Justices'
choices of the level of generality at which to state the rule of a case.
Furthermore, it is unclear how the Justices will manage the confusion generated by the Court's use of more than one method to
weaken or bolster its precedents and the uncertainty fostered by the
Republicans also opposed the Court's narrow interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 36 (1873), but later came to embrace that opinion as part of the Party's political
theory of government. For their part, many Democrats initially opposed, but accept
today, the Court's general practice to recognize that the Constitution primarily protects
negative rights, which require the government to refrain from certain conduct, rather
than positive rights, which impose affirmative duties on the government to take actions
or to expend resources to meet the needs of certain citizens. See Gerhardt, supra note
29, at 410.
.
87. Another example of a permanent precedent is Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954), which prohibited the federal government from maintaining segregated public
schools in the District of Columbia on the ground that the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause imposed the same equal protection of the laws concept on the federal government as the Fourteenth Amendment had imposed on the states. Bolling has become
immutable despite the considerable academic and political controversy it has generated.
See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY jUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FouRTEENTii AMENDMENT (1977); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959). Indeed, Bolling has been criticized as recently as 1989 by one of President Reagan's Supreme Court nominees. See BoRK, supra
note 12, at 83-84 (maintaining that no neutral principles can be derived from original
understanding to support the result in Bolling).
88. See Moore, supra note 26, at 359.
89. Precedents are sometimes termed "horizontal" when being reviewed by the
same court issuing them or "vertical" when constraining a lower court obliged to follow
them. Marshall, supra note 18, at 178 n.1; Cooper, supra note 12, at 6. This Part focuses
on the extent to which precedents can "horizontally" constrain the Supreme Court.
90. CJ. LLEWELLYN, supra note 21, at 4, 73-76 (observing that precedents can "liberate" judicial decisionmaking because they inherently contain inconsistencies, which can
be manipulated easily).
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Court's inconsistent explanations for explicit overrulings. These
sources of indeterminacy in dealing with preceden~ have the effect
of enabling the Justices to engage in conscientious disagreements
over the scope of precedents, to consider new or renewed arguments, and to contribute to the evolution of constitutional
doctrine.91

A. Purposeful Versus Unintentionally Indeterminate Precedents
A purposefully indeterminate precedent, difficult as it might be to
spot, results from the Justices' efforts to gloss over their differences
for the sake of creating working mcgorities, or from their conscious
or deliberate choices to leave some constitutional matters unresolved, or both. The larger the coalition on the Court, the more
differences the Justices may have to submerge for the sake of consensus, and the scope or reach of even unanimous opinions may be
ambiguous or vague.
. Brown v. Board ofEducation 92 may be the most famous example of a
purposefully indeterminate precedent. Having taken two years to
write, Brown glossed over the concerns of several of the Justices as to
the historical and textual support for the Court's striking down laws
explicidy mandating racial segregation in public schools.9s Brown
raised more questions than it answered, including the timing and
nature of a remedy, 94 the continued constitutionality of segregation
outside the public school context, and the standards for determining when the States could be held responsible for segregated conditions in public schools.95
Of course, Brown could decide only so much, inevitably leaving
many questions to be resolved and debated later. Indeed, in trying
to dispose of the case before it, the Supreme Court almost always
leaves related, but not identical, issues to be resolved through sub$equent decisionmaking.96 Because there is no way to ensure that
91. See Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and
Neutral Principles, 96 HARv. L. REV. 781, 808-09 (1983) (arguing that the institutional
pressures on the Court to obtain clear majorities undercut the Court's ability to produce
opinions based on the application of neutral principles which the entire majority addresses). The resulting ambiguities can be intentional or accidentaL See, e.g., Vincent
Blasi, The Unanswered Questions of the First Amendment, 33 WM. & MARY L. REv. (forthcoming 1992) (discussing eight questions regarding the central meaning of the First Amendment left unresolved by constitutional adjudication).
92. 347 u.s. 483 (1954).
93. See generally WILLIAM 0. DouGLAS, THE CouRT YEARS: 1939-1975: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF WILUAM 0. DOUGLAS 113-15 (1980) (describing the evolution of Brown and
suggesting that its appearance of unanimity is misleading); KLUGER, supra note 51, at
694-99 (describing the justices' responses to Chiefjustice Warren's draft of Brown).
94. Brown was, however, saving this question for reargument.
95. To be sure, the Court made clear and unequivocal its disapproval of segregation
of public schools. See infra notes 143-48 and accompanying text.
96. For example, the Court has had to address the questions left unanswered or
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later decisions will preclude ambiguities, an inevitable degree of indeterminacy creeps into the Court's decisionmaking. In other
words, vagueness in the scope and reach of the Court's precedents
can exist and pose the same problems for subsequent decisionmaking independently of the Justices' intentions. The next section explores more fully this kind of indeterminacy.

Four Sources of Indeterminate Precedents
1. The Consequences of Substantive Splits on the Court
Judicial decisionmaking imposes pressure to find c9mmon
ground. In some cases, the Justices disagree strongly but can still
find the common ground to state a clear rationale,9 7 but, in other
cases, no clear rule may emerge from the decisionmaking process.
For example, from 1976 through 1990, the substantive differences
of opinion among the Justices prevented them from producing a
clear holding regarding an. affirmative action measure under the
Equal Protection Clause.98 As a practical matter, these decisions
signaled only the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of a specific
B.

unclear by Brown in a number of cases. See Brown v. Board ofEduc. (Brown II), 349 U.S.
294 (1955) (ordering a gradual adjustment to an integrated school system, rather than
immediate integration, and vesting significant discretion in the lower courts); Green v.
County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (holding that a plan allowing a student to choose
her own public school does not constitute adequate compliance with the school board's
responsibility to achieve desegregation when there is a history of intentional segregation
in the school system); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. ofEduc., 402 U.S. 1 (1971)
(holding that the command to desegrate schools does not mean that every school must
reflect the racial composition of the community as a whole, but that busing is permissible if necessary to dismantle a dual school system); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S.
189 (1973) (holding that whenever a policy of intentional segregation is proved with
respect to a portion of a school system, the burden of proving that other schools in the
system were not intentionally segregated falls on the government).
97. Arguably, this was the case in Brown, to the extent that the Court explained that
segregation of the races in public schools violated the Equal Protection Clause because
such segregation negatively stigmatized black children. See KLUGER, supra note 51, at
655-99 (describing the differences of opinion of the justices on the Brown Court, and the
willingness of those justices to suppress those differences to reach a unanimous result);
see also BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SWANN'S WAY: THE SCHOOL BUSING CAsE AND THE SUPREME
CoURT passim (1986) (describing the strong differences of opinion among the justices
over the constitutionality of court-ordered busing that ultimately did not preclude them
from consenting to a clear endorsement of that remedy under certain circumstances).
98. See, e.g., Wygant v.Jackson Bd. ofEduc., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (holding that layoff
provisions of a collective bargaining agreement between a school board and a union
were not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest); Fullilove v. Klutznick,
448 U.S. 448 (1980) (upholding a federal set-aside program to increase minority participation in government contracting); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978) (striking down a medical school admissions program setting aside a specific
number of seats for minorities). Even though there were clear holdings in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (striking down a city program setting
aside thirty percent of its subcontracts for minority businesses), and Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, llO S. Ct. 2997 (1990) (upholding FCC broadcast license issuing policies favoring minority firms), these two cases are not easily reconciled with each other,
or with the Court's previous decisions. See Neal Devins, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
FCC: Requiem for a Heavyweight, 69 TEX. L. REv. 125, 125-35 (1990) (noting that the
Court treated governmental decisions differently in the two cases, depending upon
whether federal or state action was involved); Charles Fried, Comment: Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Two Concepts of Equality, 104 HARV. L. REv. 107 (1990) (noting Aletro
Broadcasting's focus on group rights in direct contrast to Croson "s reliance on an individual rights approach to the Equal Protection Clause).
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Iaw.99 Similarly, no sooner had the Court held in Board of Education
v. Dowell too that federal courts could end their supervision of school
desegregation plans after a school district has eliminated "the vestiges of past discrimination to the extent practicable" then the Court
understandably granted certiorari in Freeman v. Pitts 101 to clarify
w~en a school district has met its duties under a desegregation
order.l 0 2
The ambiguities reflected in these and other cases may be a substitute for an elusive neutrality. For example, even if the Justices
think they have been impartial in using such terms or phrases as
99. Sometimes the seemingly strong feelings among the Justices on certain issues
perhaps can be inferred from fractured majorities. For example, during the 1989 Term,
there were five instances in which a concurring member of the Court provided the critical fifth vote to decide a case and thereby rendered the rationale, and perhaps even the
holding, in the case unclear. See, e.g., United States v. Kokinda, llO S. Ct.-3115, 3125
{1990) (Justice Kennedy's concurrence .in. the judgment provided the fifth vote to uphold
a restriction on solicitation outside a post office}; American Trucking Ass'ns v. Smith,
110 S. Ct. 2323, 2343 {1990) (Justice Scalia providing the crucial fifth vote to strike
down an Arkansas highway tax under the Commerce Clause); Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n, llO S. Ct. 2281, 2293 (1990) (Justice Marshall providing
the crucial fifth vote to strike down certain restrictions on attorney credentialing as violative of the First Amendment); Burnham v. Superior Court, 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990) (in
which justice Scalia wrote a plurality opinion on transient jurisdiction, commanding only
two other votes, while Justice White concurred in J?art and in the judgment and five
other Justices concurred only in the judgment); North Dakota v. United States, 110 S.
Ct. 1986, 1999 {1989) (Justice Scalia providing the crucial fifth vote to uphold under the
Twenty-first Amendment North Dakota laws regulating liquor sold to military bases
within the state).
At other times, the strong feelings among the justices may not preclude a clear ruling
but rather lead to intemperate language. For example, in Burnham v. Superior Court,
110 S. Ct. 2105, 2117-19 (1990),Justice Scalia inserted into his plurality opinion a gratuitous section in which he uncharitably attacks Justice Brennan's dissent, commenting,
for example, that "one can marvel at justice Brennan's assertion." In addition, in
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 n.2, 124 n.4, 126 n.5, 127 n.6 {1989),Justice
Scalia caustically comments on four occasions that he has no idea what justice Brennan
is arguing. Several otherJustices have also demonstrated a harsh and intolerant tone for
their colleagues on the Court. See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S.
490, 538, 559-60 (1989) (Blackmun,j., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (claiming that the plurality had "gone about [its] business in ••• a deceptive fashion •••• (and
had invited] charges of cowardice and illegitimacy"); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742,
781 {1982) (O'Connor,j •• concurring in part and dissenting in part) {suggesting that the
majority's analysis of law was an "absurdity"). See generally Brenda j. Quick, Whatever
Happened to Respec!ful Dissent?, 77 A.B.A.]. 62 (1991) (discussing the justices• increasing
tendency to berate each other).
100. 111 S. Ct. 630, 638 (1991).
101. ll1 S. Ct. 949 (1991), granting cerL to 887 F.2d 1438 (lith Cir. 1989).
102. Yet another example of substantive splits on the Court precluding a clear rationale or rule is the Court's approach to obscenity cases from 1967 to 1973. During those
years the Court's inability to articulate a definition of obscenity that could command the
allegiance of the majority created chaos. In Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967),
the Court began the practice of per curiam reversals of convictions for the sale or exhibition of materials that at least five members of the Court, applying their separate tests,
deemed to be obscene. The Court disposed of some 31 cases in this fashion from 1967
·
to 1973.
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"neutral" state action, "innocent whites," or "benign racial discrimination," other Justices (as well as other people) may debate
whether these terms or phrases are justifiable, and disagree as to
what they imply, including whether they reflect the speaker's or
writer's unconscious attitudes about race and racism in American
society. 103 Others may suspect that something more is going on
than the opinions suggest arid try to dissect them to uncover the
values truly underlying them. The perspectives with which others
on the Court read what the Justices say often can dictate subsequent
debates over the use of the terms or phrases used in various opinions. Thus, the Justices often leave uncertainty over the scope of
the precedents they have made by relating disputes in ways that
other Justices believe do not disclose fully the actual underlying reasons or values.

The Difficulties of Determining the Level of Generality at which to
State the Rule of a Case
Precedents contain two elements that contribute to the flux in, or
the unpredictability of, constitutional decisionmaking. First, precedents contain ambiguous terms or principles that can leave a wide
scope of choices because Justices acting later can deal with the ambiguities in ways that state a desired principle or reach a desired result
while claiming fidelity to the precedent. Second, precedents can
prompt, generate, or be the source of ideas on which later Courts
can build constitutional doctrine. Because there is no way to predict
who future Justices will be or how they may interpret the ambiguities or develop the ideas in precedents, there is inevitably substantial uncertainty over the direction of constitutionallaw. 104
2.

103. Scholars debate the degree to which the language used in debates on affirmative
action reflects unconscious attitudes about race and racism in American society. See, e.g.,
Derrick Bell, The Supreme Court, 1984 Term-FfJTewfJTd: The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99 HARV.
L. REv. 4, 76-77 (1985) (criticizing "formal equality" and color-blind adjudication as
methods of protecting white control over the black struggle for meaningful equality);
Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987) (arguing that a symbolic message test is superior to
the current discriminatory intent test for determining equal protection violations because the former can root out unconscious racism); Thomas Ross, Innocence and A.ffinnative Action, 43 VAND. L. REv. 297 (1990) (suggesting that the rhetoric surrounding
affirmative action conceals a strong undercurrent of unconscious racism).
104. Some uncertainty about the meaning of precedents is inherent in the interpretation of legal texts. The interpretive process is the broad enterprise of trying to assign
meanings or underlying intentions or understandings to the documents being read. But
see Moore, supra note 26, at 284 (suggesting the interpretive process consists solely of
the application of the law to the facts). The interpretive process is unpredictable because there are no universally accepted rules for interpreting the ambiguities, gaps. and
contradictions inherent in every legal text, and because, even if there were such rules,
they too would be texts subject to interpretation. See Stanley Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36 STAN.
L. REv. 1325, 1326-32 (1984); Michaelj. Gerhardt, Interpreting Bork, 75 CORNELL L. REV.
1358, 1365-71 (1990) (book review) (discussing the inherent difficulties in interpreting
legal texts).
The degree to which constitutional decisionmaking is inevitably indeterminate is not,
however, as a practical matter, boundless. To preserve the rule oflaw, some commentators have argued that it is necessary to have a structure to assign at least a range of
meanings to a legal dispute at some point in the adjudicative process. Consequently, the
Constitution recognizes an authoritative reader of the Constitution in the form of the
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The latitude that subsequent Justices might have in defining the
scope of ambiguously phrased precedents is similar to the wellknown difficulties in searching for original understanding. Originalists argue that judges should enforce a constitutional provision according to its original understanding.l 05 Originalists maintain that
the relevant understanding to constitutional interpretation is not
the Framers' specific views regarding particular co~stitutional issues
but rather the general understanding of the public at the time of the
framing and ratification of the constitutional text in question.l 06
Although originalists usually agree that the critical question is the
level of generality at which the judge chooses to state the intent of
the Framers and ratifiers, 107 they often disagree on how to specifY
the appropriate level of understanding in a particular case. In a recent article, Professor Michael Perry explains that the inquiries of
even a "sophisticated originalist"'into the original meaning and into
how to specifY in a particular case "the principle that represents the
relevant aspect of the original meaning" are indeterminate, subject
to different readings depending upon the Justice or theorist's particular moral or political judgments of a good society and of the
Court's role in our political system.tos
The interpretation of precedents involves a similar process. In
trying to determine the extent to which some prior decision points
to a definite resolution ofhow the justices should decide the case in
front of them, they too must choose the appropriate level of generality at which to state the rule of law embodied in the original decision.109 But once the Justices depart from the specific facts or
Supreme Court, which embodies its pronouncements in precedents that are handed
down to guide the lower courts, the rest of the legal community, and subsequent generations and justices. Compare Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV.
739, 740 (1982) (suggesting that a conceptualization of the judicial role and a hierarchy
of constitutional decisionmakers may ensure objective interpretation) with Sanford Levinson, lAw as Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 373,401-02 (1982) (suggesting that the cooperative framework, which Fiss sees as protecting objective interpretation, does not exist
within the judicial system).
105. See generally BoRK, supra note 12, at 139-40.
106. See id. at 144.
107. See id. at 149.
108. Michael J. Perry, The Legitimacy of Particular Conceptions of Constitutional Interpretation, 77 VA. L. REV. 668,715 (1991). Many critics oforiginalism maintain, however, that
as long as it is permissible to ignore the actual, specific opinions of the Framers and
ratifiers, and instead rely on general principles, the choice of a general principle depends on the interpreter or theorist's construction of a fi~tion. As Professor Dworkin
has stated: "[T]here is no such thing as the intention of the Framers waiting to be discovered, even in principle. There is only some such thing waiting to b'e invented." Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 477 (1981).
109. See Scalia, supra note48, at 1179 (suggesting that a critical task for each justice is
to determine the appropriate level of generality at which to state a rule of law); see also
LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DoRF, ON READING TIJE CONSTITUTION 71-73 (1991)
(indicating that the level of generality in precedents often "is where the battle for constitutional meaning is joined"); Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in
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rationale of a precedent, they are in a position to reshape its ambiguities and tensions beyond the original configurations of that precedent. The Justices' efforts to define the scope of the rule of law
set forth in a prior opinion illustrate that precedents can often open
rather than close the range of choices for subsequent Courts to
make.ll 0
The ideas used in precedents can become the seeds of doctrine
seemingly unimportant to the initial case but of such importance to
a subsequent Court as to overshadow the specific ruling in the original decision. Constitutional adjudication develops in part through
subsequent Justices' scanning precedents for concepts and principles that can resolve present controversies. 111 In this sense, precedents serve as the repository for ideas on which future Justices can
build constitutional doctrine.
Perhaps the most prominent example of this aspect of constitutional decisionmaking is United States v. Carotene Products. 112 Carotene
Products held that state laws restricting the transportation of filled
milk across state lines violated the Commerce Clause. But the case
is litde remembered for its facts or holding. Carotene Products has
had its greatest impact on modern equal protection jurisprudence
through the ways subsequent Justices have interpreted its fourth
footnote, which suggested that the Equal Protection Clause might
the Definition ofRights, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1057 (1990) (exploring the problem of trying to
determine the appropriate level of generality at which to construe broad constitutional
language arguably protecting implied fundamental rights).
110. For example, in FCC v. League ofWomen Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984),Justices
Brennan and Rehnquist argued over the extent to which Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983), should have controlled. Justice Brennan read Regan as
holding that Congress could choose, under its spending power, not to subsidize lobbying activities of tax-exempt charitable organizations by prohibiting those groups from
using tax-deductible contributions to support their lobbying efforts, but only if the statute provided the organizations some method to separate tax-deductible funds from nondeductible funds. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 399-400. Justice Rehnquist read
Regan as holding that "a legislature's decision not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe the right," so that Congress could absolutely bar organizations receiving federal funds from editorializing. Id. at 405-07 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Regan, 461 U.S. at 549). Subsequently, ChiefJustice Rehnquist relied on this latter language from Regan in his opinion for the Court in Rust v. Sullivan,
Ill S. Ct. 1759, 1763 (1991) (upholding federal regulations prohibiting counseling
services that receive federal funds from mentioning abortion).
Another recent example of a disagreement over the proper reading and application of
a precedent is County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, Ill S. Ct. 1661 (1991), in which
Justices O'Connor and Scalia disagreed over the definition of the term "promptly" as
used by the Court in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 125 (1975), to hold that officials
must provide for a probable cause hearing "either before or promptly after [the] arrest"
of a suspect. Justice O'Connor suggested that a judicial determination of"promptness"
was sufficient to satisfy the Gerstein standard, Riverside, Ill S. Ct. at 1670, while Justice
Scalia argued that tradition and current state practices suggested that "promptly" meant
within 24 hours; id. at 1676-77 (Scalia,J., dissenting).
111. In constitutional law, chronology of decision is of major significance, regardless
of whether the order results from happenstance or from the Court's conscious choices in
setting its agenda. The order in which decisions are made underlies the development of
the common law and constitutional doctrine. See generally WELLINGTON, supra note 11,
passim (arguing that the Supreme Court should continue to interpret the Constitution by
common law principles, evolving its views over time and grounding them in experience).
112. 304 u.s. 144 (1938).
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protect "discrete and insular minorities" from adverse state ·regulations.113 This footnote planted the idea that subsequent Courts developed into the doctrine that effectively granted different levels of
protection under the Equal Protection Clause for different groups,
depending on the relative degree of their powerlessness.ll4
The major difference in the debates over the levels of generality at
which to state rules of decision or original understanding is that
judges can all agree on the authority of-precedents as a source of
decisionmaking whereas they may not agree on the degr~e to which
original understanding should constrain what they do. With the
possible exception of the Supreme Court; all players in the legal
system are bound mox:e stringently by a Supreme Court decision
than they are bound by original understanding. This difference
stems from the relatively strong respect for the Supreme Court as a
critical interpreter of the Constitution itself, 115 as compared to the
lesser degree of respect among judges and scpplars for, or consensus on, the Framers' understanding of the constitutional text. 116
This difference in the debates over the level of generality at which
. 1i3. Id. at 152 n.4; see afro J.M. Balkin, The Footnote, 83'NW. U. L:REv. 275, 281-82
(1989) (suggesting that footnote four has taken on far greater significance than tlie original holding of the case, despite the irony that the Co~rt's dramatic message regarding
marginalization was itself marginalized into ·a footnote to the text of the opinion). Another prominent example of this phenomenon is Near v. Minnesota ex reL Olson, 283
U.S. 697 (1931), which has come to be genera!ly regarded as the first case holding prior
restraints presumptively invalid. In fact, Near involved a slightly different question. In
Near, the Court struck down the Minnesota Gag La\v authorizing a permanent injunction
against any person engaged in the business of regularly publishing a "malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper." Id. at 702. Although the Supreme Court reversed
the Minnesota Supreme Court's affirmation of a permanent injunction against the publication of the Saturday Press, the letter's publisher, Jay Near, was not under a true prior
restraint. First, there was no licensor whose approval needed to be obtai~ed prior to the
publication. Second, there was an adversarial, not an ex parte, proceeding prior to any
determination. Third, the Gag Law 'was aimed at providing a remedy for those libel
plaintiffs suing impecunious publishers.
.
114. See jOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST! A THEORY OF jUDICIAL REVIEW 7577; 135-79 (1980) (explaining the relationship between footnote four and the theory of
representation-reinforcement); Biilkin, supra note 113, at 301 (suggesting that, even
when not invoked, the footnote can provide support for virtually all contemporary due
process and equal protection decisions). But see Louis Lusky, Footnote Redux: A Carolene
Products Reminiscence, 82 CoLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1100-05 (1982) (asserting that much of
the. theoretical and judicial reliance on the footnote is based on overbroad or erroneous
interpretations of its meaning).
115. See supra note 53.
116. Indeed,' the Justices themselves talk about respect for precedents in a way that
they do not talk about original understanding. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct.
2597, 2609 (1991) ("Stare decisis is the preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development oflegal principles, fosters reliance on
judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial
process."); see afro Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,
476 U.S. 747,786-87 (1986) (White,J., dissenting) (stating that "stare decisis is essential if
case-by-case adjudication is to be reconciled with the principle of the rule of law, for
when governing legal standards are open to revision in every case, deciding cases becomes a mere exercise ofjudicial will, with arbitrary and unpredictable re~ults").
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to state the rule of a case and original understanding has operational consequences for the ways the Justices treat precedents and
original understanding. First, every court of law, including the
Supreme Court, tries to reconcile its present decision with at least
some precedents, whereas references in judicial decisionmaking to
original understanding are less common. 117 The courts give more
widespread deference to and discuss precedents more often than
original understanding. Second, everyone agrees on what the text
of a precedent is (if not what it means), though there is extensive
dispute over which components of original understanding are relevant to judicial decisionmaking. 118 Any lawyer knows where to find
the text of a specific decision, whereas the same cannot be said for
original understanding.

3.

The Art of Weakening Precedents

The Supreme Court can overturn or othenvise weaken precedents
through explicit overrulings, overrulings sub silentio, or subsequent
decisionmaking that narrows or distinguishes precedents to the
point of practical nullification. 119 Neither the Court nor commentators have discussed fully the reasons for, or consequences of, the
117. Two Supreme Court decisions explicitly endorsing recourse to the framers' intent are Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), and Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S.
{19 How.) 393 (1856). But a more common phenomenon encountered when justices try
to rely on original understanding is reflected in Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680
(1991), in which the majority split over the degree to which the original understanding
showed that "the Eighth Amendment contains no proportionality [of punishment] guarantee." Id. at 2686. On behalf of himself and Chief justice Rehnquist, justice Scalia
found that all relevant historical materials indicated that the framers and ratifiers of the
Eighth Amendment "chose ..• not to include within it the guarantee against disproportionate sentences that some state constitutions contained." Id. at 2696. Justice Scalia
also found that many of the Court's precedents recognized this same principle. I d. at
2699-702.
On behalf of the four dissenters, however,Justice White argued that the evidence was
not "strong enough to come close to proving an affirmative decision against the proportionality component." Id. at 2710 (White,]., dissenting) (noting that a plain reading of
the text of the Amendment and the Court's precedents supported the inclusion of a
proportionality principle).
This debate reflects two things. First, the common source of decision in justices
White and Scalia's analysis was precedent. Seqmd, the justices encountered a common
problem limiting the Court's reliance on historical data for its decisions: such data may
often be inconclusive or indeterminate (or at least not overwhelmingly persuasive).
118. Compare WELLINGTON, supra note 11, at 50-60 and Paul Brest, The Misconceived
QJ.lestfor the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REv. 204, 205 (1980); Ronald M. Dworkin,
The Forum ofPrinciple, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 476 {1981) with RichardS. Kay, Adherence to
the Original Intentions in ConstitutionalAcijudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 Nw. U.
L. REv. 226, 230 (1988) and Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evi~ 57 U. CIN. L.
REV. 849, 856-65 (1989).
119. Implicit overrulings or overrulings sub silentio occur when the Court suggests
obliquely or by inference that some precedent(s) may no longer be viable. See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 532 {1989) {Scalia, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment) (suggesting that the Court can overrule precedents either explicitly or sub silentio). Implicit overrulings and distinguishing cases differ in their respective practical effects: an implicitly overruled precedent no longer
controls even the fact situation it initially purported to resolve, while a distinguished
precedent at least retains sufficient vitality to resolve a fact situation identical to that
which it originally settled. Sometimes the Court can cause confusion when the Court
does not make clear whether it is distinguishing or implicitly overruling a precedent.
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Court's choice of one of these methods. By weakening precedents
through inconsistent means, the Court can confuse the public, the
legal community, and subsequent Justices as to the status of, and its
real intentions, regarding such decisions.
There are, however, four interrelated factors that seem to influence the Justices' choice of a method to weaken precedents: {1) the
mood and composition of the Court; (2) the.political climate or timing; (3) the subject matter; and (4) the facts of the case. Although
some combination of these factors is usually at work when the Court
weakex:ts precedents, it is possible to identify situations when at least
one factor applies.

a.

The Effects of the Court's Mood and Composition

Change in personnel on the Court is often the catalyst for overrulings. New Justices may bring novel insights into old issues and
sometimes help to bring about an unforeseen overruling. For example, even though the Court upheld state laws mandating flag
salutes in public schools in Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 120 a
change in personnel contributed to the Court's explicit overruling
of Gobitis three years later in West Virginia Board of Education v.
Bamette. 12 1
For example, the Court generated considerable confusion in a series of decisions involving whether private shopping centers could regulate political speech. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (reversing the conviction of a jehovah's Witness for
distributing religious literature on the premises of a company-owned town); Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968)
(holding that the prohibition of peaceful labor picketing of a store within a shopping
center violated the First Amendment); lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972) (upholding a privately owned shopping center's prohibition of union picketing of a store on
the premises); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (clarifying that Lloyd effectively
had ove~led Logan Valley).
·
120. 310 u.s. 586 (1940).
121. 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). By the time the Court heard Barnette, Chief justice
Hughes and justice McReynolds, both of whom had been in the Gobitis majority, retired
from active service on the Court. justice Stone, who dissented in Gobitis, replaced the
Chief Justice, while Robert jackson and Wiley Rutledge replaced Stone and McReynolds, respectively, as Associate Justices. The new members of the Court, particularly
justice jackson (who wrote for the majority in Barnette), convinced justices Douglas,
Black, and Murphy that intervening events had proven that the political process could
not represent fairly the interests of, or protect, the children of the plaintiffjehovah Witnesses from violence. justices Black and Murphy each wrote separate concurrences to
explain how their views had changed. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 624 (Black,j., concurring); id.
at 644 (Murphy,]., concurring).
Another example of new Justices bringing new insight into old issues is Michelin Tire
Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276 (1976), in which the Court overruled Low v. Austin, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 29 (1871). In Michelin, the Justices decided that the original package
doctrine set forth in Low (providing that all state taxes, however nondiscriminatory, were
void if imposed on foreign imports before the package in which the goods arrived was
broken or before actual sale or use, whichever occurred first) was nonsensical enough to
modem minds to be abandoned.

1991]

99

The Legal Tender Cases 122 offer perhaps an even more dramatic example of an overruling traceable to a change in personnel. In 1870,
the Court ruled 5-3 in Hepburn v. Griswold 123 that paper money was
unconstitutional. In the year following Hepburn, Justice Grier, who
had been in the Hepburn m~ority, resigned and was replaced by Justice Strong, and the Congress added a ninth seat to the Court, filled
by Justice Bradley. In 1871, Justices Strong and Bradley joined the
three Hepburn dissenters (Justices Miller, Swayne, and Davis) in
overruling Hepburn, prompting a heated dissent from Chief Justice
Chase (who had writt~n the Court's opinion in Hepburn) charging,
inter alia, that Hepburn was being overruled under the unprecedented circumstances in which none of the Justices who had participated in Hepburn had been persuaded in the meantime to vote
differently on the constitutionality of paper money, and in which
"the then majority find themselves in a minority on the court." 124
The Legal Tender Cases are only one illustration of the fact that it is
not unusual for Presidents to appoint certain Justices for the purpose of weakening, if not overruling, certain precedents. A vivid
recent example of this phenomenon involves Roe v. Wade. 125 Both
Presidents Reagan and Bush campaigned against Roe, and there has
been widespread expectation that their appointments to the Court
portend the end of Roe. In fact, Presidents Reagan and Bush have
had the opportunity to replace five members of Roe's majority with
their six appointments to the Court.t26 Not surprisingly, in Webster
v. Reproductive Health Services, 127 three of President Reagan's appointees to the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and
Kennedy, voted to abandon Roe's trimester framework for measuring the strength. of the state's interest in regulating abortions. 128
More recently, in R'USt v. Sullivan, 129 Justice Brennan's replacement,
Justice Souter, cast the crucial fifth vote to uphold federal regulations prohibiting counseling services receiving federal funds from
mentioning abortions. Both Webster and Rust have narrowed public
access to abortions and have increased the States' ability to regulate
abortion. 130
Similarly, Presidents Reagan and Bush both campaigned on the
122. Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871), overruling Hepburn v. Griswold, 75
U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1870).
123. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1870).
124. Knox, 79 U.S. at 572 (Chase, CJ., dissenting).
125. 410 u.s. 113 (1973).
126. President Reagan nominated Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, and
Anthony Kennedy to replace Justices Potter Stewart, William Rehnquist, and Lewis Powell, respectively; President Reagan also nominated justice Rehnquist to replace Chief
Justice Warren Burger. President Bush nominated David Souter to replace justice William Brennan and Clarence Thomas to replace Justice Thurgood Marshall. Chiefjustice
Burger and Justices Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, and Powell had been in the m~ority in
Roe, see id., while then-:Justice Rehnquist had dissented in Roe. Id. at 171 (Rehnquist,j.,
dissenting).
127. 492 u.s. 490 (1989).
128. /d. at 516-21.
129. 111 S. Ct.1759 (1991).
130. See, e.g., Rust, Ill S. Ct. at 1784·86 (Blackmun,j., dissenting); n~bster, 492 U.S.
at 537-38, 539 n.l, 554-56 (Blackmun,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

100

(VOL.

60:68

The Role of Precedent
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

I•

need to appoint federaljudges who would be tougher on criminals,
and, in three of the more important criminal procedure cases from
the 1990 Term, their appointees to the Court cast the decisive votes
to cut back or narrow the rights of criminal defendants. For example, in Payne v. Tennessee, 131 President Reagan's and Bush's appointees to the Court uniformly agreed to join Justice White in
overruling two recent precedents barring the admission of victim
impact statements in the sentencing phase of capital trials. In
Harmelin v. Michigan, 1s2 the five-member majority, all of whom had
been appointed by Presidents Reagan and Bush, agreed either to
overrule or severely narrow a prior precedent applying proportionality of punishment analysis to noncapital criminal sentences. In addition, in Arizona v. Fulminante, 133 Presidents Reagan and Bush's
appointees again joined to implicitly overrule a prior ruling that automatically invalidated the criminal conviction of a defendant whose
coerced confession had been admitted into evidence:·
·
In all of these cases-Webster,' 'Rust, Payne, Fulmi~ante, and Harmelin-spirited dissents charged the majorities ~th not having sufficiently important and nonpolitic~ reasons for cutting back on prior
decisions and for not deciding cases inctemen~ally.l34 Ironically,
the conventional complaint about the W~rren Court's numerous decisions overruling precedents is really a complaint about the Justices' failure to adopt a common law approach to constitutional
adjudication, under which the Justices could have built upon their
predecessors' experience and re~soning while maintaining a healthy
degree of stability and continuity in constitutioncil.law. 185
When overrulings have been made possible only as the result of
131. 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991), overruling South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805
(1989) and Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
·
132. Ill S. Ct. 2680 (1991) (practically nullifying the Court's prior decision in Solem
v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983}).
.
133. 11 i S. Ct. 1246 (1991) (holding that the admission of a coerced confession does
not require automatic reversal of a criminal conviction, thereby partially reversing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (I967)). Justice Souter also·cast the critical fifth vote in
Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991}, nullifying the Court's prior decision in
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (striking down a mandatory life sentence without
parole), and he was a member of the six-person majority in Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S.
Ct. 2597 (1991), which reversed Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, and Booth, 482 U.S. 496.
134. See, e.g., Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2619-25 (Marshall,J., dissenting) (accusing the majority of departing from an established precedent without "special justification"); Rust,
Ill S. Ct. at 1786 (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (The "majority [opinion] disregards established principles of law and contorts this· Court's decided cases to arrive at its preordained result."); Hannelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2709-19 (White,J., dissenting) (arguing that
the majority's decision effectively nullified a number of past cases without providing
adequate justification for doing so); Webster, 492 U.S. 490, 552 (I989) (Blackmun,.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (describing the majority's decision as " 'it-isso·because-we-say-so' jurisprudence," substituting brute force for reasoning).
I35. See generally supra notes II, 24 & Ill and accompanying text (discussing the common law approach to constitutional adjudication).
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the participation of new Justices, the new Justices are particularly
susceptible to charges that they have abandoned the doctrinal approach to constitutional adjudication for no good (or new) reason,
and they instead have exercised raw power to reject prior experience in favor of ruling in conformity with their political preferences.136 At least for the time being, this charge seems to have
some merit because President Reagan's and Bush's appointees to
the Court have strong conservative ideologies and have thus far
generally followed them in voting to overrule or narrow several
precedents conflicting with those ideologies.I37
But changes in the composition of the Court do not, of course,
invariably produce overrulings. Even though new Justices might
have decided some precedents differently in the first instance, they
begrudgingly may accept certain precedents as a permanent baseline, 138 which, under certain circumstances, may even compel them
to expand those decisions. For example, Minnick v. Mississippi 139
surprised many critics expecting the Rehnquist Court to curtail Edwards v. Arizona 140 and Miranda v. Arizona, 141 which had restricted
police interrogation of criminal suspects whose legal counsel were
not present throughout questioning. In fact, the Court expanded
Edwards and Miranda by establishing a bright~line rule that once a
detained suspect declines to talk to police without a lawyer, the police can never thereafter initiate questioning without the suspect's
attorney present.I42
136. See, e.g., Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2619 (Marshali,J., dissenting) ("Power, not reason,
is the new currency of this Court's decisionmaking.•.• Neither the law nor the facts
supporting Booth and Gathers underwent any change in the last four years. Only the
personnel of this Court did."); id. at 2627 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Today's majority
has obviously been moved by an argument that has strong political appeal but no proper
place in a reasoned judicial opinion.").
137. See Guido Calabresi, What Clarence Thomas Knows, N.Y. TIMES, july 28, 1991, at
15 (criticizing the Court for following a "statist" ideology to enhance the power of government at the expense of individual liberty and, thus, to engage in behavior inconsistent with "what a judicious moderate, or even conservative, judicial body should do").
138. See supra notes 73-87 and accompanying text (providing a general discussion of
some of the conditions that immunize certain precedents from being overruled).
139. Ill S. Ct. 486 (1990).
140. 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (holding that once an accused requests counsel, officials
may not reinitiate questioning until counsel has been made available to him).
141. 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that police must terminate interrogation of an accused in custody if the accused requests the assistance of counsel).
142. See Ill S. Ct. 486 (1990). But cJ. McNeil v. Wisconsin, Ill S. Ct. 2204 (1991)
(holding that neither the Fifth nor the Sixth Amendment prohibits police ~rom questioning a man jailed for an armed robbery about an unrelated murder charge without his
lawyer in the robbery case present). In two recent decisions, the Court has expanded
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits prosecutors from using peremptory challenges to strike black jurors on the basis
of their race). See Edmondson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Ill S. Ct. 2077 (1991) (holding that private lawyers in civil cases cannot exclude potential jurors because of their
race); Powers v. Ohio, Ill S. Ct. 1364 (1991) (holding that under the Equal Protection
Clause a criminal defendant may object to race-based exclusions of jurors effected
through peremptory challenges whether or not the defendant and the excluded jurors
are the same race).
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b.

The Court's Sensitivity to Current Political Mores

.

The justices may be sensitive to the social disruption and political
backlash that explicit overrulings might produce, and consequently
opt for something less than an oytright overruling of a prec;edent
·with which they disagree. In some significant ways, Brown v. Board of
Education 143 illustrates this kind of sensitivity. The Court delayed
oral argument in Brown until after the 1952 presiqeq.~al election to
avoi.d having Brown become an issue in the election.l 4 4 More important, Brown did not explicitly overrule Plessy v. Ferguson, 145 in which
the Court upheld segregation of the races in public transportation
as long as the separate facilities were equal. Rather, the Court in
Brown implicitly abandoned its prior pJ;actice of allowing separate
but equal facilities in public education, with the effects of (1) partially deflecting controversy over precisely how much the Court
would undo segregation outside the public school context; (2) adhering to the Court's practice of issuing sepat?-te lines of decision
on segregation in public schools and in other areas such as public
transportation; 146 and (3) suggesting that the stigma from segregation in education had more severe, immediate, and lasting consequences on its victims than those on the victims of segregation in
other areas.l4 '1 In short, the ·writing of Brown reflects many of the
Justices' concerns about the propriety of overruling Plessy while at
the same time taking a stand against segregation in public
•
education. 148
143. 347 u.s. 483 (1954).
·
144. See KLUGER, supra note 51, at 539.
145. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). But cJ. Israel, supra note 25, at 214 n.15 (suggesting that
Brown overruled Plessy).
146. Compare Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (ordering the admission of a
black student to a white law school because there was no substantially equal black law
school in the same state); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Educ., 339
U.S. 637 (1950) (holding unconstitutional a state's practice of admitting a black student
into an all white school but separating him physically from the other students) and Sipuel
v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948) (holding that a state was constitutionally
obliged to provide a black student with an equal legal education) with Henderson v.
United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950) (holding that the rules and practices of a railway to
separate black and white diners violated a provision of the Interstate Commerce Act
prohibiting any railroad from subjecting any person to pr«tiudice) and Buchanan v.
Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (holding that a statute prohibiting blacks from occupying a
residence in a block where the m~ority of the houses were occupied by whitell, and vice
versa, violated the Fourteenth Amendment).
·
147. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493 (acknowledging that "education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments"). Interestingly, in a series of terse per
curiam opinions handed down in the years immediately after Brown, the Court held unconstitutional segregation in a wide \oariety of other public facilities. See, e.g., Gayle v.
Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per curiam) (buses); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S.
879 (1955) (per curiam) (municipal golf courses); Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350
U.S. 877 (1955) (per curiam) (public beaches and bathhouses).
148. Of course, the hesitancy to overrule Plessy was not just a concern about timing.
It also derived from a concern about substance. Indeed, justice Douglas noted in his
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c.

Perennial Controversy as a Deterrent to Explicit Overrulings

In his excellent 1988 study on constitutional stare decisis, Professor Henry Monaghan wondered about, but did not reach any finn
conclusion regarding, the role that precedent should play in the
Court's decisionmaking when ':_judicial closure" is not likely with respect to contested areas of constitutionallaw.l49 Not surprisingly,
precedent seems to be particularly unstable in disputed areas. For
example, in such perennially contested areas of constitutional law as
affirmative action, 15 0 church-state relations, 151 criminal procedure, 152 and hate speech, 158 the Court occasionally has overruled
itself during the past two or three decades but repeatedly has shifted
directions and established new lines of decision by distinguishing
autobiography that had the Court decided Brown when it was first argued in 1952, the
decision would have been 5-4 to uphold Plessy. DouGLAS, supra note 93, at 113.
149. See Monaghan, supra note 7, at 746.
150. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (listing recent affirmative action precedents and noting the perennial division of the Court on the issue).
151. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's consistently inconsistent Establishment Clause jurisprudence).
152. Compare supra note 35 and accompanying text (listing certain expansive Warren
Court precedents left untouched by the Burger and Rehnquist courts) with notes 38-41
and accompanying text (discussing the Court's willingness to revisit many criminal procedure precedents).
153. Although the Court has recently agreed to hear R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 111 S.
Ct. 2795 (1991) (granting certiorari to consider whether a city ordinance violates the
First Amendment by criminalizing the use of symbols, graffiti, or other objects that
would arouse "anger, alarm, or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed,
religion or gender"), it has been unclear whether the government may regulate offensive
expression directed at, and harmful to, the status of certain social groups. For example,
not everyone agrees that New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), implicitly
overruled Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 251 (1952), in which the Court upheld a
"group libel" statute that criminalized the speech of any person who "exposes the citizens of any race, color, creed or religion to contempt." See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323, 342-43 (1974); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964). Yet the
Court has relied on Beauharnais on at least two occasions. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers
Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984) (citing Beauharnais to show that some
content-based regulation of speech is permissible); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747,
763-64 {1982) (citing Beauharnais as an example of one type of speech that is not protected by the First Amendment). Moreover, Beauharnais is a source of much of the growing commentary favoring regulations of racist and sexist hate speech. See, e.g., Richard
Delgado, Legal Theory: Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in Collision, 85 Nw.
U. L. REv. 343, 376 {1991) (arguing that Beauharnais may remain a viable source of authority for regulating hate speech); Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go:
Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE LJ. 431,464 n.120 (acknowledging "compelling arguments ... for the continued viability of Beauharnais") (citation omitted).
In addition, the Court held that fighting words are not constitutionally protected in
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), which the Court subsequently narrowed in Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 133-34 (1974) (stating that words
conveying or intended to convey disgrace do not necessarily constitute fighting words);
Plummer v. City of Columbus, 414 U.S. 2, 3 (1973) (per curiam) (striking down as overbroad a statute prohibiting a person from abusing another by using menacing, insulting,
slanderous, or profane language); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 522-24 (1972)
{striking down as overbroad a statute that prohibited people from using insulting language that tended to breach the peace against another). For a further illustration of the
confusion in the case law on hate speech, compare Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15
(1971) {holding that a state could not prohibit the use of profanity expressed as part of a
message critical of·government) with FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978)
{holding that the government could prohibit using certain words on the radio through
reasonable content-neutral regulations}.
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precedents (sometimes on dubious bases). These "fluctuations suggest that agreement even about the basic concepts has been so unlikely in these areas that consensus on something as extreme as an
explicit overruling is even rarer. Thus, there is no guarantee that
the changes in these four areas represent anything more than the
continuation, rather than the resolution, of the underlying political
and legal conflicts.
As a normative matter, though, it is important to understand the
benefits and the costs of continued instability in certain areas of constitutional law. The principal benefits are: first, some groups might
feel as if they are part of an ongoing debate in the Supreme Court
on the issues involved; and second, the Court appears sensitive to
the social consequences of doctrinal shifts in these areas and to new
arguments and the lessons of history.
The costs of instability in persistently contested areas of constitutional law, however, affect both the Court and the citizenry. First,
the Court might appear indecisive or incapable of asserting a lasting
leadership role in resolving these tough questions. Second, the
Court's fluctuations create uncertainty in many people about their
individual rights in these areas. This uncertainty can be particularly
problematic because these four areas-affirmative action, churchstate relations, criminal procedur!e, hate speech-involve some of
the most intimate and sensitive ways people interact with their
government.
A particularly controversial example of a case ill1;1strating the costs
of the Court's failure to reach 'judicial closure" is Roe v. Wade.t54
Whatever th.e merits of Roe, it has never stabilized; from the beginning it has been criticized by a wide spectru~ of politicians and
scholars, 155 and has been the subject of constant challenges. In re-.
cent years, the Court formally has rejected invitations to overrule
Roe, 1~6 even while gradually dissecting it. 157 Indeed, this incremental dismantling is precisely the fate that Justice Scalia predicted for
Roe in spite of his own statec:\ .preference to explicitly overrule the
154. 410 u.s. 113 (1973).
155. Critics on the right include RoBERT BORK, supra note 12, at 111-17; and Michael
W. McConnell, The Role ofDemocratic Politics in Transfonning Moral Convictions into Law, 98
YALE LJ. 1501, 1539-41 (1989) (book review). Critics on the left include MICHAEL].
PERRY, MoRALITY, PoLITics, AND l..Aw 172-78 (1988); ARcHIBALD Cox, THE RoLE oF THE
SUPREME CoURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 113-14 (1976); and john H. Ely, The Wages of
Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE LJ. 920 (1973).
156. See Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991); Webster v. Reproductive Health
Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989); Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 772 (1986); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health,
Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 419-20 (1983).
157. See supra notes 125-30 and i1![ra notes 218-27 and accompanying text (describing
many of the precedents arguably narrowing Roe).
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decision. I 58
It is difficult to see much of an upside to Roe's prolonged instability. Most of the people involved in the public and legal debate
about Roe's future feel strongly about the need for the Court (1) to
protect women's unfettered discretion to make decisions about what
to do with their bodies, (2) to restore an important principle of federalism under which the elected branches assume the responsibility
for regulating or permitting abortions, or (3) to recognize abortion
as the moral equivalent of murder. 159 Moreover, the uncertainty
about Roe's future raises profound questions about precedent: are
the reasons for Roe's instability unique, and, if so, why. Alternatively, if Roe's fate is not unusual, to what extent can people ever feel
secure that the Court will adhere to its rights-granting decisions.
Whatever happens to Roe, its fate will serve as an excellent illustration of the problems that controversial precedents can cause for
the Court. Roe's subsequent judicial treatment has been and will
continue to be a microcosm of how a number of themes involving
precedent interact, including changes in the Court's personnel, substantive differences of opinion over the merits of a decision, the influence of politics and public opinion, and the consequences of not
having judicial closure on a significant social problem. 160

d.

Weakening Precedents Through Distinctions

A common way to determine the scope of a rule oflaw announced
by the Court is to test the degree to which it can or should control
factual situations similar to, but not precisely the same as those in
the original decision. It is routine for the Court to develop or probe
a constitutional principle through a series of similar identical cases.
Sometimes this kind of decisions can set the stage for explicit
158. Webster, 492 U.S. at 537 (Scalia,]., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Of course, Justice Marshall's departure from the Court makes it more likely that
Roe could be overruled rather than eviscerated. But whichever of these two fates is in
store for Roe will depend on the prevailing Justices' attitudes about Roe as a precedent.
Assuming arguendo Justice Scalia's prediction is correct and the Court incrementally
shifts the forum of dialogue about abortion from the federal courts to the legislatures,
then Roe's dismantling would resemble the shifts in other, perennially divisive areas. See
supra notes 35, 43 & 98. It would also resemble the fate of Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45 (1905), whose recognition of an implied fundamental right to contract was displaced by the Court in a series of decisions that ultimately shifted debate about the
propriety of regulating private economic interests from federal court to state legislatures. See generally Cass Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 CoLUM. L. REV. 873 (1987)
(describing Lochner's decline as a precedent but its persistence as an idea). Chiefjustice
Rehnquist routinely has urged the same kind of reasoning-recognizing a right or interest but treating it as not fundamental-in the abortion cases that the Court used to
displace Lochner. See infra note 265.
159. See LAURENCE TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES (1990) (discussing
the difficulty of finding the proper forum for meaningful dialogue about abortion, given
the strong differences people have about the subject); cJ. Gumo CALABRESI, IDEALS, BE·
LIEFS, AlTITUDES, AND THE LAw 98 (1985) (arguing that the problem with Roe is that the
Court should have acknowledged the claims and feelings of antiabortionists as a legitimate voice in the community, even while proclaiming that they could not override the
liberty interests of women choosing to pursue abortions).
160. See infra notes 215-306 and accompanying text (discussing the attitudes of individual Justices toward precedents with which they disagree).
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overrulings. For example, the Court explicitly overruled National
League of Cities v. Usery 16 1 in Garcia v. Metropolitan Transit Authority 16 2
only after deciding several cases that progressively undermined National League of Cities. 163 These decisions highlighted the degree to
which National League of Cities had deviated from the Court's intervening rulings upholding congressional enactments under the Commerce Clause in spite of their arguable impact on traditional state
activities. Indeed, in overruling the Court's 1968 decision in Maryland v. Wirtz, 164 National League of Cities became the first case in forty
years to invalidate a congressional enactment pursuant to the Commerce Clause. 165 In the nine years between National League of Cities
and Garcia, in four decisions the central issue was the applicability of
National League of Cities' rule prohibiting the federal government
from regulating traditional state functions under the Commerce
Clause; 166 the Court, however, did not grant states immunity from
federal regulation in any of those cases. Consequently, those rulings destabilized National League of Cities. 167 Although the Court
could have kept distinguishing and na~owing National League of Cities
in its Commerce Clause decisions, overruling National League of Cities
161. 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (holding that the Tenth Amendment protected the States'
traditional functions from being impaired by Congress' attempt to use its Commerce
Clause power to apply the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act to state and municipal employees).
162. 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (holding that Congress has the power under the Commerce Clause to apply the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act to state and municipal employees).
163. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983) (holding that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, enacted under Congress' commerce power, could be applied to
state and local employees); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S .. 742 (1982) (upholding the
application of the federal Public Utility Regulatory Policies to the States); United Trans.
Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678 (1982) (holding that the Tenth Amendment did
not prohibit application of the Railway Labor Act to state-owned railroads because operation of these railroads was not clearly a traditional state function); Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981) (upholding application of the
federal Surface Mining and Reclamation Control Act of 1977 to the States as a valid
exercise of the Commerce Clause).
164. 392 U.S. 183 (1968) (upholding the application of amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act to state employees under Congress' Commerce Clause power).
165. For commentaries describing National League of Cities as an aberration from the
Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence, see Martha A. Field, Comment: Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority! The Demise of a Misguided Doctrine, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 84, 85-87 (1985) (challenging the rationale in, and the States' need for, National
League of Cities); Philip P. Frickey, A Further Comment on Stare Decisis and the Overruling of
National League of Cities, 2 CaNST. CoMM. 341 (1985) [hereinafter Frickey, Further Comment] (emphasizing National League of Cities' weaknesses as a precedent); PhilipP. Frickey,
Stare Decisis in Constitutional Cases: Reconsidering National League of Cities, 2 CoNST. CoMM.
123, 129-32 (1985) [hereinafter Frickey, Stare Decisis in Constitutional Cases] (highlighting
the weak reasoning and lack of respect for precedent exhibited in National League of Cities
as important factors making it a weak precedent).
166. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
167. See Frickey, A Further Comment on Stare Decisis, supra note 165, at 345-46; Frickey,
Stare Decisis in Constitutional Cases, supra note 165, at 132-38.
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ironically demonstrated some respect for precedent, because reaffirming the core principles of National League of Cities in Garcia would
have compelled the Court to weaken the series of decisions leading
up to Garcia. 16B
Sometimes, however, the Court can destroy a precedent without
overruling it by distinguishing precedents in ways that practically
nullify them, thereby obscuring the differences between distinctions
and implicit overrulings. 169 The Court's decisions on proportionality of punishment present such a quandary. In 1980, Rummel v. Estelle170 held by a 5-4 vote that Texas' statutory requirement of
mandatory life sentence for a defendant convicted of three felonies,
consisting in that case of fraudulent practices cumulatively depriving people of property totaling less than two hundred dollars, did
not violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment. But this holding cast doubt on the validity of
the Court's prior practice of applying, beyond the death penalty
context, the standard that the Eighth Amendment prohibited imposition of a sentence that is grossly disproportionate to the severity of
the crime.I 71
Subsequently, the Court by a 5-4 vote in Solem v. Helm 172 struck
168. Two of the dissenters in Garcia, however, made clear their intention to overrule
Garcia as soon as they could command five votes. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 580 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); id. at 589 (O'Connor,]., dissenting). In one recent decision, the Court may
have begun to take its first step in retreat from Garcia. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 111 S.
Ct. 2395 (1991) (holding that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act did not apply
to a state's mandatory retirement provisions applying to appointed state judges on the
ground that, inter alia, those provisions fell into exemptions for "appointee[s] on a policymaking level" and intruded on matters of a "fundamental sort for a sovereign entity").
169. The slight differences between cases, however, might lead the Court to define
the outer limits of a rule it has formulated previously. For example, in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), the Court held that the Fourth Amendment prohibited searching a person's home for obscene materials, but, in Osborne v. Ohio, 110 S. Ct. 1691
(1990), the Court held Stanley did not apply to the possession of child pornography.
A variation occurs when the Court claims to be relying on a precedent in a decision
but is, in fact, mischaracterizing it for the purpose of weakening it. For example, in
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), the Court did not overrule, but grossly mischaracterized, Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), as having "fashioned the
principle that the constitutional guarantee[] offree speech ... do[es] not permit a State
to forbid ... advocacy of the use offorce or oflaw violation except where such advocacy
is directed to incit[e] or produc[e] imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action." Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447 & n.2. In fact, Dennis had upheld the
federal antisubversive law, the Smith Act, under a test that required the Court to "ask
whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion
offree speech as is necessary to avoid the danger." 341 U.S. at 510 (citation omitted).
Nevertheless, subsequent to Brandenburg, the Court relied on Dennis on at least one occasion. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 563 (1976). Even more surprising may be that after Brandenburg explicitly overruled Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357 (1927), the Court subsequently relied on justice Brandeis' concurrence in Whitney,
id. at 377 (Brandeis,]., concurring), even as recently as Texas v.johnson, 491 U.S. 397,
419 (1989).
170. 445 u.s. 263 (1980).
171. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 372, 377, 380 (1910) (striking down a
penalty for falsifying a public record that included a twelve-year prison term with "accessories" or "accompaniments" such as hard labor while chained).
172. 463 U.S. 277 (1983). In an intervening case, Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370
( 1982), the Court upheld a sentence offorty years' imprisonment and a $20,000 fine for
possession of marijuana with intent to sell. /d. at 371.
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down a punishment scheme almost identical to Rummel, except that
Solem involved a mandatory life sentence without the possibility of
parole. Justice Blackmun was the swing vote in Solem, but he did not
write an opinion. Rather, Justice Powell's opinion for the Court in
Solem was virtually identical to his Rummel dissent, prompting the
dissenters in Solem to claim that Rummel was being overruled sub
silentio. 173
In Harmelin v. Michigan, 174 the Court recently tried to resolve the
confusion Rummel and Solem had generated. The five-member majority upheld Michigan's imposition of a mandatory life sentence
without parole for drug possession but split over how to deal with
Solem. While ChiefJustice Rehnquist andJustice Scalia argued that
Solem should be overruled because it embodied an unworkable standard and was inconsistent with prior decisions and original intent, 17 5 Justice Kennedy in a separate concurrence (joined by
Justices Souter and O'Connor) refused the entreaty to overrule Solem and instead tried to reconcile Solem and Harmelin on the ground
that the Eighth Amendment "forbids only. extreme sentences that
are 'grossly disproportionate to the crime.' "176
In summary, the degree to which the Court weakens precedents in
unpredictable ways can reflect the Court's flexibility. Indeed, this
flexibility is not necessarily undesirable because most observers
would prefer the Justices to be sensitive to changes in social conditions and to new arguments, while maintaining a healthy respect for
stability and for the past. These debates ·will persist unless and until
precedents become practically immune to overruling.t77

4. The Confusion over the Criteria for Overrulings
Even if all the Justices agree that they should reconsider a prior
ruling, they may disagree on the appropriate criteria or standards
for making such a determination. In his classic 1963 study on overruling, Professor Jerrold Israel argued that the reasons given by the
Justices for overruling prior cases fell into three categories:
changed cond,itions, the lessons of experience (including unworkability), and conflicting precedents. 178 As a descriptive matter,
173. Solem, 463 U.S. at 304 (Burger, CJ., dissenting) (complaining that "[a]lthough
to day's holding cannot rationally be reconciled with Rummel, the Court does not purport
to overrule Rummel").
174. 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991).
175. /d. at 2683-96.
176. /d. at 2702, 2705 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (citation omitted).
.
177. See supra notes 73-~7 and accompanying t~xt.
178. See Israel, supra note 25, at 219-23 (observmg that these are the three most significant bases on which the Court overrules precedents). For example, the Court relied
on changed circumstances in The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12
How.) 233, 239 (1851) (stressing that the definition of"public rivers" in Article III had
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the Court has, both before and after Professor Israel's article, generally grounded its overrulings on one or more of these reasons. 179
Moreover, these reasons generally reflect the Court's established
practice· to ground its overrulings on the erroneous reasoning of the
prior decision and some other substantial consideration such as the
proven unworkability of that decision.
Professor Israel, however, failed to account for the inapplicability
of these reasons to the numerous cases in which the Court has overruled itself in a short period of time.l80 In addition, the Court's
stated reasons do not necessarily fully explain certain overrulings.
For example, Justice Blackmun was the swing vote in .both National
League of Cities v. Usery 181 and Garcia v. San Antonio Mass Transit Authority, 182 and it was his belief that National League of Cities proved
itself unworkable that became the Court's rationale in Garcia. 1as
The four other Justices who joined his opinion in Garcia, however,
joined at least in part because they believed National League of Cities
simply had been decided wrongly as evidenced by their dissents in
National League of Cities. 184
As a normative matter, these criteria might be criticized for being
changed), to overrule The Steamboat Thomas jefferson, 23 U.S. (12 How.) 428 (1825).
The Court relied on the lessons of experience in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-55
(1961) (applying the exclusionary rule to the States}, to overrule Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S.
455 (1942); and in United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 86-87 (1978) (declaring that the
Double Jeopardy Clause is not violated when a state appeals from a decision in favor of
the defendant when the defendant sought termination of the proceeding on a basis
other than guilt or innocence), to overrule United States v.Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358 (1975}.
The Court relied on inconsistent precedents in City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S.
297, 305-06 (1976) {holding that a grandfather clause permitting pushcart vendors with
eight years' operation to continue was valid under the Equal Protection Clause), to overrule Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957}; and in Tyler Pipe Industries v. Washington
State Department of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 252 (1987} (holding that a Washington
state business and occupation tax on manufacturing discriminated against interstate
commerce), to overrule General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436 (1964).
179. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
180. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (holding that police can
search even closed containers in a car's trunk whenever a police officer has reasonable
cause to suspect that the car contains contraband), overruling Robbins v. California, 453
U.S. 420 (1981}; United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978) (holding that the Double
Jeopardy Clause is not violated when the state appeals from a judgment in the defendant's favor when the defendant had tried to terminate the proceedings on a basis other
than guilt or innocence), overruling United States v.Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358 (1975}; United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950} (holding that a warrantless search, conducted
as incidental to the defendant's arrest, was reasonable and valid, even though the officers had time to procure a warrant prior to the arrest and search), overruling Trupiano
v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943)
(overturning the convictions of Jehovah's Witnesses for soliciting without a permit),
overruling Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942}; Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457
(1871} (upholding the constitutionality of paper money), overruling Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1870).
181. 426 u.s. 833 (1976).
182. 469 u.s. 528 (1985).
183. Id. at 531.
184. See National League if Cities, 426 U.S. at 856 (Brennan,J.,joined by White,J., and
Marshall,]., dissenting); id. at 880 (Stevens,J., dissenting). In addition, one could speculate that the real explanation for any inconsistencies between Solem v. Helm, ~63 U.S.
277 (1983), and Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980), turns on the undisclosed reasons for justice Blackmun's casting the critical fifth vote in both cases, in neither of
which did he write an opinion. See supra notes 170-76 and accompanying text.
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manipulated too easily to produce overrulings or refusals to overrule. For example, some Justices have argued that changed conditions should have led the Court to overrule its precedents
upholding the death penalty, while other Justices have argued that
changed conditions are better taken into account by legislatures in
the process of designing punishment schemes.1s5
Inconsistent precedents also have not invariably produced overrulings. For example, they have not produced ~xplicit overrulings
in the area of separation of powers, in which the Court repeatedly
has used inconsistent methodologies, 18 6 or under the religion
clauses, in which the Court's shifts perennially defy explanation.l 87
Nor is there consensus on what would qualify as a lesson of experience requiring an explicit overruling. For example, even though
Justice Lewis Powell joined the majority in Bowers v. Hardwick 1ss to
uphold criminal prosecution of persons engaging in consensual homosexual sodomy, he admitted after his retirement from the Court
that he had been mistaken to join the Bowers m~ority because he
had underestimated the harm that Bowers would cause homosexuals.189 Yet none of the other members of the Bowers majority nor
185. Compare Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 293 (1976) (holding that
mandatory death sentences violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishment because "evolving standards of decency respecting the imposition
of punishment in our society • • • conclusively point to the repudiation of automatic
death sentences") and Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (striking down the death
penalty, in part, as violative of contemporary sense of decency), with Walton v. Arizona,
110 S. Ct. 3047, 3067 (1990) (Scalia,j., concurring) ("It is quite immaterial that most
states have abandoned the practice of automatically sentencing to death all offenders
guilty of a capital crime(;] still less is it relevant that mandatory capital sentencing is (or
alleged to be) out of touch with •contemporary community values' regarding the administration of justice."); see also Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 283-84 (1980) (thenJustice Rehnquist arguing that changed conditions should not influence the Court, but
rather should guide legislative decisions on the propo.rtionality of punishment).
186. Compare Metropolitan Washington Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement
of Aircraft Noise, Ill S. Ct. 2298 (1991) (striking down as violative of separation of
powers Congress' conditioning of the transfer of control over Washington area airpQrts
to the Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority on the creation of a Board of Review partially composed of Congressmen with veto power over the decisions of the directors of the Authority) and Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (holding that
Congress cannot confer certain executive functions over the budgetary process on officials within its removal power), with Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (upholding
Congress' delegation of the executive function of criminal prosecution to an individual
not formally associated with any of the three branches). See generally Peter L. Strauss,
Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Qpestions-A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72
CoRNELL L. REv. 488 (1987} (critiquing the fundamentally incompatible methodologies
used by the Court in several recent separation of powers decisions).
187. See supra note 43.
188. 478 U.S. 186, 197 (1986} (Poweli,J., concurring).
189. See Ruth Marcus, Powell Regrets Backing Sodomy Law, WASH. PoST, Oct. 26, 1990, at
A3. Similarly, ChiefJustice Warren and Justice Douglas let it be known after their retirements that they each had regretted their efforts (Warren as California's Attorney General and Douglas as a Justice) to support the internment ofJapanese-Americans during
World War II, which had been upheld in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
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any of the Justices who have been appointed to the Court since Justice Powell seem disposed to leam the same lesson he did from the
aftermath of Bowers. t9o
Nevertheless, although the criteria discussed above may mean different things to different Justices, this may not be a problem but
rather a function of conscientious disagreements among the Justices. In this regard, .Professor Israel's categories of reasons for
overrulings may not be any more difficult to apply or follow than
any other standard the Court tries to use.
Perhaps as an altemative to (or an expansion of) the criteria often
followed by the Justices in making overruling decisions, Chief Justice Rehnquist declared in Payne v. Tennessee 191 that the Court's two
prior decisions on victim impact statements deserved less than the
usual deference owed to constitutional precedents because they
were both decided by 5-4 votes with vigorous dissents and that the
Court's practice has been to overrule prior decisions when those decisions "are unworkable or are badly reasoned." 192 He then cited
thirty-three decisions in twenty Terms to support his statement.l 93
There are three serious problems with the Chief Justice's statements regarding the deference to precedent and the Court's traditional approach to precedent. First, he misstated the Court's past
practice. Perhaps as few as four of the thirty-three opinions cited by
the Chief Justice-all four of which he had written himself-involved the Court's overruling of some prior decision(s) on the sole
basis of the precedent having been reasoned badly. 194 The remaining twenty-nine opinions, including two authored by then-:Justice
Rehnquist, appear to ground the overruling on the bases of erroneous reasoning and the unworkability or outmoded nature of the
overruled precedent or the existence of subsequent, inconsistent
case law.
Second, if adopted by a majority of the Court, the ChiefJustice's
(1944). See G. EDWARD WHITE, EARL WARREN: A PuBuc LIFE 75-77 (1982) (describing
how Chiefjustice Warren later came to regret the role he had played in the internment
of japanese-Americans); DouGLAS, supra note 93, at 39 (expressing regret for his being
part of the Korematsu majority). Ironically, none of these disclaimers has ever led the
Court to overrule itself on the issues in question. The reason for this is that the critical
measure of whether precedents matter in constitutional decisionmaking is the degree to
which the persons currendy sitting on the Court respect a prior decision.
190. Similarly, the plurality in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S.
490, 516-19 (1989), pointed to the lessons of experience as demonstrating the unworkability of Roe's framework for measuring the strength of the state's interest in regulating abortions, while justice O'Connor argued in concurrence that the Court in Webster
need only decide whether the constitutionality of the specific regulations at issue could
be evaluated within Roe's framework. /d. at 525-30 (O'Connor, j., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).
191. 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
192. /d. at 2609.
193. /d. at 2610 & n.l.
194. Collins v. Youngblood, 110 S. Ct. 2715, 2723 (1990) (overruling Thompson v.
Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898), and Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221 (1883)); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 329-31 (1986) (overruling Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981));
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833,852-55 (1976) (overruling Maryland v.
Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968)); Edelman v.jordan, 415 U.S. 651,671 (1974) (overruling in
part Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)).
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criterion of "bad" reasoning clearly would wreak ·havoc on the legal
system because it easily can be manipulated and abused. Given the
current Court's lack of ideologkal balance, 19 5 it probably would be
some time before a majority of the Justices even acknowledged that
any argument except for one supporting their conservative viewpoint
on a constitutional issue was persuasive or that the reasoning of
some prior decision is wrong but respectable enough for them to
leave it alone. Because it is not hard for intelligent Justices (particularly if they share strong views about how the Constitution should
be interpreted) to find some fault with a cons"titutional precedent, it
is likely that if they were to follow the Chief Justice's criterion for
overruling, they could overrule numerous precedents. 196
Third, the argument that 5-4 decisions with vigorous dissents are
entitled to less than the usual (low) level of deference given to constitutional precedents is inimical to the rule. of law in our society.
These decisions state rules of law, no more nor less than any of the
other of the Court's decisions. Moreover, many of the Court's 5-4
decisions (for example, Knox v. Lee, 19 7 Miranda v. Arizona, 198 West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette 199) practically are immune to reconsideration or overruling, even though they included vigorous
dissents. It would disrupt our legal system severely for anyone on
or off the Court to treat a 5-4 ·vote with a vigorous dissent as a rule
oflaw entitled to less respect from the Court and other.govemment
decisionmakers than any of the Court's other constitutional law
decisions.20o
Regardless of the criteria that the Court uses for making overruling decisions, the Court's explanations for those decisions cannot
reasonably be expected to be consistent with each other. The reasons ·given for explicit overrulings may change with the Justices and
the kinds of cases heard. The more variables involved in the decisionmaking process, .the less likely it is that any clear signal \vill
emerge regarding the Justices' collective· attitude about any one factor. Nevertheless, a mqre comple.te picture
of the
of precedent
.
. role
.,
195. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Rehnquist Ascendancy: Marshall's VISion-and the E11d of
Cottrt-Led Refonn, WAsH. PoST, June 30, 1991, at C1 (commenting on the consequences
of Justice Marshall's departure as depriving the Court of its only consistently strong
voice for social justice); Edwin M. Yoder, The Rehnquist Ascendancy: The Radical Agenda ofa
Triumphant Chiefjustice, WASH. PoST, June 30, 1991, at Cl (arguing that Justice Marshall's
resignation ensures the transformation of the Court from the protector of individual
liberties to the guarantor of governmental power).
196. See supra note 44 {listing the decisions labeled by Justice Marshall as "endangered" in his dissent in Payne).
197. 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871):
198. 384 u.s. 436 (1966).
199. 319 u.s. 624 (1943).
200. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, Ill S. Ct. 2597, 2625-27 (1991) (Stevens, j.,
dissenting).
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in the Court's decisionmaking emerges from Part III's analysis of
the Justices' individual attitudes toward precedent.

IlL

The justices' Individual Approaches to Precedent

This Part first examines the implications of focusing on the degree to which precedents matter as a source of decision to each Justice. It then describes and critiques the different ways the Justices
individually factor precedents into their decisionmaking.

A.

The Implications of Focusing on the justices' Individual Approaches to
Precedent

Critics complaining about the Court's inconsistencies in its review
of its prior decisions often mistakenly assume that the Court can act
as if it were a single person capable of making perfectly coherent
and consistent decisions. 201 Although it is beyond the scope of this
Article to replicate the ways newly developed interpretive techniques· such as public choice theory,2o2 chaos theory,2o3 or legal
pragmatism,204 can be applied to explain the Court's decisions, it is
significant that each of these techniques points to the same result:
when institutions make decisions by majority vote, the majority will
201. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 20; Moore, supra note 26; Munzer & Nickel, supra note
49.
202. Public choice theory has been used mosdy to explain congressional decisionmaking. See William M. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice
Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REv. 275, 285 (1988); Daniel A. Farber & Philip
P. Frickey, The jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873, 908-11 (1987);Jerry L.
Mashaw, The Economics of Politics and the Understanding of Public Law, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REv.
115, 150-60 (1989); Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice TheoT)~ Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 CoLUM. L. REv. 2121,
2139-40, 2212-13 (1990). For applications of public choice theory to judicial decisionmaking, see Easterbrook, supra note 18, at 425-26; Easterbrook, supra note 46, at 811-31;
Farago, supra note 26, at 229-31. Each of these latter commentaries has shown that
multimembered courts produce inconsistent decisions because their members have different orderings of preferences. Moreover, the periodic changes in the composition of
the Court exacerbates the inconsistencies, because the new members will introduce into
the decisionmaking process different orderings of choices or preferences from those
previous members had accepted or acted upon.
203. For a discussion of chaos theory and constitutional decisionmaking, see Glenn
H. Reynolds, Chaos and the Court, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 110 (1991) (arguing that the ways
chaos theory demonstrates order within the apparent disorder of the universe can also
clarify the chaos that seemingly characterizes the Court's constitutional decisionmaking); cJ. Laurence H. Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can Learn
from Modem Physics, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1989) (suggesting that just as classical constitutional thought was strongly influenced by Newtonian paradigms of clockwork precision,
regularity, and objectivity, so modern constitutional thought might gain from an appreciation of certain post-Newtonian concepts).
204. The notions that the Justices bring complex agendas to each case they decide
and that their decisions incorporate their attitudes about precedents is consistent with
recent work about legal pragmatism. See, e.g., Steven D. Smith, The Pursuit ofPragmatism,
100 YALE LJ. 409 {1990) {critiquing legal pragmatism as an effort to return experience,
practice, and common sense to legal thinking); Steven D. Smith, Law Without Mind, 88
MICH. L. REv. 104, 117 (1989) (suggesting that pragmatism encourages judges to decide
which policies or results will achieve justice); see also Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism
and The Co11Slitution, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1331, 1343 {1988) (making the case for greater
judicial reliance on common sense and legal tradition as opposed to global theories in
constitutional analysis}.
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generate logically inconsistent results unless the voters have very
similar preferences. This proposition holds true for the Supreme
Court, which over time will produce precedents whose reasoning
and/or holdings will be inconsistent ·with each other.
As an alternative to the traditional efforts to reconcile the Court's
rulings on constitutional stare decisis, these techniques suggest that
a particularly effective measure of the role of precedent in the
Court's decisionmaking is to compare and contrast the degree to
which eachJustice consistently follows a coherentjurisprudence on
constitutional stare decisis. Because each Justice has discretion over
her votes and decisions, their performance can be judged on the
basis of the tendency of their respective choices to expand or contract precedents.
One can argue, however, that the practice of the Justices to operate as coalitions on the Court makes it difficult, if not impossible, to
isolate the expressed or preferred principles of individual Justices.205 This view posits that these principles become submerged
in the inevitable bargaining process that enables the Court to resolve a case. In other words, the real opinions of the Justices may be
obscured by the deals made on the Court.
Although it may be true that focusing on the voting patterns of
each Justice may not reveal much conclusive evidence about their
attitude toward a matter not explicitly discussed in the Court's opinion, that insight does point to something important about the
weight of precedents in the Justices' decisionmaking: that precedents can be counterbalanced by other considerations, such as the
desire to form coalitions.2° 6 Of equal importance is the fact that
precedents do make a discernible difference, as evidenced by the
criti~al roles they can play behind the scenes in framing the Court's
agenda2°7 and in the Justices' dialogues about the degree of deference they each should have for the Court's previous constitutional
judgments.208
If one seriously were interested in increasing tJJ:e Court's respect
for precedents, the solution may not be to have greater candor2°9 or
205. See Tushnet, supra note 91, at 826-27;see also Mark V. Tushnet, The optimist's Tale,
132 U. PA. L. REv. 1257, 1263-64 (1984) (showing how Justice Brennan finessed the
differences among various Justices to build a coalition in Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202
(1982)).
206. IfTushnet were right about the impossibility of figuring out the preferred views
of each Justice, then his major enterprise, critiquing the Court's constitutional opinions,
would be pointless: it never would be possible to isolate the factors that influenced each
justice, because they would have been submerged in the decisionmaking process.
207. See supra notes 26-48 and accompanying text (discussing the role of precedent in
the certiorari process).
208. See, e.g., infra notes 215-27 and accompanying text (discussing how the justices
individually balance certain factors when reviewing precedents).
209. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 46, at 811, 832 (acknowledging that each justice
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a criteria for overrulings 210 as some commentators have suggested,
because these proposals would complicate rather than clarify the
orderings of preferences of the individual decisionmakers. Rather,
one might follow the lead of some public choice theorists who have
suggested that changes in outcomes are best achieved through
structural alterations to the decisionmaking process.2u For example, the Court could make an internal, structural change requiring a
supermajority vote or the passage of a certain amount of time prior
to overruling one of its prior rulings.
The reasons such structural changes never would be accepted by
the Court provide considerable insight into the Justices' views on
constitutional stare decisis.212 First, these changes might seriously
hinder constitutional decisionmaking. They could prevent the
Court from fully discharging its constitutional duty to resolve cases
or controversies because a minority of the Justices might be able to
prevent the Court from resolving an issue as long as there was a
potential for its decision to contribute in some way to the weakening
of a precedent. Nor could the Court decide controversies if it were
prohibited from reviewing the scope of some precedents during a
set time period. The Court temporarily would be unable to clarify
precedents because clarification might involve narrowing or weakening a prior decision.
Second, these structural modifications might conflict with the Justices' views on their respective roles and prerogatives in constitutional decisionmaking. In particular, they might agree that each
Justice should have the complete freedom to balance, as he sees fit,
his normative views on constitutional interpretation and the social
or institutional values associated with fidelity to precedent.213
could be more open about the reasons for their judgments); Maltz, .supra note 12, at 483
(urging the Court to explain more fully the principles on which its decisions rest, to
refuse to apply reversals retroactively, and to devise holdings no more broadly than
necessary); Monaghan, .supra note 7, at 764-67 (urging the Justices to provide greater
candor about the reasoning underlying their decisions); see also Henry P. Monaghan,
Taking Supreme Court Opinions Seriously, 39 Mo. L. REV. 1, 19, 21, 23-25 (1979) (arguing
that greater reasoned elaboration on the part of the Court would increase respect for
the Court and would clarifY the grounds on which certain decisions have been based and
may be challenged).
210. BoRK, .supra note 12, at 156-59 (emphasizing whether the precedent conforms to
original intent, and the degree of insitutional reliance on the precedent); Monaghan,
supra note 7, at 756-63 (setting forth criteria for the Court to consider when deciding
whether to adhere to a challenged precedent).
211. See, e.g., Farber & Frickey, .supra note 202, at 903-04 (noting the structural alterations proposed by some public choice theorists to resolve chaotic and paradoxical majority rule); Mashaw, .supra note 202, at 131-33 (describing the structural changes some
public choice theorists have proposed for resolving self-interested governmental
decisionmaking).
212. Cf. Monaghan, .supra note 7, at 754-55 (suggesting that how one regards the
constitutionality of a congressional statute directing the Court to review precedents in a
certain way will say a great deal about one's attitude toward the role of stare decisis in
the Court's decisionmaking).
213. In fact, the Justices do seem to agree that they each should have the freedom to
conduct such a balance. See infra notes 215-27 and accompanying text. Other problems
with a stated standard or rule on the precise deference owed to precedents are that some
Justices simply may refuse to follow the rule; they may argue that structural prohibitions
against correcting the Court's mistakes merely perpetuate those errors and prevent the
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Last, requiring a supermajority for overrulings might effectively
prevent justifiable overrulings because getting more than five votes
to overrule on tough constitutional issues is difficult at best.2 14 No
matter how compelling the reasons may be for overruling a precedent, no overruling could ever. be achieved without the minimum
number of votes. If those votes are not forthcoming, then whatever
harm that could be perpetuated by preserving the precedent would
remain in effect.

B.

The Individual justices' Vwws on Precedent

Commentators often do not discuss five themes that can be discerned from studying how each justice factors pret;edents into their
decisionmaking. 21 5 Most important, whenever the Court reviews its
precedents, the standard practice seems to be for. the Justices indi- ·
vidually to balance their normative views on how the constitutional
provision at issue should be interpreted216 and their perceptions of
Court from getting back on the right constitutional track. These justices may argue that
waiting to undo a precedent has no virtue.because it allows aefective precedents to distort our social arid governmental structures. Moreover, these structui'al changes might
increase deception in decisionmaking because some justices may· feel compelled to act
on their strong feelings to overrule certain precedents by falsely,claiming to be clarifying
or distinguishing a precedent while actually trying to weaken it. This kind of conduct
might increase friction on the Court and could provoke the oilier justices to engage in
similar behavior to ensure cases are resolved in a manner agreeable to them. The end
result could be the substantial lowering of collegiality on, and public respect for, the
Court.
214. There are two other difficulties with the supermajority rule. First, it could frustrate the Court's efforts to identify overruled precedents, and such identification is necessarily a critical step in the process of effectuating reversals,., Second, there is no
principled basis on which to choose the precise number for the-supermajority, although
it is true that the larger the number required for overrulings the less likely such deci~
sions would ever be made.
215. This section illustrates these five themes by drawing examples primarily, but not
exclusively, from the approaches to precedent of the 10 people who have thus far populated the Rehnquist Court, including Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Brennan,
White, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter. I address
justice Clarence Thomas' views on precedent in a forthcoming piece. See supra note 5.
Although some commentators have focused on some aspects ofindivi<iual decisionmaking in constitutional law, they have not fully explored the consequences or implications
of their analysis. See, e.g., Robert W. Bennett, A Dissent on Dissent, 74 jUDICATURE 255
(1991) (generally distinguishing "institutionalist" justices, who appreciate the importance of stability and predictability in constitutional decisionmaking, from "individualist" Justices, who are prone to dissent whenever the Court deviates from their personal
view of how a case should be decided); Henry J. Bourguignon, The Second Mr. justice
Harlan: His Principles ofjudicial Decision Making, 1979 SuP. CT. REv. 251, 277-81 (recounting Justice Harlan's philosophy of constitutional stare decisis); Maurice Kelman, The
Forked Path of Dissent, 1985 SuP. CT. REv. 227 (describing the different grounds on and
ways in which various Justices have chosen to dissent).
216. Each justice may feel a compulsion to act on their normative views on constitutional interpretation because of the constitutional requirement that each Justice "shall
be bound by Oath or Affirmation, ••• to support the Constitution.'' U.S. CoNsT. art. VI;
see, e.g., South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 825 (1989) (Scalia,J., dissenting) ("I
would think it a violation of my oath to adhere to what I consider a plainly unjustified
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the practical needs to submerge those views for the sake of certain
social or institutional values such as stability, continuity, or consensus. The Court's decisions are inconsistent because each of the nine
Justices tends to strike this balance differently in different cases.21 7
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services2 18 illustrates how, in striking
this critical balance, the Justices reveal many of their attitudes about
constitutional stare decisis. Indeed, the majority splintered over the
appropriate point at which to strike the balance. The plurality's answer was, as Justice Scalia described it, to "disassemble[] [Roe]
dooijamb by dooijamb." 219 Rather than declare that there was no
foundation for the fundamental right recognized in Roe, the plurality (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Kennedy) confined its opinion to exposing the internal incoherence of Roe's
trimester framework for measuring the strength of the state's interest in regulating abortion. 22° The plurality's argument that Roe
could be undone by its own internal incoherence as revealed
through a series of decisions 221 may have had the effect of dispelling
some criticism of the Court for having changed course on abortion
rights because of a change in personnel.
Justice Scalia argued that his normative views on how the constitutional issue should be resolved and the social values of overruling
Roe pointed clearly in favor of his voting to overrule Roe. He believed the Court should swifdy and unambiguously overrule Roe to
undo the damage Roe had inflicted on social and governmental institutions.222 By denouncing the plurality's attempted ':_judicial statesmanship" in favor of casting the only vote to overrule Roe in its
entirety,223 Justice Scalia distanced himself from his colleagues.
Nevertheless, he cast a critical vote to uphold Missouri's regulations.
Justice O'Connor also struck a balance that distanced her from
intrusion upon the democratic process in order that the Court might save face.''). Less
obviously, some Justices may feel that the oath they have taken requires them to consider such social or institutional values as stability in their constitutional decisionmaking.
Some Justices may believe that the Constitution is partly what the precedents say it is
and, therefore, deviating from precedents is the functional equivalent of abandoning
certain constitutional norms.
217. See supra notes 202-04 and accompanying text (explaining how various techniques show the inevitability of inconsistent outcomes or rulings).
218. 492 U.S. 490 (1989). Webster raised questions regarding the constitutionality of
Missouri regulations that prohibited the use of public facilities or employees to perform
abortions, the use of public funding to support abortion counseling, and that required
physicians to determine, when possible, whether a fetus at least twenty weeks old is
capable of surviving outside the womb.
219. 492 U.S. at 537 (Scalia,J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
220. /d. at 516-21.
221. This technique might have the effect of demonstrating how Roe could "deconstruct" itself. SeeJ.M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE LJ. 743, 755
(1987) (using deconstructive techniques to expose the self:.contradictions inherent in
constitutional analysis). But see Suzanna Sherry, Selective judicial Activism in the Equal Protection Context: Democracy, Distrust, and Deconstruction, 73 GEo. LJ. 89, 99 (1984) (suggesting that because deconstruction reveals the inability of any legal text to constrain
due to its inherent self-contradictions, the Court should be held accountable for the
substantive results of its decisions).
222. Webster, 492 U.S. at 532, 537 (Scalia,J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
223. /d. at 532.
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her colleagues. Rather than join the plurality and justice Scalia who
approvingly cited her previous criticisms of Roe, 2 24 she spent much
of her opinion trying to demonstrate that the Court could uphold
the Missouri regulations at issue without disturbing any aspect of
Roe, including its trimester framework. She stressed that Webster was
not the appropriate case in which to reconsider Roe. 22s
The dissent rested its argument in part on stare decisis. It
stressed, inter alia, that the long line of cases affirming Roe would be
undermined by the plurality's decision and maintained that deviating from those rulings at this juncture would make the Court look as
if it were the political instrument of a President and interest groups
bent on overturning Roe. 22 6 The dissent struck the balance solely in
favor of stability, which meant deciding Webster consistently with its
previous opinions on abortion rights.227 Because the dissenters
views prevailed more often than not in previous abortion cases, arguing for continuity in the law necessarily meant tracking or following its previously expressed views on how the relevant constitutional
provisions should be interpreted.
The two cases decided on the last day of the 1990 Term also show
how the Justices each try to balance their underlying views on how
the Constitution should be interpreted and the need for the Court
224. See, e.g., id. (citing Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416,
453-59 (1983) (O'Connor,J., dissenting) (criticizing Roe's trimester framework)).
225. /d. at 526 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
("When the constitutional validity of a State's abortion statute actually turns on the constitutional validity of Roe v. Wade, there will be time enough to reexamine Roe. And to do
so carefully.'')
226. See id. at 538 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
227. See id. at 553-54, 558-59. In subsequent cases, a majority of the Justices have
cqntinued their efforts to uphold restrictions on public access to abortions. See Rust v.
Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991) (upholding federal regulations requiring that family
counseling services receiving federal funds avoid mentioning abortion); Ohio v. Akron
Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 110 S. Ct. 2972 (1990) (upholding an Ohio statute that, with
certain exceptions, prohibited any person from performing an abortion on an unmarried, unemancipated minor without giving notice to· one of her parents or receiving a
court order of approval). But see Hodgson v. Minnesota, llO S. Ct. 2926 (1990) (invalidating a provision of a Minnesota statute that prohibited the performance of abortions
on women under the age of 18 unless at least 48 hours had elapsed since the time when
both parents were notified). Nevertheless, several states have passed laws for the purpose of giving the Court the opportunity to revisit Roe. See, e.g., 1991 La. Sess. Law.
Serv. 26 (West) (prohibiting physicians from performing abortions at any stage of the
mother's preganancy except in cases of incest, rape, and when the abortion is intended
to save the life of the mother; 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3201-3220 (1983 & Supp.
1991) (prohibiting physicians from performing abortions without obtaining "informed
consent," spousal consent, and requiring a 24-hour waiting period). The United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently upheld the Pennsylvania statutory
scheme, but did strike down the spousal consent ·provisions. Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, No. 90-1662, 1991 WL 209106 (3d Cir. Oct. 21, 1991).
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to adhere to certain values such as stability and continuity. For example, although Payne v. Tennessee 228 overruled two decisions barring victim impact statements from the sentencing phase of capital
trials, the six-member majority disagreed on the criteria for overruling those decisions. Speaking for that majority (consisting of himself and Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter),
Chief justice Rehnquist argued that the previous decisions, Booth v.
Maryland 229 and South Carolina v. Gathers, 2so should have been given
less deference than constitutional decisions usually deserve because
Booth and Gathers had been recent opinions, decided by 5-4 votes
with vigorous dissents, and that Booth and Gathers required overruling because they were both erroneously reasoned. 231 Joined by Justices White and Kennedy,Justice O'Connor followed with a separate
concurrence arguing that Booth and Gathers needed to be overruled
because they "were wrongly decided. " 232 In another separate concurrence, Justice Scalia, joined by Justices O'Connor and Kennedy,
sharply argued that, contrary to the assertions made injustice Marshall's dissent, the Court did not need to show any "special justification" for overruling Booth and Gathers and that, in fact, those
decisions did far more damage to the notion of stare decisis than the
majority's opinion in Payne because those decisions violated the
"general principle that the settled practices and expectations of a
democratic society should generally not be disturbed by the
courts."233 In yet another separate concurrence, Justice Souter,
joined by Justice Kennedy, argued that Booth and Gathers should be
overruled because they were erroneously reasoned and demonstrably unworkable. 234
Justice Marshall and justice Stevens wrote separate dissents, both
joined by Justice Blackmun, challenging, inter alia, the majority's
views on precedent. Justice Marshall argued that: (1) these overrulings could be traced to the sole fact that the Court's personnel had
changed; 235 (2) overruling precedents based on their erroneous reasoning and close votes would disrupt constitutional law significantly,236 and (3) the majority had generally failed to "come fonvard
228. Ill S. Ct. 2597 (I991), overruling South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805
(I989) and Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
229. 482 u.s. 496.
230. 490 u.s. 805.
231. Payne, IllS. Ct. at 2609-11.
232. ld. at 2611-12 (O'Connor,]., concurring).
233. Id. at 26I3-14 (Scalia,]., concurring).
234. ld. at 26I6 (Souter,]., concurring).
235. Id. at 262I (Marshall,]., dissenting). justice Marshall argued in dissent that the
Court should follow Rumsey by showing "special justification" for overruling Booth and
Gathers. Id. (citing Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984)). justice Scalia rejected
justice Marshall's argument as "[un]fair" and argued that he and the other justices
should have the freedom to vote to overturn Booth and Gathers solely because these two
cases were decided wrongly. Id. at 2613 (Scalia,]., concurring).
236. I d. at 2619 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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with the type of extraordinary showing that this Court has historically demanded before overruling one of its precedents."287 Justice
Marshall maintained that the ChiefJustice's argument that 5-4 decisions, with vigorous dissents, deserve less than the usual deference
owed to precedents threatened to "destroy" the Court's authority as
the final decisionmaker on questions involving individual liberties,
because it "invite[d]" state actors to treat certain decisions as nonbinding and instead "to renew the very policies deemed unconstitutional in the hope that this Court may now reverse course, even if it
has only recently reaffirmed the constitutional liberty in question."238 In his dissent,Justi~e Stevens accused the majority of discarding reasoning and stare decisis because of the " 'hydraulic
pressure' of public opinion," and concluded his opinion by lamenting that "[t]oday is a sad day for a great institution."289
An equally illuminating debate occurred in Harmelin v. Michigan, 240 in which the five-member majority split over the necessity
and the criteria for overruling Solem v. Helm.24 l On behalf ofhimself
and the ChiefJustice,Justice Scalia appeared to move away from his
and the Chief Justice's previously stated views that overrulings
should be based solely on the erroneous reasoning of a precedent.
Instead, perhaps because Solem had been around a few years more
than Booth and Gathers, Justice Scalia could assert more reasons
favoring Solem's overruling; he argued that Solem should be overruled because it was erroneously reasoned, articulated an unworkable standard, and was inconsistent with the original understanding
of the Eighth Amendment and other case law.242 Nevertheless, Justices O'Connor and Souter joined Justice Kennedy's concurrence
rejecting Justice Scalia's arguments in favor of overruling Solem. Instead, Justice Kennedy maintained that even though Solem could
have been better reasoned and could have articulated a more workable standard, the Court could remedy those problems by narrowing
237. !d. at 2621. Justice Marshall explained further that this "extraordinary showing"
usually required
such justifications [as] the advent of'subsequent changes or development in
the law' that undermine a decision's rationale[;] the need 'to bring [a decision] into agreement with experience and with facts newly ascertained'[;]
and a showing that a particular precedent has become a detriment to coherence and consistency in the law.
/d. at 2621-22 (citations omitted).
238. /d. at 2624.
239. /d. at 2631 (Stevens,J., dissenting) (quoting Northern Sec. Co. v. United States,
193 U.S. 197, 400-01 (1904) (Holmes,J., dissenting)).
240. 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991).
241. 463 u.s. 277 (1983).
242. See Hannelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2686-96 (pointing out how Solem deviated from the
original understanding of the Eighth Amendment); id. at 2696-99 (demonstrating Solem's
unworkability); id. at 2699-70 1 (describing Solem's incompatibility with other case law).
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but not overruling Solem. 243 In dissent, Justice White (joined by
Justices Blackmun and Stevens) found neither the history, nor the
case law, regarding the Eighth Amendment supported Justice
Scalia's conclusion that the Eighth Amendment contained no proportionality principle or Justice Kennedy's analysis, which Justice
White argued, was "contradicted by the language of Solem and by
our other cases interpreting the Eighth Amendment."244
A second theme is that the more areas in which a Justice routinely
dissents or deviates from precedents, the less influence she has on
the Court and the more likely she becomes a marginalist with more
extreme views on stare decisis. 245 Justice Brennan has said that a
Justice can dissent routinely in no more than a handful of areas
before he has impaired his ability to build coalitions.246 In his
thirty-four years on the Court, he routinely dissented in only a few
areas, including, most notably, capital punishment.247 Similarly,
Justice Stewart's reluctance to dissent"in every substantive due process case led him to concur in Roe on the ground that the right to
have an abortion fell clearly within the scope of the right of privacy
that had been well established by prior decisions. 248 Unlike Justices
Brennan and Stewart, Justice Scalia often has placed himself on the
Court's margin by disregarding or direcdy challenging the Court's
precedents in order to enunciate "correct" views in such areas as
separation of powers,249 proportionality .of punishment,2so abortion,251 the right to die,2s2 nude dancing,2ss obscenity,254 criminal
243. /d. at 2703-05 (Kennedy,]., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment}.
244. /d. at 2709, 2714 (White,J., dissenting}.
245. See generally Kelman, supra note 215, at 248-58 (discussing various justices who
have dissented repeatedly in a number of areas and the modest influence they each exerted over their colleagues}.
246. See Brennan, supra note 48, at 435-37.
247. /d. at 432 (noting that he dissented routinely on obscenity, the death penalty,
double jeopardy, and the Eleventh Amendment}. For the most part, Justice Marshall
followed a similar pattern. See Kelman, supra note 215, at 253 (noting justice Marshall's
persistent dissents on the death penalty and obscenity).
248. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 169-70 (1973} (Stewart, J., concurring}. justice
White shows some affinity for a standard not dissimilar from justice Stewart's adherence
to prior decisions when there is a clearly established practice on the part of the Court to
follow them. Compare Barnes v. Glen Theater, Inc., Ill S. Ct. 2458, 2474 (1991) (White,
]., dissenting) (denouncing the majority's upholding of a state's regulation of nude
dancing despite "settled doctrine" to the contrary) and Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct.
1246, 1254 (1991) (White, J., dissenting in part) (harshly criticizing the majority for
"overrul[ing a] vast body of precedent without a word and in so doing dislodg[ing] one
of the fundamental tenets of our criminal justice system") with Payne v. Tennessee, Ill
S. Ct. 2597 (1991} (joining Chief justice Rehnquist's opinion overruling the relatively
recent decisions of South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989}, and Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987}). For more on justice White's approach to precedent, see
supra notes 282-85 and accompanying text.
249. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 417 (1989} (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(rejecting the Court's methodology in recent separation of powers decisions); Morrison
v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 710-12 (1988} (Scalia,J., dissenting} (same}.
250. See Harmelin v. Michigan, Ill S. Ct. 2680 (1991} (joined only by Chief justice
Rehnquist in urging the overruling of Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983)}.
251. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 532 (1989} (Scalia,] .•
concurring in pan and concurring in the judgment} (arguing that Roe should be overruled explicitly}.
252. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, IIO S. Ct. 2841, 2860 (1990)
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jury selection,255 negative commerce clause,255 affirmative action,257
religion,258 and criminal procedure.259 In some other areas, Justice
Scalia has assembled coalitions by distinguishing rather than direcdy challenging precedents, even though those distinctions seemingly have narrowed prior decisions to their facts. 26 0
Justice Scalia's performance as a Circuit Justice provides a stark
illustration of how, when removed from a setting in which consensus is important in order to get things done, he grounds his decisions solely on his views on how the Constitution should be
(Scalia,J., concurring) (rejecting the reasoning of precedents such as Roe and arguing
that there is no substantive due process fundamental right to refuse unwanted medical
treatment).
253. See Barnes v. Glen Theater, Inc., Ill S. Ct. 2456, 2463 (1991) (Scalia,j., concurring in the judgment) (suggesting, contrary to the Court's precedents, that nude dancing
deserves no First Amendment protection).
254. See Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 505'(1987) (Scalia,J., concurring) (calling for a
reconsideration of the Court's test for evaluating the constitutionality of obscenity laws,
set forth in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)).
255. See Powers v. Ohio, IllS. Ct. 1364, 1381 (1991) (Scalia,j., dissenting) (questioning Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S: 79 (1986), and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966)).
256. See American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 303-06 (1987)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (challenging the Court's negative Commerce Clause
jurisprudence).
257. See City ofRichmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 520-21 (1989) (Scalia,j.,
concurring) (suggesting that race can never be the basis of legislative classifications,
thereby calling into question the validity of Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980)).
258. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 611 (1987) (Scalia,j., dissenting) (criticizing the first prong of the Court's test for evaluating Establishment Clause challenges).
259. See South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 823 (1989) (Scalia,j., dissenting)
(urging the overruling of Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987)).
As the previously cited cases indicate, see supra notes 249-59, justice Scalia has written
separately more often than any other member of the Rehnquist Court. See David Stewart, A Chorus of Voices, 77 A.B.A.j. 50, 52 (1991) (documenting justice Scalia's tendency
to write separately). justice Scalia routinely quotes Justice Douglas' views on the importance of correctly deciding cases rather than blindly following precedent. See, e.g.,
Gathers, 490 U.S. at 825 (Scalia,j., dissenting) (quoting Douglas, supra note 2, at 736).
Ironically,justice Douglas was a notorious marginalist. See G. Edward White, The Antijudge: William 0. Douglas and the Ambiguities of Individuality, 74 VA. L. REv. 17, 42, 65
(1988) (describing justice Douglas' lack of interest in consensus building).
260. See, e.g., Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990) (maintaining that the Court had never recognized a free exercise of religion exception to the application of an otherwise valid criminal law by distinguishing several
precedents upholding free exercise claims on the ground that they were unique to the
employment context); james D. Gordon Ill, Free Exercise on the Mountaintop, 79 CAL. L.
REV. 91, 94-100 (1991) (criticizing Smith for dubiously distinguishing clearly relevant
precedents that previously had required the Court to strictly scrutinize laws significantly
impairing the free exercise of religion); see also Burnham v. Superior Court, 110 S. Ct.
2105,2116 (1990) (holding that prior contacts with a state were not necessary for a state
to exercise transient jurisdiction over a defendant by distinguishing Shaffer v. Heitner,
433 U.S. 186 (1977), and International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945),
on the basis that they recognized only a narrow exception to this rule for defendants not
in the state at the time of service of process even though they had been cited mostly for
the proposition that a state must show minimum contacts whenever it wants to assert
jurisdiction over a defendant).
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interpreted rather than on the social consequences of deviating
from past practice. In his capacjty as the Circuit Justice for the Fifth
Circuit, Justice Scalia recently declared that he would break from
the past practice ofFifth Circuit Justices to grant automatic time extensions in capital cases for defendants needing lawyers.261 This
statement suggests that when Justice Scalia does not have to get
consensus to formulate a rule oflaw of which he approves, he seemingly prefers not to follow prior practice but rather to reach what he
regards as the right conclusion, even though, as in this case, the
prior practice had increased the opportunities for death row inmates
to obtain legal counsel. Because Justice Scalia's decisions as a Circuit Justice are rarely reviewable, he has more freedom as a Circuit
Justice to disregard the need to strike a balance.
A third theme emerging from the study of the individualJustices'
approaches to stare decisis is that the Justices each seem to have
different approaches· to weakening or overruling precedents. For
example, ChiefJustice Rehnquist tends to weaken precedents by citing them for much narrower propositions than the ones they originally had held. For example, in W?Sconsin v. Constantineau, 262 the
Court struck down a law permitting the public posting of the names
of persons causing disturbances because of excessive drinking. But
later, in Paul v. Davis, 263 then-Justice Rehnquist wrote the Court's
opinion holding that government-inflicted injury to reputation,
without more, does not require due process. He distinguished Constantineau on the ground that the public posting in that case had altered the plaintiff's legal right to purchase liquor,264 even though
Constantineau originally had based its holding on the idea that whenever government action "stigma[tizes]" .a person, impairing the liberty interest she has in her good name, reputation, honor, or
integrity, then due process must be afforded.265
Justice Scalia rarely equivocates or uses indirect methods to dismantle the precedents he does not like. He is the archetype of the
Justice who prefers to challenge directly decisions he regards as erroneously reasoned. 266 Although he shows great deference toward
261. See Marcia Coyle & Marianne Lavelle, Chilling Capital Appeals; Scalia Ruling Makes
It Harder To Find Attorneys, NAT'L LJ., Mar. 11, 1991, at 1.
262. 400 u.s. 433 (1971).
263. 424 u.s. 693 (1976).
264. /d. at 709-10.
265. Constantineau, 400 U.S. at437. In another case, Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services, 492 U.S. 490, 520 (1989), Chiefjustice Rehnquist speculated about the different ways to characterize the fundamental right recognized in Roe and settled on the
notion of having an abortion as a "liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause,"
subjecting state abortion regulations to the rational basis test in federal courts. Obviously, Chiefjustice Rehnquist's rephrasing of the right in Roe, if adopted in the future,
would remove any meaningful federal constitutional protection for abortions.
A variation on this practice is citing precedents for broader or completely different
propositions than those for which they originally stood in order to support some present
decision. For example, in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965), justice
Douglas cited Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), and Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510 (1925), as recognizing privacy interests under the First Amendment, even
though those decisions concerned themselves solely with substantive due process.
266. See, e.g., supra note 259.
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the States' historical practices as strong evidence of constitutionally ·
permissible traditions, 267 he rarely respects the Court's past practices or traditions simply because they are old: he prefers to correctly decide cases to restore certain constitutional nonns (for
example, on federalism or separation of powers) rather than perpetuate errors unless the hann of overruling is so great that he finds he
has no practical choice but to avoid reexamining an erroneous
·
decision.268
Unlike Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy has tended to decide cases
as if he had a strong but rebuttable presumption in favor of prior
decisions. He tends to decide cases on the narrowest available
grounds, hesitating to overrule or expand a previous ruling, for the
sake of affecting settled doctrine as little as possible.269 More recently, however, in Payne v. Tennessee,21o he joined the majority and
two separate opinions that argued for overturning two precedents
267. justice Scalia frequendy defers to what the States have permitted historically.
See, e.g., Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, ll1 S. Ct. 1032, 1047 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (suggesting that it is not possible for punitive damages to violate due process if the States have had discretion concerning them for over 200 years); Burnham v.
Superior Court, 110 S. Ct. 2105, 2112-13 (1990) (arguing that the states' historic treatment oftransientjurisdiction establishes a tradition that satisfies due process); Michael
H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (suggesting that if the States have overwhelmingly protected an interest through legislation it would then be permissible for a
court to conclude that the interest in question is a "tradition" deserving of constitutional protection under the Due Process Clause).
268. Cf. South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 825 (1989) (Scalia,J., dissenting)
(observing that "I had thought that the respect accorded to [precedents] increases,
rather than decreases, with their antiquity, as the society adjusts itself to their existence,
and the surrounding law becomes premised upon their validity").
269. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680,2702 (19Q1) (Kennedy,]., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the case before the Court
could be decided based on prior case law, and therefore finding it unnecessary to overrule the Court's most recent deciSion on proportionality of punishment); Jones v.
Thomas, 491 U.S. 376, 383-84 (1989) (refusing to extend a precedent recognizing that
"where one valid alternative provision of the original sentence has been satisfied, the
[criminal defendant] is entided to be freed of further restraint [in compliance with the
requirements of the Double jeopardy Clause]," to the present case "involv[ing] separate
sentences imposed for what the sentencing court thought to be separately punishable
offenses, one far more serious than the other") (citation omitted); Barnard v. Thorstenn,
489 U.S. 546, 551-58 (1989) (refusing to determine whether the Court's "supervisory
power" over lower federal courts could resolve the question before the Court, and instead relying on an interpretation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 518 (1989) (Kennedy,]., concurring) (declining
to join the majority orjustice Scalia's separate concurrence commenting on the scope of
Congress' power to adopt legislation designed to remedy past discrimination because
the issue was not before the Court). See generally Michael]. Gerhardt, Anthony M. Kennedy,
in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (forthcoming Dec. 1991) (describing
various cases in which justice Kennedy avoided expanding or contracting precedent).
270. 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991), overruling South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805
(1989) and Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
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regarding victim impact statements on the grounds that those opinions had been erroneously reasoned. 271 In Payne, he also joined Justice Souter's separate concurrence arguing that those decisions
should be overruled because they were erroneously reasoned and
demonstrably unworkable. 272 In Payne, he also recently joine~ opinions narrowing public access to abortions 273 and challenging prior
interpretations of the Establishment Clause, which he argues should
be construed as prohibiting government from coercing people into
believing sot:p.ething they do not believe or from establishing the
functional equivalent of state religions.274
Like Justice Kennedy,justice O'Connor seems to treat precedents
with a strong presumption of validity. She explained in Arizona v.
Rumsey, 275 that "[a]lthough adherence to precedent is not rigidly required in constitutional cases, any departure from the doctrine of
stare decisis demands special justification."276 Although Justice
O'Connor has not yet personally spelled out the "special justification" that would persuade her to overrule a precedent, she separately concurred in Payne v. Tennessee 2 77 on the ground that Booth
and Gathers should be overruled merely because they were badly
reasoned. 278
Similarly, justice Souter's views on stare decisis are not entirely
clear, although he has shown a tendency to prefer that the Court
show something more than erroneous reasoning to justify overruling a precedent. His respect for constitutional precedents can be
gleaned primarily from his separate concurrence in Payne, in which
he argued that the Court had "specialjustification" for overturning
Booth and Gathers because those precedents were "unworkable" and
badly reasoned.279 In addition, Justice Souter joined Justice Kennedy's separate opinion in Harmelin v. Michigan, 280 which argued
that the case could be decided without having to overrule
precedent. 281
Despite being on the Court for nearly thirty years, Justice White's
views on stare decisis remain unclear. For example, although he
271. See id. at 2601 (opinion of the Court}; id. at 2611 (joining Justice O'Connor's
concurring opinion}; id. at 2613 (joining relevant part of Justice Scalia's concurring
opinion}.
272. ld. at 2614, 2626 (Souter,J., concurring). '
273. See Rust v. Sullivan, IllS. Ct. 1759 (1991) (voting to uphold a federal regulation prohibiting counseling organizations that receive federal funds from talking about
abortion}; Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (voting with
ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justice White to dismantle Roe's trimester framework).
274. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655-63 (1989} (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part}.
275. 467 u.s. 203 (1984}.
276. ld. at 212.
277. Ill S. Ct. 2597, 2611 (1991) (O'Connor,J., concurring}.
278. !d. at 2612 (justifying her willingness to overrule Booth and Gathers only by stating that she "agree[d) with the Court that [Booth] and [Gathers] were wrongly decided"}.
279. /d. at 2614, 2616 (Souter,J., concurring).
280. Ill S. Ct. 2680, 2702 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
281. /d.
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joined the Court's opinion in New York Times v. Sullivan, 282 he expressly disavowed Sullivan in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. 283 but did not indicate in his concurring opinions whether
his disagreement with the reasoning in Sullivan would be sufficient
grounds for overruling that precedent.284 In the abortion context,
Justice White has more than once urged the overruling of Roe but
did notjoinJustice Scalia's concurrence urging Roe's overruling.285
Justice Stevens has explained what would satisfy his "special examination [before an overruling]. Among the questions to be considered are the possible significance of intervening events, the
possible impact on setded expectations, and the risk of undermining
public confidence in the stability of our basic rules oflaw."286 Justice Stevens, however, apparendy did not find any such conditions
barring his argument in United 8_tates v. Eichman 287 for overruling
Texas v. johnson, in which the Court recognized First Amendment
protection for flag burning.28B
These different approaches to precedent indicate that even when
the Justices might agree that something substantially more than erroneous reasoning should be the basis for an overruling, they might
still disagree in particular cases whether the standard has been met.
These latter disagreements suggest that an even higher standard of
deference for precedents would not necessarily preclude overrulings because many of the Justices may still have strong feelings or
juogments about how the Constitution should be interpreted and
about the Court's role in our political system that lead them to apply
the standards for overrulings differendy. In other words, a higher
standard of deference to precedents does not guarantee any particular outcome. It is also true, however, that any lower standard for
282. 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding that a public official may not recover for libel absent a clear showing of actual malice).
283. 472 U.S. 749, 765 (1985) (White,J., concurring in the judgment).
284. In a similarly confusing vein, justice White wrote the Court's opinion in Swain v.
Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause did not prohibit prosecutors from using peremptory challenges to remove from petit juries members of the defendant's race), but he joined the Court's opinion in Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79, 100, 102 (1986) (White,j., concurring), which overruled Swain.
285. Compare Thornburgh v. American College 'or Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747, 788 (1986) (White,j., dissenting) (arguing that Roe should be overruled, and
stating "[t]hat the flaws in an opinion were evident at the time it was handed down is
hardly a reason for adhering to it") with Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492
U.S. 490, 532 (1989) (Scalia,J., concurring in the judgment).
286. Stevens, supra note 46, at 9 (footnote omitted).
287. 110 S. Ct. 2404, 2410 (1990) (Stevens,]., dissenting).
288. 491 U.S. 397 (1989); see also supra note 71. In contrast, justice Stevens argued
there were no conditions requiring the overruling of Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753
(1979), in California v. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 1994, 2003 (1991) (Stevens,J., dissenting) (complaining that "[t]he [majority's decision] is .•• not nearly as significant as
the Court's willingness to [overrule Sanders] without a colorable basis").
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overruling a precedent, such as a prior decision's erroneous reasoning standing alone, would be likely (depending, of course, on the
kinds of people who apply it) to produce many disagreements, numerous overrulings, and general confusion in constitutionallaw.289
A fourth theme is that the position of ChiefJustice may make its
occupants less likely to write separate opinions. As "the first among
equals," 290 the Chief Justice is in a unique position to exercise social, intellectual, and policy leadership on the Court. 291 Some Chief
Justices have made a greater investment in avoiding or discouraging
divisions on the Court than the average Associate Justice,292 suggesting the possibility that someone who has moved from being an
Associate Justice to Chief Justice, such as William Rehnquist, may
change his attitudes about the need for consensus after becoming
the Chief Justice. Interestingly, as an Associate Justice, Rehnquist
frequently wrote separately to denounce precedents, but, as Chief
Justice, he has severely limited that practice. 293 As ChiefJustice, he
has also moderated several earlier positions in order to build coalitions to weaken some precedents294 and to bolster others.295
Perhaps emboldened by the Court's decisive ideological shift to
the right during the 1990 Term, however, Chief Justice Rehnquist
289. See, e.g., Paynev. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597,2619,2621-22 (1991) (Marshall,J.,
dissenting).
290. ROBERT j. STEAMER, CHIEF jUSTICE: LEADERSHIP AND THE SUPREME COURT 10
(1986).
291. See generally STEPHEN L. WASBY, THE SUPREME CouRT IN THE FEDERAL jUDICIAL
SYSTEM 188 (2d ed. 1984) (describing the various leadership roles a Chief justice can
perform).
292. Chief justices sometimes have voted against their beliefs in the interest of solidarity. See Kelman, supra note 215, at 241-42 n.50; see also STEAMER, supra note 290, at
24-32 (describing the practice of Chiefjustices to submerge their personal opinions on
some issues to build coalitions).
293. See, e.g., Bennett, supra note 215, at 255 n.1 (showing that in the year before
becoming Chiefjustice, then:Justice Rehnquist had been the Court's fifth most prolific
dissenter, but, in his first year after becoming the Chief Justice, he became the least
prolific dissenter, a position he held again during the 1990 Term); see also Stewart, supra
note 259, at 50 (comparing then-Associate justice Rehnquist's writing 12 separate concurrences in the October Term 1978 with his writing only three concurring opinions in
the 1989 and 1990 Terms as Chiefjustice).
Interestingly, Edward D. White, who served as Chiefjustice from 1910-21 after having
served as an Associate justice, also moderated some of his previous positions after becoming Chief justice. BENNO C. SCHMIDT, 9 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES, THE jUDICIARY AND RESPONSIBLE GoVERNMENT 1910-1921 (PART II), at
745 (1984) (noting Chiefjustice White's moderations of his previous positions on segregation); see also WASBY, supra note 291, at 189 (noting that Chief justice White ranked
relatively high among Chiefjustices in avoiding conflict during his tenure as Chiefjustice). Harlan Fiske Stone, however, who served as Chiefjustice from 1941-46 after having served as an Associate justice, achieved little success in coalition building despite his
stated desire to do otherwise. See ALPHEUS T. MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF
THE LAw 574-75 (1956); see also WASBY, supra note 291, at 188 (noting that Chiefjustice
Stone "dissented in a larger proportion of non-unanimous cases than did any other
ChiefJustice").
294. See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 492 (1989) (not following Justice Scalia's call to overrule Roe based on arguments derived from previous
dissents joined by then:Justice Rehnquist); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469 (1989) (joining justice O'Connor's majority opinion and, in so doing, softening his absolute rejection of affirmative action indicated by his joining justice Stewart's
dissent in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 523 (1980) (Stewart,]., dissenting)).
295. For example, Chief justice Rehnquist's opinion in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell,
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ventured to explain in a speech before the Fourth Circuit Judicial
Conference what he perceived as the basis for the Court's decision
in Payne v. Tennessee 2 9 6 to overrule two precedents prohibiting the
admission of victim impact statements in the sentencing phase of
capital trials.29 7 Going beyond the actual reasons given in the majority's opinion in Payne, he maintained that constitutional precedents carry little weight in and of themselves in decisionmaking, but
they usually carry even less weight than usual in criminal procedure
cases.29S He explained further that with decisions involving property or contracts, parties have a "reliance interest" in desiring stability from the Court but that " '[a] criminal defendant has no reliance
interest at all' ... [given] that few criminals'would base their decisions to commit a crime on whether Booth and Gathers were still in
place. " 299
·
If Chiefjustice Rehnquist's point is that people's expectations regarding their social, economic, and political interests are more settled ·with respect to property and contracts cases than with criminal
procedure precedents, he may be right, but he has yet to produce
empirical support for his proposition. MQre importantly, if the
Chiefjustice's point is that criminal defendants have less legitimate
interests in preserving the precedents that favor them than do the
parties in property or contract decisions, then he is seriously mistaken. The fact remains that many of the people interested in the
outcome of these different precedents, including criminal defendants, are asserting constitutional rights that the Court has recognized and enforced in the past. Thus, it is the Court itself that has
legitimated the claim& of (and any reliance by) all these parties.
When economic interests, liberty, or, ·more importantly, life itself,
tum on the Court's reasons for abandoning previously recogn~zed
rights, the Court is the institutidn best situated to bear the burden
and the responsibility of sho·wing why the social costs of withdrawing constitutional protections are different with respect to the people, rights, and situations involved.
485 U.S. 46 (1988) (holding that public plaintiffs cannot recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress without a showing that the publication complained of contained a false statement of fact published with actual malice), surprised many of his
critics, because it strengthened New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), rather
than follow his criticisms of that decision made before he became Chiefjustice. See, e.g.,
Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 166-68 (1979) (refusing to apply Sullivan automatically to someone who had engaged in criminal conduct); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 453-55 (1976) (restricting Sullivan to apply to voluntary public
figures and declining to apply it at 'all to reports of judicial proceedings).
·
296. 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
297. See Tony Mauro, Courtside: Marshall: Scant Mementos, Scattered Clerks, LEGAL
TIMES, july 15, 1991, at 8.
298. /d. at 9.
299. Id.
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Finally, the current and recent Justices rarely take contradictory
stances on constitutional stare decisis. For example, despite charges
to the contrary, 30° Chief Justice Rehnquist has shown remarkable
consistency in demonstrating respect for precedents only when he
agrees with the values underlying them. 301 Similarly, Justice Blackmun abandoned National League qf Cities v. Usery 302 as demonstrably
unworkable in his majority opinion in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,303 but provided a vigorous defense of Roe on
the basis of stare decisis in his Webster dissent because he believed
Roe had proved to offer workable standards for reviewing abortion
regulations.304
The general reluctance of the Justices to state a theory of stare
decisis conforms to their general practice of confining their rhetoric
to the present case to avoid painting themselves into a corner in
future decisions.305 Ironically, this selective disclosure preserves
the Justices' flexibility for future dialogues regarding the sanctity of
particular precedents.
A number of constitutional experts, including Dean Guido Calabresi of the Yale Law School, testified during the confirmation proceedings for Justice Thomas, however, that the Court lacks
300. See, e.g., Earl Maltz, The Nature of Precedent, 66 N.C. L. REv. 367, 371 n.16, 374
n.28 (1988) (criticizing then:Justice Rehnquist's lack of respect for, and inconsistent
posturings regarding, precedent).
301. Compare City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 631-32 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (expressing dismay at the Court's deviation from precedents upholding the states' power to prohibit importation of diseased items, and to enact
quarantine laws) with National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833,855 (1976) (suggesting that Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), must be overruled, given its incompatibility with the standard he had just set forth for limiting congressional power under
the Commerce Clause); see also supra note 168. But see Hearings Before the Comm. on the
judiciary, United Slates Senate, On the Nomination of William H. Rehnquisl to be an Associate
justice of the United Slates, 117 CoNG. REc. 39765 (1971) (statement of William H. Rehnquist) ("I feel that great weight should be given to precedent.").
302. 426 u.s. 833 (1976).
303. 469 u.s. 528, 531, 548-58 (1985).
304. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 537, 553-60 (1989)
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
305. The perception that many Justices do not speak more fully about precedents is,
of course, a source of the view that precedents do not matter to the Court. See supra note
24 and accompanying text. This Article has tried to show, however, that this view is
overstated because the Justices do seem to consider precedents in the certiorari process
seriously, see supra notes 27-48 and accompanying text, and because it is possible for the
Justices to achieve a suitable balance between their reasoned elaboration on the merits
of precedents and their efforts to promote stability or achieve consensus. See supra notes
215-27 and infra notes 356 & 384 and accompanying text.
Interestingly, whenJustices have tried to state a complete theory of stare decisis, they
sometimes have found themselves on the margin of the Court, as demonstrated by Justices Scalia and Douglas' routine disregard of precedent in order to do what each
thought was right, and by Justice john Marshall Harlan, who frequently found himself
alone when offering his complex view that a "precedent should not be jettisoned when
the rule of yesterday remains viable, creates no injustice, and can reasonably be said to
be no less sound than the rule sponsored by those who seek change, let alone incapable
of being demonstrated wrong." Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 128-29 (1970)
(Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Bourguignon, supra note 215, at 277-81 (describing
Harlan's unique practice of dissenting from a particular decision for the duration of the
Term in which it was issued and thereafter considering himself bound by the precedent
while expressing his dissatisfaction with it); Kelman, supra note 215, at 274-83 (describing justice Harlan's handling of precedents whose holdings he opposed).

130

(VOL.

60:68

The Role of Precedent
TilE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

ideological balance and is, therefore, not likely to be interested in
preserving or pursuing a dialogue about how the Constitution
should be interpreted.3°6 Although the preceding survey suggests
that the current conservative Justices do not yet seem to share a consensus on the appropriate criteria for overruling precedents, it is
likely that, for their part, ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia
will continue to press the other Justices to adopt the practice of
overruling precedents deemed erroneously reasoned. This scenario
raises a serious question as to what the consequences for precedent
would be if a mcrlority of the Justices were dogmatists set on overturning or abandoning any principles that deviate from the overarching, single, or unifying principle by which they believe the
Constitution should be interpreted. Part IV explores the consequences for precedent posed by a Court dominated by such a single
normative vie·wpoint with regard to constitutional interpretation.

IV.

Constitutional Theory and the Problem
Nonconforming Precedents

of

This Part describes the incompatibility between unitary constitutional theories, which aim to restrict constitutional interpretation
and adjudication to one overarching or unifying principle, and
precedents whose reasoning or holdings do not conform to that
principle or vision. This analysis not only provides additional insights into the role of precedents in constitutional decisionmaking
but also shows the practical failure of unitary constitutional theory.
This Part concludes lvith a normative proposal for reconciling constitutional theory with nonconforming precedents.

A.

The Tension Between Unitary Theory and Precedent

My focus in this section is narrow but significant. I am addressing
so-called unitary theories that favor one unifying or overarching
principle for organizing, explaining, or guiding constitutional interpretation.307 Unitary theories have been criticized for being logically inconsistent and incoherent and for being generally incapable
of achieving their stated objectives.308 They also can be criticized
306. See Kurt Shillinger, What Was Learned from Senate Hearings, THE CHRISTIAN SciENCE MoNITOR, Sept. ,24, 1991, at 6.
307. See generally MARK V. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF
CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw 1, 3, 181 (1988) (defining "grand" or "unitary" theories as nonnative attempts to justify judicial review in a democracy in terms of a single unifying or
overarching principle).
308. Id. at 179, 313 (arguing that no unitary theory is immune to internal incoherence, or to the problem of not being able fully to achieve its stated objective).

1991]

131

for not containing any mechanism by which they can be implemented without doing serious damage to many of the settled governmental, social, and personal expectations and practices built up
around precedents.
So much constitutional doctrine is premised on the rejection of
any one view of theory and so much unitary theory is premised on
the idea that most precedents have been decided wrongly that, as a
practical matter, the Court would face an inescapable dilemma if it
were to rigidly or dogmatically adhere to a single unifying principle
of constitutional interpretation. The Court would have to choose
between rejecting most of its precedents, thereby precipitating constitutional turmoil, or rejecting or seriously modifying the proposed
unitary theory to ensure stability or continuity in constitutional
decisionmaking.
The conflict between a unitary theory and precedents derives
from their fundamentally different purposes. Precedents perform
various roles in the Court's decisionmaking and for society, virtually
all of which are ignored by a unitary theory. Perhaps most important, the Court's review of its decisions comprises a dialogue among
the Justices on the need to decide cases narrowly and move incrementally to avoid constitutional error and on whether to perpetuate
certain values the Court previously has approved for guiding the operation of government. A unitary theory purports either to end this
dialogue or to explore the implications of only one constitutional
vision, not the process of mediating among different visions.so9 A
unitary theory attempts to provide strict guidelines for the Justices
to correct or avoid many of the Court's past errors. Consequently, a
dogmatic application of such a theory is at odds with most precedents because the Court's fidelity to a unitary theory would cause
substantial social and political disruption, and because no unitary
theorist has incorporated into her approach standards for dealing
with nonconforming precedent and the actual process by which the
Justices interpret or apply precedents.
Moreover, the practical value of a unitary theory is seriously
threatened by its failure to comprehensively and coherently confront all of the questions precedents pose for constitutional decisionmaking and theory. Precedents can, for example, force
theorists in general to make judgments about which precedents are
worth keeping. Although skeptics can emphasize a unitary theory's
lack of responsiveness to precedents, proponents of such approaches have yet to respond to this criticism. Precedents also can
provide theorists with an escape clause in the sense that they may
avoid problems with their theory by claiming the need to preserve
precedents for the sake of constitutional stability; however, unitary
theorists have rarely used precedents in this manner, nor is it clear
309. For a general discussion of theories that restrict constitutional interpretation to
certain unifying concepts, see William A. Kaplin, The Process of Constitutional Interpretation:
A Synthesis of the Present and A Guide to the Future, 42 RUTGERS LJ. 983 (1990). For a
criticism of these theories, see Fallon, supra note 20, at 1248.
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which escape routes different unitar.y theorists would prefer. Last,
precedents impose a disorder on constitutional law that necessitates
a comprehensive theory of constitutional interpretation that accommodates precedent.s10 In short, a theorist bent on restricting constitutional interpretation to one unifying principle QUt who cares
about the practical value of her thepry and prefers stability to constitutional turmoiP 11 must find a principled solution to nonconforming precedents.
Nevertheless, some unitary theories imply less respect for precedents than others. The unitary theory that probably implies the
least respect for precedents is original understanding.s 12 Indeed,
the failure to reconcile originalism with constitutional doctrine is a
prime example of the dilemma that nonconforming precedents can
pose for theory. So many Supreme Court precedents have been
based ·on a rejection of original understanding31 S that faithful adherents to original understanding face an inescapable dilemma.8 14
They either can strive to overrule the better part of constitutional
310. See Monaghan, supra note 7, at 747 (arguing that "one needs a general theory of
constitutional interpretation that includes some account of precedent" to justify the
Court overruling precedents in some areas but not others). .
311. A number of theorists may not defer much to precedent because they may desire
some kind of revolution precipitated by the Court's overturning, of all of the precedents
they regard as wrongly decided. See, e.g., RtcHAIU> EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY
AND THE PoWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 29;31 (1985) (advocating a level ofjudicial intervention with respect to eminent domain far great~r than any precedents in existence
would support); CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON
LIFE AND LAw 213 (1987) (arguing that the Court's obscenity and pornography decisions
contribute to the enslavement of women and, therefore, need to be overturned); BERNAIU> H. SIEGAN, EcoNOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE .CONSTITUTION 318-22 (1980) (setting
forth five reasons for the Court to overrule its decisions abandoning strict scrutiny of
governmental regulations of economic activities); TusHNET, supra note 307, at 15, 275,
314 (indicating that social and political revolution is necessary to bring about the kind
oflegal system that would satisfy him); see also Frank I. Michelman, Process and Property in
Constitutional Theory, 30 CLEv. ST. L. REV. 577, 583, 590-92 (1982) (acknowledging a
number of precedents inconsistent with the results his mode o£ judicial decisionmaking-public values-would produce).
.
312. For a brief summary of this theory, see BoRK, supra note 12, at 143-60 (1989)
(maintaining that the most effective way that judges can restrain tlieir tyrannical tendencies is if they confine themselves to discovering, and consequently- respecting, what each
constitutional provision objectively meant to its framers and ratifiers-leaving to the
majoritarian legislative process any matter on which the Constitution, or the original
understanding of its framers and ratifiers, is silent or ambiguous).
313. See Monaghan, supra note 7, at 739 ("[N]o acceptable version of original understanding theory can [explain] the major features of our •Bicentennial Constitution':
nontextual guarantees of civil liberties; a powerfully presi~entially centered national
government; a huge administrative apparatus; and national responsibility for what has
long been considered of either as local responsibilities or as not the responsibility of
government at all.").
314. For discussions of this dilemma, see MICHAEL J• PERRY, THE CoNSTITUTION,
HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE CouRTS 64-67 (1982); Monaghan, supra note 7, at 723-24;
Gerhardt, supra note 104, at 1383-85. Prominent originalists that have tried to resolve
this problem include RAOUL BERGER, FEDERAUSM: THE FoUNDERS' DESIGN 178-92
(1987); RoBERT BORK, supra note 12, at 155-59; and Cooper, supra note 12, at 404, 406,
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doctrine and thereby thrust the world of constitutional law into turmoil, or they must abandon original understanding in numerous
substantive areas in order to stabilize constitutionallaw.8 15
When originalists have acknowledged the need to reconcile their
respective theories of constitutional interpretation with nonoriginalist precedents, they have suggested approaches to stare decisis so
riddled with exceptions as to be meaningless restraints on judicial
activism. Originalists tend to propose some variation of the following three principles as guides to stare decisis: (1) lower courts
should respect precedents more rigorously than the Court itself; 816
(2) the Court should never overrule any decision unless the Court
has found that it was wrongly decided;817 and (3) the Court should
not overrule prior, erroneous decisions when it would create serious
upheaval of established governmental operations.sts
None of these principles of stare decisis produces any meaningful
deference to nonoriginalist precedents. First, originalists tend to focus only on the Supreme Court rather than lower courts, so there is
insufficient data to discern just how closely these originalists would
expect lower courts to adhere to precedent.319 Second, requiring a
case to be decided wrongly before it can be overruled is hardly a
barrier to overruling, as demonstrated by the large number of decisions criticized and rejected by many originalists. a2o Third, it is a
mistake to believe that once a constitutional issue can be resolved
correctly in terms of original understanding the decision will be immune to overruling because it is not likely there will be consensus
on the Court that originalism is the preferred mode of constitutional
decisionmaking or can be read in only one way.32I Lastly, originalists' approaches to nonconforming precedents do not derive from
408, 410. But see Kay, supra note 118 (responding to three objections to original understanding but not mentioning, much less addressing, the dilemma posed by the tension
between precedents and original intent).
315. See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, What Is The Constitution? 9-12 (unpublished
manuscript on file with the author) (continuing to adhere to his position that the incompatibility between originalism and precedents is so profound that he can conceive of no
justification for advocating a return to the former); Gerhardt, supra note 104, at 1383-85
(discussing the magnitude of the tension between original intent and precedents by
demonstrating the few instances that the Coun has tried to follow original intent).
316. See, e.g., BoRK, supra note 12, at 157-59.
317. ld.
318. BERGER, supra note 12, at 79-80 (suggesting that in the rare case where practicalities argue against reversal, the Court can refuse to expand or to apply the mistaken
decision in the future); Cooper, supra note 12, at 410 (following Bark in accepting the
need to follow precedents whose reversal "would pitch the country into the abyss").
319. Indeed, for one originalist, Robert Bork, this admonition to lower courts is
purely hortatory and glosses over the complex ways in which lower federal courts may
bypass, tamper with, or even challenge Supreme Court precedent. See BORK, supra note
12, at 156; see also Gerhardt, supra note 104, at 1384.
320. See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 12 (suggesting that much of the Court's Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence is inconsistent with original intent); BoRK, supra note 12, at
19-32, 133-266, 323-36 (interspersing critique of particular decisions with his originalist
views); Berger, supra note 82, at 755-66 & 774-83 (critiquing the Court's federalism jurisprudence as inconsistent with original intent); Cooper, supra note 12, at 410 (suggesting that certain unnarr.ed precedents would survive a judicial return to original
intent).
321. See Richard A. Posner, Bork a11d Beetllovell, 42 STAN. L. REv. 1365, 1371, 1382
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original understanding but rather from their consideration of certain social values such as the need for stability and continuity in constitutional law; however, for some originalists, taking the perceived
social impact of a decision into account is· more akin to legislating
from the bench than interpreting the law.s22
A unitary theory that is only slightly more deferential to precedents is neutral principles, which posits that the judicial process is at
its most legitimate when it rests its decisions and each step of its
reasoning on grounds of appropriate neutrality and generality.s2s
This approach requires overruling many precedents, including
Brown v. Board of Education, 3 24 for the approach's chief adherent has
noted thatjudges should "stand with the long tradition of the Court
that previous decisions must be subject to reexamination when a
case against their reasoning is made."325
Adopting theories aimed at critiquing decisions in terms of moral
reasoning also pose problems for precedents. For example, Professor David Richards has argued that judicial review is at its most legitimate :when judges are guided by moral principles ofjustice. He
has explained that "[m]ajority rule is not the basic moral principle
of the constitutional order. The basic moral principles are the principles of justice, including the principle of greatest equal liberty.
Mcyority rule is justified only to the extent that ·it is compatible with
this deeper moral principle."326 Professor Richards has elaborated
on the theory of human rights underlying this principle, the fundamental assumptions of which are "the belief that <=:.very person has a
capacity for autonomy, and ... the principle that every person has
the right to equal concern and respect in pursuit of his autonomy."327 For Professor Richards, this theory leads to the recognition of constitutional protection for a significant realm of personal
autonomy, including "the principle oflove as a civil liberty," a right
(1990) (suggesting that neither the authority of, nor the public's approval of, the Court
depends on its adherence to originalism).
322. See, e.g., BoRK, supra note 12, at 187-221 (critiquing any contemporary theorist's
reliance on anything but original understanding as a source ofjudicial decision).
323. See HERBERT WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, PoLITICS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 21
(1961).
324. 347 u.s. 483 (1954).
325. See Wechsler, supra note 87, at 19, 31-32, 34 (criticizing Brown for lack of neutral
principles supporting it}. More recently, Professor Maltz has argued that "the most important institutional constraint on the Court's action [is] the requirement that the Court
reach its results by a rational, consistent application of'neutral' principles." Maltz, supra
note 12, at 467. Even though Professor Maltz is a conservative constitutional scholar
who has expressed dismay over the Court'~ seemingly increasing disregard for precedent, id., he has identified as the most important constraint on the-Court's review of precedent a theoretical approach to interpretation that includes no mechanism for
deferring to precedent.
326. DAVID AJ. RICHARDS, THE MoRAL CRITICISM oF LAw 50-51 (i977}.
327. David AJ. Richards, Se:o.-ual Autonomy and the Constitutional Right to Priva0•: A Case
Study in Human Rights and the Unwrillen Constitution, 30 HASTINGS LJ. 957. 964 {1979}.
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to die, consensual homosexual conduct and possibly such "basic life
choices" as dress and hair length, or perhaps even "soft drug
use." 328 While it seems as if Professor Richards' theoretical view of
constitutional law is at odds with-existing constitutional doctrine, he
has yet to clarify as a general matter the principles by which he
would determine which precedents to preserve or overrule.
Professor John Hart Ely's representation-reinforcing approach is
yet another unitary theoretical approach that has been constructed
without incorporating any concept on the respect due to nonconforming precedent, even though his approach purports to explain
or justify more precedents than perhaps any other unitary theory.32 9
He argues that judicial interference with majoritarian decisionmaking is justified when certain people have been formally or structurally denied the opportunity to participate equally in the political
process. 330 Although Professor Ely identifies decisions that do not
conform to his approach, such as Griswold v. Connecticut 3 3 1 and Roe v.
Wade, 332 he does not suggest the degree of deference representation-reinforcing judges should have for such precedents.333
The theoretical approach that is most deferential to precedents is
antiformalism. Antiformalists accept the Court's aversion to unitary
theory as a principled decision rather than an exercise in judicial
tyranny. Antiformalists characterize judicial review as an integral,
indispensable, and inevitably value-laden component of our constitutional government. 334 Although many antiformalists do not discuss the criteria by which an antiformalist judge should review
328. Id. at 1005, 1015 n.245; cJ. PERRY, supra note 155, at 150-51 (arguing that each
justice should routinely consult precedents in order to test her own beliefs in a "dialog[ic] encounter with the wisdom of the past," but adding that no justice should accord
any precedent "determinative status"). Although Professor Perry does not elaborate on
the factors the justices should take into account when deciding whether to overrule
precedents, he obviously understands the relationship between constitutional theory
and practice: that constitutional theory and prac~ice are interdependent, given our general "rel[iance] ... on historical and predictive claims and on moral judgments about
the consequences of the style/role at issue-as a part of our constitutional-theoretical
enterprise." Perry, supra note 17, at 249.
329. See ELY, supra note 114, at 73-75, 87-104 (attempting to reconcile interprevist
techniques with many Warren Court decisions).
330. Id.
331. 381 u.s. 479 (1965).
332. 410 u.s. 113 (1973).
333. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 114, at 221 n.4; Ely, supra note 155, at 928-30.
334. For antiformalists, constitutional adjudication is described in positive, nonthreatening terms such as (1) a dialogue among governmental actors and the citizenry
using the framework and language of the Constitution as the medium and subject of
discourse; see infra note 355; (2) government decisionmakers' search for the public values that underly the Constitution and that provide the guidelines for legislation, see, e.g.,
Frank I. Michelman, Politics and Values or Whats Really Wrong with Rationality Review?, 13
CREIGHTON L. REv. 487, 508-09 (1979); Cass R. Sunstein, Public Values, Private Interests,
and the Equal Protection Clause, 1982 SuP. CT. REV. 127, 165 (maintaining that constitutional interpretation should be understood as the process by which judges try to define
the "public value" that underlies the concepts embodied in the Constitution); (3) the
balancing of the competing constitutional claims of individuals and the government, see,
e.g., Gerald Gunther, In Search qfjudidal Quality on a Changing Court: The Case qfjustice
Powel~ 24 STAN. L. REv. 1001 (1972) (praisingjustice Harlan's balancing in First Amendment cases); Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a
General Theory qfthe First Amendment, 78 Nw. U. L. REv. 1212, 1251-53 (1983) (defending
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nonconforming precedents,8 85 I consider in the next section the arguments of some of those antiformalists who do discuss precedent
as a source of decision.

B.

The Challenge of·Reconciling Standards for Reviewing Precedents and
Interpreting the Constitution

There are two misunderstood aspects of reconciling standards for
reviewing precedents with nonunitary theories of constitutional interpretation. First, the choices of such standards often tum on a
theorist's preferences to preserve only certain precedents. Second,
the more precedents that accumulate on a certain constitutional issue, the more difficult it becomes to consider the affected .area without taking the relevant precedents into account. Both aspects
underscore the need for theorists to grapple more with precedent.

1. Explaining Theories of Precedent
The effort to reconcile standards for interpreting the Constitution
and reviewing precedent often turns on the degree to which such
standards derive from theorists' preferences on how they would
strike the critical balance as Justices between their views on how the
Consitution should be interpreted and the practical needs to submerge those views for the sake of consensus or stability.sss Theorists also need to explain more fully which effects they intend for
their proposals to have in order to clarify the reach and scope of
their proposed standards for guiding constitutional interpretation
and reviewing precedents.ss7
balancing methodology in First Amendment cases); and (4) the allocation of different
theories to specific areas of constitutional law. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, A Different Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Congress and Fetleral]urisdiction, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (1990) (suggesting that Article III authorizes a dialogue between the courts and the political
branches over the proper scope of federal jurisdiction); Gerhardt, supra note 63, at 4143, 103-04 (suggesting the impeachment clauses make sense only if they are interpreted
on their own terms rather than those of a "grand" theory).
335. See, e.g., Robert A. Burt, Constitutional Law and the Teaching of the Parables, 93 YALE
LJ. 455 (1984); Shiffrin, supra note 334.
336. See Monaghan, supra note 7, at 741-43, 748-50, 753, 757-58, 760, 762-64 (suggesting that commentators generally have failed to appreciate the degree to which their
own normative views on constitutional interpretation tend to influence their review of
precedents by making them more skeptical of certain kinds of decisions and, therefore,
more disposed to devise a rule for review that allows the precedents they each prefer to
survive).
337. For example, there are problems with Professor Maltz's proposal, supra note 12,
at 483 (suggesting that the Court more fully explain the principles on which its decisions
rest and not apply its overrulings retroactively nor issue holdings more broadly than
necessary). First, if his rules were voluntary, then they would be of use only as long as
all of the Justices were inclined to accept them. Second, the constraining power of the
rule, even if mandatory, is limited because they are subject to manipulation through
different interpretations. Third, it is not clear at what point a precedent would deviate
fr~m his preferred mode of decisionmaking such that he would then be concerned.

1991]

137

For example, many commentators have recommended increased
candor among the Justices in constitutional cases but have not fully
considered or discussed two possible effects of this proposal. 338
First, this proposal could have the effect of making consensus more
difficult on the Court. More particularly, greater candor on the
Court might complicate or hinder coalition building, and thereby
inhibit and weaken the Court's ability to issue rulings more quickly,
or possibly at all, on such politically divisive or contentious subjects
as abortion or economic regulations.339 Consequently, the theorists
making this proposal need to address more fully the degree to which
Justices need to compromise their normative views when reviewing
precedent or in generally deciding a case.340
Second, a proposal for greater candor might have the effect of
increasing respect for the Court by providing an outlet for the reasoned differences among the Justices. This suggestion, however,
can overlook that respect for the Court might just as easily depend
on the Justices' submergence of their personal views, even as to the
important reasons for overruling precedents, for the sake of consensus or stability.341
Of course, the effects of different proposals for reconciling the
standards for interpreting the Constitution and reviewing precedents may be only some of the factors theorists take into account in
making choices between different proposals. The choices may also
turn on the reasons or goals underlying the proposal and on certain
political or moral judgments of the kind of Court and society the
Justices or theorists prefer.342 It is long overdue for Justices and
theorists to disclose the extent to which they rely on the latter kind
of judgments in making their choices on their approaches to
precedent.
Such disclosures might clarify the seeming impropriety of liberals
tending toward those theories that do not conform to conservative
precedents, while conservatives may tend toward those theories that
are incompatible with liberal precedents. Until now, neither liberals
nor conservatives have been much inclined to defend their choices
in terms of the political or moral judgments underlying their preferences because doing so might brand them as biased.343
338. See supra note 209.
339. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 46, at 805-07, 832 (suggesting greater reasoned
elaboration on the part of each justice but accepting the inevitable conflict that this
would produce on the Court).
340. Professor Monaghan's suggestion that the reasoned elaboration of principle
should be the goal for each justice, see supra note 7, at 764-67, strikes a balance that
would preserve certain kinds of constitutional precedents and secure a specific role for
the Court under the Constitution.
341. Another proposal suggests that to increase stability, predictability, and impartiality in the Court's decisionmaking each justice should try to emphasize the institutional
considerations of each decision more than her normative views on constitutional interpretation. See Bennett, supra note 215, at 258-60.
342. See, e.g., LAURENCE TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CoNSTITUTION
15 (1991); Richard Kay, Preconstitutional Rules, 42 Omo ST. LJ. 187, 204, 206 (1981);
Perry, supra note 95, at 718-19.
343. See supra note 342.
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Fuller disclosure of a theorist's political or moral judgments
about the good society might also clarify to some extent the problem that Professor Jack Balkin calls "ideological drift," by which positions identified at a particular moment in history with a given
political stance, come at a later-point to be identified with quite different positions.s44 For example, many liberals are beginning to
discover the virtues of judicial restraint and stare decisis,345 while
many conservatives have begun to differ on the merits of a more
active judiciary for the sake of restoring certain basic principles of
constitutional law, or on whether the very existence of a body of
precedent is a conservative, stabilizing force in adjudication.346

2.

Critiquing Constitutional Hierarchies

As a practical matter, it is no longer true that the Constitution is
the sole "touchstone" of constitutiomU decisionmaking.347 Instead,
the Justices tend to consider, weigh, and arrange differently a variety
of sources of decision, including precedent, in resolving any constitutional matter brought before them.348 The gloss added to the
Constitution in the form of precedents is an integral part of most
dialogues among the Justices about the Constitution.
The more difficult, and perhaps impossible, question to answer is
whether one· can determine precedent's precise influence as source
of decision for each of the Justices. In one of the more comprehensive efforts to resolve this question, Professor Richard Fallon argues
that
mostjudges, lawyers, and commentators recognize the relevance
of at least five kinds of constitutional argument: arguments from
the plain, necessary or historical meaning of the constitutional
344. J .M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First Amendment, 1990 DUKE LJ. 375, 383.
345. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2619 (1991) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
346. Compare RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DoMAIN (1985) (arguing that the original understanding supports interpreting the
takings clause to invalidate a wide range of economic regulation) and BERNARD StEGAN,
EcONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CoNSTITUTION (1980) (arguing for a resurgence in economic substantive due process) and Earl Maltz, The Prospects for a Revival Of Conservative
Activism in Constitutional]urisprudence, 24 GA. L. REv. 629, 668 (1990) (suggesting that
"the emergence of conservative activism may ultimately be the best hope for a general
resurgence of the philosophy ofjudicial restraint") with Monaghan, supra note 7, at 752
(suggesting that "[a] practice ofjudicial adherence to this body of precedent will further
conservative values") (citation omitted). Professor Monaghan explains that his latter
statement reflects "an avowedly conservative conception of the judicial office-conservative in a Burkean, not libertarian sense. There is an important and wide difference
between the two." !d. at 752 n.l65.
347. Graves v. New York, 306 U.S. 466, 491-92 (1939) (Frankfurter,J., concurring).
348. See, e.g., Monaghan, supra note 315, at 14~17 (expressing concern that the text is
only one factor among many in contemporary constitutional decisionmaking).
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text; arguments about the intent of the framers; arguments of constitutional theory that reason from the hypothesized purposes that
best explain either particular constitutional provisions or the constitutional text as a whole; arguments based on judicial precedent;
and value arguments that assert claims about justice or social
policy. 349

According to Professor Fallon, the Court's objective should be to
reconcile its decisions with respect to each of the five kinds of constitutional argument.
My quarrel with Professor Fallon's suggestion about how constitutional disputes should be resolved is that it would produce more
conflict than consensus because the Justices may have signififant differences of opinion about how each of the five kinds of constitutional arguments apply in a given case. Nor does his analysis
account for legitimate differences among the Justices concerning the
ranking and content of the different sources of argument. Moreover, Fallon discounts the practical reality that each Justice might
have good reason to defer to a single source that points to a clear
result in a particular case. For example, in separation of powers
cases, Justice White might be inclined to place precedent more toward the forefront of the sources that he consults in light of the
Court's settled practice to defer to Congress' innovations;350 however, in this same area, Justice Scalia seems to place comparatively
more weight on the text and history than he places on the relevant
precedents in order to protect individual liberty from congressional
deviations from constitutional structure.sst
In addition, it is interesting to note that, even though he lias yet to
participate in deciding any cases, Justice Thomas repeatedly testified in his confirmation proceedings that in approaching constitutional issues he would consult the relevant precedents or case law as
his first step in making a decision on the Court.ss2 Although Justice
Thomas' statements may have been designed to alleviate some Senators' concerns about his intentions to help undo many liberal
precedents, his stated position conflicts with Professor Fallon's
ranking of the different sources of decision and demonstrates the
degree to which the Justices each have the discretion, flexibility, and
need to arrange the sources of decision as they see fit.
C.

Toward a Reconciliation of Theory and Precedent

If Justices or theorists were seriously interested in accommodating precedent in their work product, then they should try to do two
things. First, they should formulate criteria for overruling decisions
349. Fallon, supra note 20, at 1189-90.
350. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 967 (1983) (White,J., dissenting).
351. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,413 (1989) (Scalia,J., dissenting);
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
352. See, e.g., Bruce Fein, Adding up the Supreme Quiz Score; Flawed but Passing, WASH.
TIMES, Sept. 17, 1991, al Fl; Walter V. Robinson, Thomas Self-Portmit: Rightist, .Vol Actil•lst, BosT. GI.OBE, Sept. 18, 1991, at I; David G. Savage, Thomas Backs Pl"l!cedent as Testimouy Ellds, L.A. TIMES, Sepl. 17, 1991, at I.
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that provide (1) real protection for most precedents and (2) sufficient flexibility for the Justices to act conscientiously to undo.decisions when they believe there are important reasons to do so. The
appropriate criteria that seem to meet these objectives already have
been proposed in effect by several Justices and by Professors
Monaghan and Israel: the demonstration of a precedent's erroneous reasoning and some other substantial or important consideration, such as the precedent's proven unworkability or inconsistency
with substantial case law.sss
Second, theorists and the Justices should recognize that the most
effective way to implement the .criteria proposed above is through
the Justices' pressuring each other in the decisionmaking process.
The criteria are the common ground that the Justices should be trying to influence each other to occupy. In other words, the current
Justices need to send the message to each other and to future Justices (in the form of precedents) that the former will overrule decisions only if they find those decisions were erroneously reasoned
and are otherwise substantially problematic in some demonstrable
way. As a practical matter, the most likely way that the Justices can
pressure each other to follow certain criteria for overrulings is for
them to adopt a practice under which they each are expected at
some point in the deliberative process to give their reasons for finding that the criteria for overrulings have been met or not met in a
given case.
The antiforrnalist concept of dialogue is the theoretical approach
to interpretation and acljudication that best seems to accommodate
the criteria that I have proposed above; it allows the Justices to pressure each other through the disclosure of their respective reasons
for finding that the criteria have been met or not met. Indeed,
American law exalts dialogue. Much recent theoretical writing has
focused on ·the degree to which a meaningful exchange of ideas
should be at the center of governmental decisionmakfug authorized
by the Constitution/354 and the Court's review ofits precedents essentially has involved a colloquy among the Justices on the criteria
353. See Israel, supra note 25, at 219-26; Monaghan, supra note 7, at 758.
354. A growing number of theorists have sought to revive a "republican" system of
government in which "dialogue" figures prominently as the critical device by which consensus on the public good is achieved in legislative decisionmaking. See, e.g., BENJAMIN
R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POUTICS FOR A NEW AGE 117, 173
(1984); Frank I. Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE LJ. 1493, 1529-37 (1988); Cass R.
Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE LJ. 1493, 1580-81 (1988). These scholars offer their conception of the legislative process as an alternative to the classical liberal view, which maintains that as long as all relevant groups have equal access to the
democratic process, they should be allowed to battle among themselves for whatever
benefits they can get from the state. See, e.g., RoBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMO·
CRATIC THEORY 132 (1956); ELY, supra note 114, at 135; M. MARGOLIS, VIABLE DEMOC·
RACY 99 (1979); Owen Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 107,
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for evaluating the need to disrupt previously settled constitutional
doctrine. 355
As a normative matter, there are five reasons that a dialogic approach insisting on greater reasoned elaboration of the Justices'
grounds for finding a heightened standard for overruling decisions
has been met is superior to the status quo. In reviewing these reasons, however, one should keep in mind that, in practice, they may
not guarantee any particular outcome because the Justices can argue
conscientiously that strong reasons point in favor of overruling.
Nevertheless, reasoned elaboration discloses to present and future generations and Courts the Justices' grounds for following
heightened criteria for overruling decisions and for having applied
them in a certain way in a particular case.356 Reasoned elaboration
can provide guidance to litigants and Justices on how to argue
against previous Courts' choices and in favor of different choices on
overruling precedents.
Second, reasoned elaboration on whether heightened criteria
have been met can demonstrate the Justices' careful consideration
of each litigant's arguments for overruling.357 Indeed, constitutional adjudication is at its most legitimate when the Court deliberates carefully about the constitutional visions of different segments
150-51 (1976). For an excellent survey and critique of both the "liberal" and "republican" views of the legislative process, see Cynthia V. Ward, The Limits of"Liberal Republicanism·~ Why Group-Based Remedies and Republican Citizenship Don't Mix, 91 CoLUM. L. REv.
581 (1991). For commentators focusing on the degree to which constitutional adjudication is a form of dialogue, see irifra note 355.
355. For the notion of constitutional acljudication as a form of dialogue requiring
reasoned elaboration on the principles or values underlying particular decisions, see
Robert A. Burt, Constitutional Law and the Teaching of the Parables, 93 YALE LJ. 455 (1984)
(arguing that the legitimacy of the Court's adjudication ultimately depends on an underlying alliance between opponents); Chemerinsky, supra note 14, at 90, 95, 99-100 (emphasizing the importance of disclosure and discussion of values pertinent to the
constitutional issue at hand); Farber, supra note 204, at 1343 (claiming that pragmatism
increases the possibility of dialogue between the Court and society by showing the Justices how to balance competing social values through legal reasoning and experience);
Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms ofjustice, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1, 10-15 (1979) (construing the judicial function as an attempt to reveal or elaborate the meaning of constitutional values through the dialogue of adjudication); see also Richard H. Fallon, What Is
Republicanism and Is It Worth Reviving?, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1695, 1697, 1735 (1989) (providing a liberal critique of two modem republican conceptions of constitutional decisionmaking as dialogue); cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38
STAN. L. REv. 29, 86-87 (1985) (arguing that constitutional adjudication should be a
dialogic process in which the judiciary prevents interest groups from manipulating governmental power against the "common good" by closely scrutinizing legislation to ensure that it accurately reflects citizens' preferences).
Of course, reasoned elaboration does not take place in a vacuum; it occurs within a
multimembered Court in which each member should take into account the need to compromise for the sake of such social institutional values as stability and consensus. See
supra notes 215-27 and accompanying text and infra note 363 and accompanying text
(discussing the factors individual justices might be inclined to consider when reviewing
precedents).
356. See supra note 355; see also Terrence Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79
MICH. L. REV. 1033, 1033, 1048, 1051, 1067-68 (1981).
357. But too much discussion can result in unclear holdings. See supra note 99; see also
Monaghan, supra note 7, at 755 n.184 (arguing that the individual justices have an institutional obligation to harmonize their views}. The appropriate equilibrium between discussion of precedents and clarity in the Court's decisionmaking is an indispensable
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of society and the values that it might endorse (or perpetuate) for
the operation of govemment.35 B When the Justices explain their refusal to overrule a precedent under heightened criteria, the Justices
show that they have taken seriously. the arguments for upsetting the
status quo, including settled expectations, while revie·wing the precedent reveals the Justices' willingness to look at new ways of dealing with old ideas.
Third, reasoned elaboration in the Court's opinion writing on
whether heightened criteria have been met is a necessary precondition for a genuine dialogue on which values should continue to
guide the Court's decisionmaking in a particular area. There can be
no meaningful exchange of ideas among th~ Justices on the question of continued adherence to precedent unless they each disclose
their reasons for the positions they have taken and the values they
believe should continue to guide the Court's decisionmaking on the
particular issue under reconsideration. ·
Fourth, reasoned elaboration on whether the criteria have been
met can sharpen the Justices' thinking about whether continued adherence to a particular doctrine is worthwhile. The Justices' deliberations about the values they are thinking about substituting for
other values previously endorsed by the Court for the operation of
government will be clarified if they each know they must include in
their opinions the reasons for finding that the criteria for overrulings have been satisfied or not.
Last, criticism of the Court's overruling of precedents may actually be a complaint about the Court's departure; from a common law
mentality in constitutional decisionmaking.ssg The common law approach, which feeds off reasoned elaboration, seeks to preserve a
variety of values, including the legitimation of judicial review itself
as an impartial decisionmaking process distinguishable from the
heated partisanship of the legislative process. If the Justices have
important reasons for abandoning a previously formulated rule of
law, then it is more likely that their decision to overrule will appear
to be impartial rather than meanly political.
But even if they were using a tougher standard for overruling
precedents, many Justices still might conscientiously find good reason for overruling or severely narrowing many precedents. Each
Justice still may have different views on the plausibility and strength
element of the more general decisionmaking process in which the justices balance their
normative views on constitutional interpretation and the need to submerge those views
for the sake of certain institutional values such as stability or consensus. See supra notes
215-27 and accompanying text.
358. See Monaghan, supra note 7, at 752-53.
359. See supra notes II & Ill; see also LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE
FRAMERS' CoNSTlTUTION 329-49 (1988) (describing the tradition of the common-law
Constitution).
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of the reasons being put forward for overruling or reaffirming certain precedents. Consequently, it is not surprising to find, for example, that in Payne v. Tennessee 360 the conservative majority split on the
criteria for overrulings, but not on whether the criteria that each of
the Justices each chose to follow were met in that case.
Without doubt, the Court's ideological shift to the right will have
an inevitable impact on precedent because, depending on the area
involved, many of the Justices may not rank precedent very high in
their calculations and, as such, find other compelling reasons for
overruling, or at least weakening, certain precedents. For instance,
even though in Harmelin v. Michigan 361 Justices O'Connor, Kennedy,
and Souter refused to find that Justice Scalia's criteria for overruling
Solem v. Helm 362 had been met, those same three Justices favored
severely narrowing Solem in part because their reading of the text and
history of the Eighth Amendment and other case law suggested to
them that Solem was problematic. Given the ideological makeup of
these latter Justices, it will not be hard for critics to charge that the
reasoning of those three Justices in Harmelin was bad, partisan, or
could have been better; however, this kind of criticism is almost always applicable in constitutional law because there are so many respectable and defensible angles from which to view constitutional
problems and the sources of decision with which to resolve those
issues. 363 In the final analysis, even though we might insist that each
Justice should seriously consider and even try, when possible, to defer to certain values, such as the need for stability or continuity in
constitutional law, this insistence will not and cannot guarantee any
particular outcome or result in a particular case.
Regarding constitutional adjudication as a form of dialogue between the Justices and different segments of society using the Constitution as the required medium of discourse concedes that the
power that enabled the Justices to reject Plessy can also be used to
abandon Brown. 364 This idea is disturbing because it acknowledges
that, as a practical matter, precedents can last only as long as a majority of the Court wishes to preserve them. Hard-fought victories,
such as Roe, can erode over time. But this insight is also instructive
because it underscores the need for the Justices and the citizenry to
defend the precedents about which they care most. Brown has
achieved permanency precisely because subsequent generations (on
360. 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991}.
361. Ill S. Ct. 2680 (1991}.
362. 463 u.s. 277 (1983).
363. Indeed, as the hearings on Robert Bork's nomination to be an Associate justice
illustrated, the public exhibits no preference for finding a single theory to resolve the
countermajoritarian difficulty. See Posner, supra note 321, at 1382. In large part, the
people's respect for the Court may be premised on their perception of each justice's
willingness to factor into his or her decisionmaking such institutional values as stability
and consensus, and of the Court's flexibility preserved through its steadfast refusal to
endorse one overarching methodology or set of values directing constitutional interpretation. Thus, respect for the Court seems to turn more on the Court's aversion to,
rather than attraction for, one theoretical view of constitutional decisionmaking.
364. See WELLINGTON, supra note 11, at 152, 158; Sandalow, supra note 356, at 106872; Stone, supra note 8, at 72-73.
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the Court and in the political process, including confirmation proceedings) have been willing to endorse the value of ending segregation chosen by the Warren Court to displace the value of
segregation previously embraced by the Plessy Court. The values or
criteria that the Justices use in reviewing precedents cannot be taken
for granted by the citizenry, who can voice their concerns in the judicial nomination and confirmation processes, their choices of the
President who nominates Justices, and the kinds of arguments they
make in the adjudicative and legislative processes.

Conclusion
Given that the present Supreme Court is as ideologically unbalanced as it has ever been in this century, many people fear it will
overrule or severely narrow numerous precedents about which they
care. This Article has tried to relieve this anxiety to some extent. It
has argued that, in constitutional decisionmaking, it is inevitable for
thejustice:5 to come into contact and conflict with many precedents
with whose reasoning, holdings, and/or constitutional visions and
values they disagree. This Article has also argued that the Court's
review of i_ts precedents is, for the most part, a dynamic process in
which the Justices individually balance their views on how the Constitution should be interpreted and the social or institutional consequences of no longer preserving particular values previously
endorsed by the Court for the operation of government.
This Article argues further that once we shift our focus from trying to figure out whether the Court has crafted a coherent doctrine
on precedent to the particular ways in which the individual Justices
approach precedent, we can expect that in the forseeable future the
Justices will probably be debating which one of two standards they
should use for resolving their conflicts over precedents. First, some
may prefer to overrule precedents that they have deemed erroneously reasoned. This approach has the virtue of preserving the Justices' flexibility in making decisions and of sharpening the reasoning
of the Court's opinions. It has the obvious drawback of ultimately
producing chaos or uncertainty over the longevity of various principles in constitutional law by providing later Justices (with their
unique perspectives) with a rule of law on which to rely in overruling precedents that they deem erroneously reasoned.
A second approach is for the Justices to demand something more
than erroneous reasoning as a basis on which to overrule a precedent. Indeed, in one form or another, most Justices throughout history have favored overruling precedents on the grounds of
erroneous reasoning and some other serious flaw justifying overruling, including unworkability and incon~istencies with case law. The
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benefit of this second approach is that, like the common law approach to constitutional adjudication, it ultimately may not prevent
overrulings but rather, if followed, might slow down the overrulings
because it justifies overruling precedents only if after the passage of
some time a decision has proved to be defective in some serious
way. This approach would not guarantee any particular outcomes,
however, because the justices still can state conscientiously their
reasons for overrulings in sufficiently strong terms to satisfy even a
heightened standard of review for precedents. Although adherents
to this second approach may split on whether the criteria have been
met in a particular case, it has the additional advantage of paying
more explicit attention to the traditional values associated with fidelity to precedent, including the neutral, consistent, ~md predictable application of the rule of law as well as the legitimation of
judicial review itself.
Because neither of the approaches the Justices are likely to follow
in determining whether to overrule precedents would provide much
lasting protection for precedents, people interested in safeguarding
precedents from being overruled might also look to the political
process. If it chose, the Senate could insist, inter alia, that nominees
to the Supreme Court express a clear liking for the values associated
with fidelity to precedent, and detail the circumstances under which
they would vote to overrule precedents. Or, the Senate could investigate further into the moral or political judgments of the nominees
regarding the Court's role in our political system and the kind of
society we should have, with the hope of finding people who share
the Senators' views on either the appropriate criteria for overruling,
or the cases that should not be overruled. Yet another solution is
for the Congress to take more decisive action in passing legislation
to restore the liberties that the Supreme Court may restrict.365
For their part, theorists need to accommodate precedent (and the
values associated with its preservation) in their proposals for constitutional interpretation and adjudication. In this regard, they, like
the Justices and the Senate, should pay more explicit attention to
their respective moral or political judgments about the Court's role
and the kind of society we should have that may be the starting
points for their constitutional analysis.
In the final analysis, the difficult thing is, of course, to identify
precisely precedent's place among the sources of constitutional
decisionmaking, including the text, history, and theory. Perhaps the
most that safely can ever be said is that precedent has a pervasive
role in constitutional decisionmaking, and that it is an integral part
of the more general dialogue in which each Justice considers the
reasons for preserving or rejecting the values his predecessors have
previously endorsed for guiding the operation of government. In
365. See generally Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV.
L. REv. I (1975) (arguing in part that Congress effectively could overrule Supreme
Court decisions failing to recognize individual liberties by passing legislation that pro·
vides protections for such liberties~.
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my opinion, no analysis of the Court's review of precedent is complete, nor could any proposal for improving that process work, without taking into account that there is a point at which, in reviewing
precedents, eachjustice tends to balance his views on how the Constitution should be interpreted, and perceptions of the need for the
Court to defer to the social or institutional values of stability and
continuity in constitutional law.
As long as it is likely that the Court will not adopt a standard of
review for precedent that will guarantee a particular outcome, then
the most that one can expect, or demand, from the Court is for a
·heightened degree of discussion regarding the reasons for restricting or overruling a precedent. In the long run, the Court's most
important mission is to preserve this dialogue. Candid and reasoned elaboration of the criteria for overruling precedents is indispensable to constitutional adjudication because it provides a basis
for present and future generations to understand, and to respond
to, the reasons underlying each Justice's choices on the values to
perpetuate for guiding governmental operation, and because it demonstrates that the Court has fully and seriously considered the arguments in favor of preserving precedent. Consequendy, the more
openly and fully the Justices discuss the reasons or criteria for adhering to or rctiecting precedent, the more confident the people can
be that the Court is taking seriously the values associated with precedent, and that the rumors of its demise have been gready
exaggerated.

Appendix*
Any list of explicit overrulings is idiosyncratic. In this Appendix, I
offer my list of those cases in which the Supreme Court made unmistakably clear its intent to overrule some prior decision(s). The Appendix does not include precedents involving statutory
interpretation.
0VERRUUNG CAsE
VOTE OF THE CouRT

Tk Propelkr Gemste
Clziif v. Fitzlzugh, 53
U.S. (12 How.) 443
(1851) (8·1)

Knox v. Lu, (Legal
Tender Cases), 79 U.S.
(12 Wall.) 457 (1871)
(5·4)

OVERRULED CAsE(S)

OVERTURNING
LANGUAGE

Tk Tlzomasjtjfmon, 23
U.S. (10 Wheat.) 173
(1825); Tlze Or/tans v.
Phoebus, 36 U.S. (11
Pet.) 175 (1837)

"if we follow [Thomas
]tjfmon], we follow an

Htpbum v. Griswold, 75

"overrule." 79 U.S. at
553.

U.S. (8 Wall.) 603
(1870)

SUBJE!=i" MAnER

maritime jurisdiction;
art. Ill, § 2, cl. I

erroneous decision."
53 U.S. at 456.
impairment of
contrncts; art. I, § 2,
cl. 1

* Laura Dalton, Class of 1991, deserves special mention for her creative and
diligent work in helping to construct this Appendix.
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0\'F.RRUUNG CASE
\'oTF. oF TilE CouRT

0\'ERRULED CASE(S)

Krlhoum t•. Thompson,
103 u.s. 168 (1880)
(7-0)

Amln:son v. Dmm, 19
U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204
(1821)

"notwithstanding what
is said in the case of
Anderson v. Dunn" 103
U.S. at 199-200.

power of Congress to
punish witness for
contempt; art. I, § 5

Plnlad~lphra and S.
Sttamslup Co. t•.
Permsy/vama, 122 U.S.
326 (1887) (8-0)

State Tax on Ry. t•. Gross
Rmipts, 82 U.S. (15
Wall.) 284 (1872)

"the first ground on
which the decision in
State Tax ••• was
placed is not tenable."
122 U.S. at 342.

state taxation in
violation of Commerce
Clause; art. I, § 8, cl. 3

In reAym, 123 U.S.
443 (1887) (8-0)

Osborn v. United States
Bank, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 738 (1~24)

decision distinguished
at 123 U.S. at 488.

sovereign immunity;
amend. XI

ul.oup v. Port 'If Mohik,
127 u.s. 640 (1888)
(9-0)

Osborne v. Mohik, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 479
(1872)

"an ordinance [of the
state taxation in
type in Osborne] would
violation of Commerce
Clause; art. I, § 8, cl. 3
now be regarded as
repugnant to the power
conferred upon
Congress." 127 U.S. at
647.

OvERTURNING
LANGUAGE

SUBJECT MATTER

Lezsy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. Prerce v. New Hampshire,
100 (1890) (6-3)
46 U.S. (5 How.) 504
(1847)

"Prerce v. New Hampshire
••• must be regarded
as having been
distinctly overthrown
by the numerous cases
hereinafter referred
to." 135 U.S. at liS.

interpretation of
Congressional silence
concerning interstate
commerce; art. I, § 8,
cl. 3

Garland v. ll'ashi11gton,
232 u.s. 642 (1914)
(9-0)

Crain v. United States,
162 u.s. 625 (1896)

"overruled.'' 232 U.S.
at 647.

criminal procedure and
due process; Amend.
XIV

u.s. 591 (1916) (9-0)

United States v. Nice, 241

Malter 'If Ht}f. 197 U.S.
488 (1905)

"overruled." 241
at 601.

u.s.

commerce with Indian
tribes; art. I, § 8, cl. 3

Pen11sylvania R.R. v.
Towm, 245 U.S. 6
(1917) (9-0)

Lake Shore Ry. v. Smith,
173 u.s. 684 (1899)

"overruled.'' 245
at 17.

u.s.

rate fixing and due
process; Amend. XIV

Terral v. Burk~ Comtr.
Co., 257 U.S. 529
(1922) (9-0)

"overruled." 257 U.S.
Doyle v. Co11tinentallm.
Co., 94 U.S. 535
at 533.
(1876); Security .Hut. Lift
lm. Co. v. Prewilt, 202
u.s. 246 (1906)

right to resort to
federal courts; art. III

Alpha Qmmt Co. t•.
Massachus~tts, 268 U.S.
203 (1925) (8-1)

Baltic Mini11g Co. v.
MasJachusetts, 231 U.S.
68 (1913)

"definitely
disapproved." 268
at 218.

state ta.xation in
conflict with the
Commerce Clause; art.
I,§ 8, cl. 3

Fanner's Loan and Trust
Co. v. Min11esota, 280
u.s. 204 (1930) (7-2)

Blackstone v. .\ltller, 188
u.s. 189 (1903)

"definitely overruled. ••
280 U.S. at 209.

East Ohio Gas Co. v. Ta...:
Comm 'n, 283 U.S. 465
(1931) (9-0)

Pnmsylvania Gas Co. v.
Public Sert•. Comm n, 252
u.s. 23 (1920)

state taxation under 1he
"disapproved to the
Commerce Clause; art.
extent it is in conflict
I,§8,c1.3
with our decision
here." 283 U.S. at 472.

ChiCago & E. Ill. R.R. v.
btdustnal Comm'n, 284
u.s. 296 (1932) (9-0)

Em R.R. v. Collms, 253
U.S. 77 (1920); Erie
R.R. t•. S:ary, 253 U.S.
8 (1920)

"definitely overruled."
284 U.S. at 299.

Fox Frlm Corp. v. Doyal,
286 u.s. 123 (1932)
(9-0)

Lo11g v. Rockwood, 277
u.s. 142 (1928)

148

u.s.

- "definitely O\'erruled."
286 U.S. at 131.

due process concerning
inheritance tax; Amend.
XIV

FELAandthe
Commerce Clause; art.
I,§ 8, cl. 3
immunity from state
taxation of federal
instrumentalities under
Supremacy Clause; art.
\'1, cl. 2
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OVERRULED CAsE(S)

OVERTURNING
LANGUAGE

ll~t Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379

Adkins v. Childrm:r
Hosp., 261 U.S. 525

"overruled.'' 300 U.S.
at 400.

(1937) (5-4)

(1923)

due process concerning
minimum wage Jaw;
amend. XIV

"overruled.'' 303 U.S.
at 387.

immunity of state
instrumentality from
federal tax; amend. X

Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S.

"In disapproving [the

(16 Pet.) I (1842)

Swift] doctrine" 304

rights reserved to the
states; amend. X

Burmt v. Cowrada Oil &
Htlumng t•. Mountain
Producm Corp., 303 U.S. Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393
{1932); Gillispie v.
376 (1938) (5-2)
Oklahoma, 257 U.S. 501

SUBJECT 1\fATI'ER·

{1922)

Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,
304 u.s. 64 (1938)

U.S. at 79-80.

{S.O)

Graves v.

Nni~

York a reL

Dobbins v. Erie County,

O'Kttft, 306 U.S. 466
(1939) (7-2)

41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 435
(1842); Colkclor v. Day,
78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113
(1870); Nni~ lork a rtL
Rogm v. Graves, 299
U.S. 401 (1937); Bmsh
v. Commissioner, 300
u.s. 352 (1937)

O'Malley v. IVoodrough,

Euans v. Gore, 253 U.S.
245 (1920); Miles v.
Graham, 268 U.S. 501

307 u.s. 277 (1939)
(7-1)

(1925)

"overruled.'' 306 U.S.
at486.

immunity of federal
and state officers from
income taxes; amend.
X

"to the extent that
what the Coun now
says is inconsistent •••
[Miles] cannot survive.''
307 U.S. at 282-83.

diminution ofjudges'
salaries through
taxation; an. III, § I.

u.s. 83 (1940) (7-2)

u.s. 404 (1935)

Colgate v. Harvey, 296

"overruled." 309 U.S.
at93.

right to engage in
certain incidents of
business and the
Privileges and
Immunities Clause;
amend. XIV

Htlumng v. Hallock, 309

Becker v. St. Louis Union
Trust Co., 296 U.S. 48
(1935); Helumngv. St.
Louis Union Trust Co.,

"We therefore reject as
untenable the
diversities taken in the
St. Louis Trust Cases in
applying the Klein
doctrine••• .'' 309·
U.S. at 122.

value of remainder
interest is part of
decedent's gross estate
under the Revenue Act
of 1926.

"Connolly :r case ••• is

equal protection of
various industries
under criminal laws to
deter monopolies:
amend. XIV

Madden v. Kentucky, 309

u.s. 106 (1940) (7-2)

296

u.s. 39 (1935)

1ignerv. Ttxas, 310 U.S. Comrolly v. Union Sewer
141 (1940) (8-1)
Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540
(1902)

C!nittd Statts v. Darby,

Hammer v. Dagenhart,

312 u.s. 100 (19·H)
(9-0)

247

l'nittd Statts v. Chirago,
.\filu•auktt, St. Paul &
Par. R.R.. 312 U.S. 592

250

(1941) (9-0)

1991]

u.s. 251 (1918)

l'nittd Statts t•. Htytmrd,

u.s. 633 (1919);
l'nittd States t•. L:rnah,
188 u.s. 445 (1903)

no longer controlling.''
310 U.S. at 147.

"overruled." 312 U.S.
at 116-17.

fair labor standards
within the Commerce
Clause; amends. V, X

"(S)o far as [L_wzah and

authorized takings and
just compensation;
such a principle, it is in amend. V
irreconcilable conflict
with our later decisions
and cannot be
considered as
expressing the law."
312 l'.S. at598.

Htyu•ard] sanction[ )
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0VERRUUNG CASE
VoTE OF THE COURT

OVERRULED CASE(S)

OVERTURNING
LANGUAGE

California v. Thompson,
313 u.s. 109 (1941)
(9-0)

DiSanto v. Pmnsylvania,
273 u.s. 34 (1927)

"overruled." 313 U.S.
at 116.

licensing criteria for
free agents under the
Commerce Clause; art.
I, §8,cl.3

Olsen v. Nebraska, 313

Ribnik v. McBrilk, 277
u.s. 350 (1928)

"The drift away from
[Ribnik] has been so
great that it can no
longer be deemed a
controlling authority."
313 U.S. at 244.

due process concerns
of business affected
with a public interest;
amend. XIV

Alabama v. King (5
Boour, 314 U.S. 1
(1941) (9·0)

Panhandle Oil Co. v.
Knox, 277 U.S. 218
(1928); Graves v. Ttxa.s
Co., 298 u.s. 393
(1936)

"(S]o far as a different
view has prevailed [in
Panhandle and Graves],
we think it no longer
tenable." 314 U.S. at
9.

immunity of federal
government from state
taxation under the
Supremacy Clause; art.
VI, §2

State Tax Comm n v.
.-tldrich, 316 U.S. 174
(1942) (7-2)

First Nat'l Bank v.
Maine, 284 U.S. 312
(1932)

"overrule." 316 U.S. at due process and death
tax; amend. XIV
181.

llllliams v. North
Carolina, 317 U.S. 287
(1942) (7-2)

Haddock v. Haddock, 201
u.s. 562 (1906)

"overruled." 317 U.S.
at 304.

full faith and credit
concerning divorce
decree; art. IV, § I

jones v. Opelika, 319
U.S. 103 (1943) (per
curiam); Murdock v.
Pmnsy/vania, 319 U.S.
105 (1943) (5-4)

jones v. Opelika, 316
u.s. 584 (1942)

"The judgment injones
v. Opelika has this day
been vacated." 319
U.S. at 117.

license tax imposed on
religious colporteurs;
amend. I

Chillkrs v. Beaver, 270

"Chillkrs ••• was in
effect overruled by the
Mountain Producm
decision." 319 U.S. at
604.

state estate taxes
imposed on federally
restricted Indian
property under the
Supremacy Clause; art.
VI,§ 2

!Vest l'irginia Bd. of Educ. Minmvi/le Sch. Dist. v.
v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586
624 ( 1943) (6-3)
(1940)

"overruled." 319 U.S.
at 1187.

freedom of religion and
due process; amends. I,
XIV

Smith v. Allwright, 321
u.s. 649 (1944) (8-1)

Cravey v. Townsend. 295
u.s. 45 (1935)

"overruled." 321 U.S.
at 666.

right to vote; amend.
XV

Girouard v. United States,
328 u.s. 61 (1946)
(5-3)

United Stales v.
Schwimmer, 279 U.S.
644 (1929); Unittd States
v. Macintosh. 283 U.S.
605 (1931); United States
v. Bland, 283 U.S. 636
(1931)

"We conclude that the
Schwimmer, Macintosh,
and Bland cases do not
state the correct rule of
Jaw." 328 U.S. at 69.

construction of the
Naturalization Act in
light of freedom of
religion guarantee;
amend. I

.-tngelt•. Bullmgton, 330
u.s. 183 (1947) (6-3)

Lupton :S Sons Co. v.
Automobile Club, 225
u.s. 489 (1912)

"Cases like Lupton s ...
are obsolete insofar as
they are based on a
view of diversity
jurisdiction which came
to an end with Eri~."
330 U.S. at 192.

diversity jurisdiction;
art.lll, § 2

Lmcol11 l'mo11 ''·
.\'orthwtslml Iron &
.l!ttal Co., 335 U.S. 525
(1948) (9-0)

.-tdair ''· l'mttd Statts,
208 u.s. 161 (1907);
Coppage ''· Kansas, 236
U.S. I (1914)

"This Court has
steadily rejected the
due process philosophy
enunciated in the .-tda~r
- Coppage line of cases...
335 U.S. at 536.

state legislation
prohibiting injurious
business practices and
due process; amend.
XI\'

u.s. 236 (1941) (9-0)

Oklahoma Tax Comm 'n v.
u.s.. 319 u.s. 598
(1943) (5-4)
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u.s. 555 (1926)
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OVERRULING CAs£
Vore OFnJ& CoURT

Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v.
Tc:as Co., 336 U.S. 342
(1949) (9·0)

OVERRULED CASE(S)

Choctaw, OAla. & Gulf
R.R. v. Harrison, 235
U.S. 292 (1914): Indian
Taritory /Uuminating Oil
Co. v. Oklahoma, 240

OVERTURNING
LANGUAGE
"overruled." 336 U.S.
at365.

u.s. 522 (1916):
247 u.s. 503 (1917):
Large Oil Co. v. Howard,
248 u.s. 549 (1919):

5UBJ£cr MATTER
non-Indian leases of
restricted Indian lands
are subject to state
production and excise
taxes: amend. X

Howard v. Gipsy Oil Co.,

Oklahoma v. Banudall
Refineries, 296 U.S. 521
(1936)

United States v.
Rahinowit:, 339 U.S. 56

Trupiano v. United States,
334

u.s. 699 (1948)

(1950) (5-3)

Buntyn v. Wilson, 343

u.s. 495 (1952) (9-0)
EIHns v. United States,
364 u.s. 206 (1960)
(5-4)

Mapp v. Ohia, 367 U.S.

"overruled." 339 U.S. reasonableness goes to
I the search, not the
at66.
procurement of a
warrant: amend. IV

Mutual Film Co. v.
Industrial Comm 'n, 236

"overruled." 343 U.S.
at 502.

freedom of speech and
press: amend. I

Weeks v. United States,

"reason and experience
••• point to the
rejection of [the Weeks]
doctrine." 364 U.S. at
222.

admissibility of
evidence obtained by
state search in federal
court; amend. IV

u.s. 230 (1915)

232 u.s. 383 (1914)

IVo!f v. Colorado, 338

643 (1961) (5-4)

u.s. 25 (1949)

"[w}e can no longer
pc:nnit that right [to be
secure against invasions
of privacy by state
officers] to remain an
empty promise." 367
U.S. at660.

admissibility of
evidence obtained in an
illegal federal search in
state court; amend. IV

Gickon v. Wainwright,

BellS v. Brady, 316 U.S.

Amici "argue that BellS
should now be
overruled. We agree."
372 U.S. at 345.

applicability of
constitutional right to
counsel in state court;
amends. VI, XIV

Adams v. Tanntr, 244

"[R]eliance on [Adams]
is as mistaken as would
be adherence to [Adkins
••• overruled by IJ~I
Coast Hotelj." 372 U.S.
at 731.

state restrictions on
operation of certain
businesses and due
process; amend. XIV

Twining v. New jmey,

"Decisions of the Court
since Tu•ining and
Adamson have departed
from the contrary view
expressed in those
cases.'' 378 U.S. at 6.

privilege against selfincrimination is
applicable to state
actions; amends. V.
XIV

"The Court today
rejected [the rule of the
aforementioned cases],
and with it, all the
earlier cases resting on
that rule.'' 378 tt.S. at
77.

use of federally
compelled evidence to
incriminate at state
level; amends. V, XIV

372 u.s. 335 (1963)
(9·0)

Ferguson v. Sltrupa, 372

u.s. 725 (1963) (8-1)

Malloy v. Hogan, 378

455 (1942)

u.s. 590 (1917)

U.S. I (1964) (5·4)

u.s. 78 (1908);
Adamson v. Colifon~ia,
332 u.s. 46 (1947)

•lfurph,r v. llateifront

jack v. Karuas, 199 U.S •
372 (1905); l"nited States
t•. ,\lllrdock, 284 U.S.
141 (1931); Feldman v.
l"nited Stales, 322 U.S.
487 (1944); Knapp v.
Srhu•nl:.n; 357 U.S. 371
(1958); .\lills v.
I.onisiar111, 360 U.S. 230

Comm~r.

378 U.S. 52
(1964) (7-2)

211

(1959)
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0V£RRUUNG CAS£
VoTE OF nl£ COURT

OVERRULED CASE(S)

OVERTURNING
UNGUAG£

jackson v. Dmno, 378
u.s. 368 (1964) (5-4)

Stein v. Nnu York, 346
u.s. 156 (1953)

"overruled." 378
at 391.

Escobedo ''· 1/lmois, 378
u.s. 478 (1964) (5-4)

Crooktr v. California, 357
U.S.433 (1958); Cicenia
v. lAGay, 357 U.S. 504
(1958)

"[T]o the extent that
ClCmia or Crooktr may
be inconsistent with the
principles announced
today, they are not to
be regarded as
controlling." 378 U.S.
at 492.

statements made prior
to reading of rights
when investigation is
focused on one
individual are
inadmissible; amends.
VI, XIV

!Vest v. lAuisiana, 194

"In the light of Gideon
••• the statements
made in 11~1 ••• can
no longer be regarded
as the law." 380 U.S.
at 406.

right to confrontation
applicable in state
coun; amends. VI, XIV

Harptr v. Virginia BtL of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663
(1966) (6-3)

Bmdlave v. Shu/lies, 302
U.S. 277 (1937); Butltr
v. Thompson, 341 U.S.
937 (1951)

Breedlove "overruled."
383 U.S. at 669. The
Butler decision is only
mentioned in dissent,
but stands for the same
overruled proposition.

state conditioning of
right to vote is
violation of equal
protection; amend. XIV

Sproack v. Klein, 385
u.s. 511 (1967) (5-4)

Cohtn v. Hurley, 366
u.s. 117 (1961)

"overruled." 385 U.S.
at 514.

equal protection of
lawyers assening right
against selfincrimination; amends.
V,XIV

Keyishian v. Board of
Regmts, 385 U.S. 589
(1967) (5-4)

Adltr v. Board of Educ.,
342 u.s. 485 (1952)

"[C]onstitutional
doctrine which has
emerged since that
decision has rejected
[Ad/tr's] major
premise." 385 U.S. at
605.

public employment
conditioned upon
surrender of
constitutional rights;
amend. I

Afroy•m v. Rusk, 387
u.s. 253 (1967) (5-4)

Ptrez. v. Brownell, 356
u.s. 44 (1958)

uoverruled ... 387
at 268.

u.s.

state's attempt to
revoke citizenship
violative of Citizenship
Clause; amend. XIV

Camara v. .\lumcipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523
(1967) (6-3)

Frank v. Maryland, 359
u.s. 360 (1959)

"overruled." 387 U.S.
at 528.

warrantless searches by
municipal health
inspector; amend. IV

"We conclude that the
underpinnings of
Olmstead and Goldman
have been so eroded by
our subsequent
decisions that the
'trespass' doctrine
there enunciated can
no longer he regarded
as controlling." 389
U.S. at 353.

recordation of oral
statements
unaccompanied by
actual trespass; amend.
IV

Pointtr v. Texas, 380
u.s. 400 (1965) (7-2)

Kat~

u.s. 258 (1904)

v. l'nited States, 389 0/msttad v. United States,
277 u.s. 438 (1928);
Goldman v. United States.
316 u.s. 114 (1942)

u.s. 347 (1967) (7-1)

SUBJECT MATTER

u.s.

determination of
voluntariness of a
confession and due
process; amend. XIV

Bmtou t•. l"mttd Statts,
391 l 1.S. 123 (1968)
(6-2)

Delli Paoli v. {'mttd
Statts, 352 U.S. 232
(1957)

"overruled." 391
at 126.

u.s.

co-defendant
confession at joint trial:
amend. VI

jones t• .·llfud II• .\la_rn
Co., 392 U.S. 409
(1968) (7-2)

Hodges ''· l'mttd States.
203 U.S. I (1906)

"overruled." 392 U.S.
at 441 n.78.

congressional power to
decide ,,·hat arc
incidents of slavery and
enact legislation:
amend. XIII
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OVERRULED Cl.sE(S)

OVERTURNING
LANGUAGE

Moore v. Ogilvie, 394
u.s. 814 (1969) (7-2)

MadJougaU v. Grtm,
335 u.s. 281 (1948)

"overruled." 394 U.S.
at819.

residency requirements
for political parties and
due process; amend.
XIV
freedom of speech;
amend. I

Brandmburg v. Ohio, 395

SUBJECT MATI'ER

u.s. 444 (1969) (8·0)

274 u.s. 357 (1927)

IVhitnty v. California,

"overruled." 395 U.S.
at449.

Chimtl v. California, 395
u.s. 752 (1969) (6-2)

Harris v. United States,
331 u.s. 145 (1947);
United States v.
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56
(1950)

"It is time ••• to hold searches at the time of
that ••• insofar as the
arrest must be limited
principles [that Harris
to the person and the
and Rabinowil%] stand
area within his reach;
for are inconsistent
amend. IV
with those that we have
endorsed today, they
are no longer to be
followed." 395 U.S. at
768.

u.s. 784 (1969) (7-2)

Benton v. Maryland, 395

u.s. 319 (1937)

Palko v. Conntcticut, 302

"overruled." 395 U.S.
at 794.

Double jeopardy
prohibition is
applicable to the states;
amends. V, XIV

Ashe v. Swenson, 397
u.s. 436 (1970) (7-1)

Hoagv. Newjmty, 356
u.s. 464 (1958)

The Court compared
the virtualJy identical
facts of Hoag and Ashe
finding that more
recent decisions
changed the Court's
perspective on the
applicability of
collateral estoppel.
Haag is implicitly
overruled since the
Court reaches the
opposite result on
nearly the same facts.
397 U.S. at 445.

guarantee against
double jeopardy
includes collateral
estoppel as a
constitutional
requirement; amend. V

Brantlty v. Georgia, 217

"overruled." 398 U.S.
at330 n.9.

new trial for defendant
convicted oflesser
offense limited to that
lesser charge; amends.
V,XIV

Thompson v. Utah, 170

The overruled cases
are cited as authority
for a twelve-man jul)',
399 U.S. at 91-92, and
are implicitly overruled
by the announcement
of the ne1v rule
allowing six-man juries.
!d. at 103-04.

six-personjul}' is not
violative of defendant's
Sixth Amendment
right; amends. VI, XIV

"We can no longer
adhere to the
aberrational doctrine of
Kesler." 402 U.S. at
651.

state legislation that
frustrates full
effectiveness of federal
law is invalid under
Supremacy Clause even
if supported by
legitimate state
purpose; art. VI, § 2

Price v. Georgia, 398

u.s. 323 (1970) (8.0)

Williams v. Florida, 399

u.s. 78 (1970) (6-2)

u.s. 284 (1910)

u.s. 343 (1898);

Rassmussm v. United
Statts, 197 U.S. 516
(1905)

Perc. v. Campbtll. 402

u.s. 637 (1971) (5-4)

Kesler v. Dtpartmm/ of
Pub. Sq{et)'. 369 U.S.
153 (1962)

.
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OVERRULING CASE
VoTE OF TilE COURT

Dunn v. Blumstein, 405

OVERRULED CASE(S)

0VERnJRNING
LANGUAGE

SUBJECT MATI'ER

u.s. 330 (1972) (5-2)

u.s. 621

Pope v. Williams, 193
(1904)

"To the extent that
dicta in [Pope] are
inconsistent with the
test we apply or the
result we reach today,
those dicta are
rejected." 405 U.S. at
337 n.7. "[T]he Court
today really overrules
the holding in Pope v.
Williams and does not
restrict itself, as
footnote 7 says, to
rejecting what it says
are mere dicta." ld. at
362 (Biackmun,j.,
concurring).

one year residency
requirement to voting
violates Equal
Protection Clause;
amend. XIV

Lehrzlzausen v. Lake Shore
Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S.
356 ( 1973) (9-0)

Q}taker City Cab Co. v.
Pmruylvania, 277 U.S.
389 (1928)

"overruled." 410 U.S.
at 366.

state law requiring
payment of ad valorum
taxes on corporations
but not individuals
does not violate Equal
Protection Clause;
amend. XIV

Miller v. California, 413
u.s. 15 (1973) (5-4)

A Book Named 'John
Ckland's Mcnoirs of a
Woman of Pkasure" v.
Attorney Gen. of Mass.,
383 u.s. 413 (1966)

"Mcnoirs test has been obscenity test; amend. I
abandoned as
unworkable by its
author, and no Member
of the Court today
supports the Mcnoirs
formulation." 413 U.S.
at 23.

North Dakota Phannacy
Bd. v. Sn)'tfer's Drug
Stores, 414 U.S. 156
(1973) (9-0)

Liggett Co. v. Baldridge,
278 u.s. 105 (1929)

"overruled." 414 U.S.
at 167.

state law requiring
pharmacists to be
registered, or majority
of stock to be owned
by pharmacists in good
standing not violative
of equal protection;
amend.X1V

Ecklman v.]ordan, 415
u.s 651 (1974) (5-4)

Slzapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618 (1969); Stale
D.p't of Health and
Relzab. Serv. v. Zarate,
407 u.s. 918 (1972);
Serretl v. Mother.s' and
Chi/duns' RightJ Org.,
409 u.s. 809 (1973)

"we disapprove the
Eleventh Amendment
holdings of those cases
to the extent that they
are inconsistent with
our holding today."
415 U.S. at 671.

retroactive payment of
benefits under AABD
programs which were
withheld ''Tongfully by
state officials
prohibited; amend. XI

Taylor v. Louisiana, 419

HO)·t v. Florida, 368 U.S.
57 (1971)

"we cannot follow the
contrary implications of
the prior cases,
including Ho)'l v.
Flon'da." 419 U.S. at
537.

automatic exemptions
cannot be used to
exclude women from
jury to obtain male
venire; amend. VI

,\ftchelizz 1ire Corp. v.
llages, 423 U.S 276
(1976} (7-1)

Law v. Austin, 80 U.S.
(13 Wall.) 29 (1968)

"overruled." 423 U.S.
at 301.

state may assess nondiscriminatory ad
valorem tax on
imported items; art. I,
§ 10, cl. 2

u.s. 522 (1975) (8-1)
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0VERRUUNG CAS&
Vore OFTH& COURT

HudgtnS v. NLRB, 424

u.s. 507 (1976) (5-3)

OVERRULED CAS&(S)

AIIUllgamawl Food
Empla]ees Union Lorol
590 v. Logan 'Valley
Plaza, 391 U.S. 308
(1968)

OV&In"URNING
LANGUAGE

SUBJECT MATTER

"[WJe make it clear
picketing is not
now, ifit was not clear protected speech on
before, that the
private shopping center
rationale of Logan 'Valley property; amends. I,
did not survive the
XIV
Court's decision in the
Lla]d case." 424 U.S.
at 518.

Pirginia Bd. of Plumnacy
v. Pirginia Citizens
O:msumer Counci~ 425

316 u.s. 52 (1942)

'Valmtine v. Chrestmsen,

Overruling is implicit
in the discussion of
'Valmtine and the
following contrary
holding. 425 U.S. at
760-62.

purely commercial
speech is protected
speech but is subject to
regulation; amend. I

National League of Cities
v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833

Maryland v. Jllirtz, 392

"overruled." 426 U.S.
at855.

Congress cannot force
states to make certain
choices in the guise of
regulating interstate
commerce; arL I, § 8,
cl. 3

Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S.

"overruled." 427 U.S.
at 317.

purely economic
legislation given
deferential treatment;
amend. XIV

"Insofar as Goesaert •••
may be inconsistent,
that decision is
disapproved.
Undoubtedly reflecting
the view that Goesaert's
equal protection
analysis no longer
obtains, the District
Court made no
reference to that
decision in upholding
.Oklahoma's statute."
429 U.S. at 210 n.23.

gender discrimination;
amend. XIV

u.s. 748 (1976) (7-1)

u.s. 183 (1968)

(1976) (5-4)

City of N~ Orftans v.
Duks, 427 u.s. 297

457 (1957)

(1976) (8-0)

Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190 (1976)

Goesam v. Cltary, 335

u.s. 464 (1948)

\

Ortgon v. Corvallis Sand
& Gravel Co., 429 U.S.
363 (1977) (6-3)

Bonelli Calllt Co. v.
Arizona, 414 U.S. 313
(1973)

Compltte Auto Transit v.
Brady, 430 U.S. 274

Spector Motor Serv. v.
O'Connor. 340 U.S. 602

(1977) (9-0)

(1951)

Snojfer v. Heitner. 433

Ptnnoyerv•• Ndf. 95 U.S.

u.s. 186 (1977) (8-0)

1991]

714 (1878)

"Bonelli's application of disputed ownership of
federal common law to
cases such as this must
be overruled." 429
U.S.at382.

riverbed lands must be
determined as a matter
of state law

"overruled." 430 U.S.
at 289.

state tax levied for the
privilege of doing
business is not per se
unconstitutional; art. I,
§ 8, cl. 3

The jurisdictional
framework of Pmnuyer
is implicitly rejected in
the Court's discussion.
433 U.S. at 197-206.

due process and
personal jurisdiction;
amend. XIV
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0V£RRUUNG CASE
VOTE OF TilE CouRT

OVERRULED CASE(S)

OvERTURNING
LANGUAGE

SuBJEcr MATI'ER

Department of R~mue v.
Association of Washington
St~cdoring Cos., 435
u.s. 734 (1978) (8-0)

Puget Sound St~edoring
Co. v. Stale Tax Comm 'n,
302 u.s. 90 (1937);
joseph v. Cartrr (!J JVeeka
St~edoring Co., 330 U.S.
422 (1947)

"overruled." 435 U.S.
at 750.

business and
occupation tax does
not violate Commerce
Clause when applied to
the commercial activity
of stevedoring; art. I,
§8,cl.3

l'nited State.s v. Scoll,
437 u.s. 82 (1978)
(5-4)

Unittd States v. jenkins,
420 u.s. 358 (1975)

"overruled." 437 U.S.
at87.

Double jeopardy
Clause is not violated
when a state appeals
from a decision in
favor of defendant
when defendant sought
termination of
proceeding on a basis
other than guilt/
innocence; amend. V

Hughe.s v. Oklahoma, 441
u.s. 322 (1979) (7-2}

Cur v. Connecticut, 161

"overruled." 441 U.S.
at 335.

state regulation of
wildlife is to be
analyzed by same rules
in respect to
Commerce Clause as
other natural resources;
art. I, § 8, d. 3

United States v. Salvucci,
448 u.s. 83 (1980)
(7-2)

jone.s v. United State.s,
362 u.s. 257 (1960)

"We are convinced that
the automatic standing
rule ofjone.s has
outlived its usefulness
in this Court's Fourth
Amendment
jurisprudence." 448
U.S. at 95.

defendants charged
with possession may
only claim benefits of
exclusionary rule if
their own Fourth
Amendment rights have
been violated; amend.

Commonwealth Edison Co.
v. Montana, 453 U.S.
609 (1981) (6-3)

Heisler v. Thomas Colliery
Co., 260 U.S. 245
(1922)

"Any contrary
statements in Heisler
and its progeny are
disapproved." 453 U.S.
at 617.

state tax is not
protected from
Commerce Clause
scrutiny by a claim that
the tax is imposed on
goods before they
enter the stream of
commerce; art. I, § 8,
d. 3

United State.s v. Ross, 456 Robbins v. California,
453 u.s. 420 (1981)

"[W]e reject the
precise holding of
Robbins." 456 U.S. at
824.

scope of search in
automobile not limited
to the container, but by
the object of the search
and probable cause
giving rise to the
search; amend. IV

Sporhase v. Nebraska ex
rtl. Douglas, 458 U.S.
941 (1982) (7-2)

Hudson County Water Co.
v. AlcCarter, 209 U.S.
349 (1908)

Court explains that
Hudson was based on
Geer which was
expressly overruled
previously. 458 U.S. at
950-51.

ground water is an
article of commerce
and is subject to
Commerce Clause
regulation; art. I, § 8,
d. 3

lllmois v. Gaits, 462
u.s. 213 (1983) (6-3)

Aguilar v. Ttxas, 378
The Court discussed
U.S. 108 (1964}; Spinelli the tests contained in
t•. l'mttd Slale.s, 393
.-lgmlar and Spmelli and
u.s. 410 (1969)
concludes that "it is
wiser to abandon the
"two-pronged test"
established by our
decisions in .-lguilar and
Spmtllt." 462 U.S. at
238 (footnote omitted).

u.s. 519 (1896)

u.s. 798 (1982) (6-3}

156

IV

"totality of the
circumstances..
determines probable
cause questions;
amend. IV
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OVERRULING CASE
VOTE OF THE COURT

Pmnhurst Start Sch. &
Hosp. v. Haltfmnan, 465

u.s. 89 (1984) (5-4)

OVERRULED CASE(s)

Rolston v. Milsouri Fund
Comm'rs, 120 U.S. 390
(1887): Siler v. Louisville
& Nashville R.R. Co.,

213 u.s. 175 (1909):

Atchinson T. & S.F. Ry.
v. O'Connor. 223 U.S.
280 (1912): Grtme v.
Louisville & lnttrurban
R.R., 244 U.S. 499
(1917):johnson v.
Lanlford, 245 U.S. 541

OVER'l"URNING
LANGUAGE

SUBJECT MATtER

"In sum, contrary to
the view implicit in
decisions such as
Gr~• ••• , neither
pendent jurisdiction,
nor any other basis of
jurisdiction may
override the Eleventh
Amendment." 465
U.S. at 121.

rule that claim against
state officials is a claim
against the state and is
barred by the 11th
Amendment also
applies to state claims
in federal court under
pendent jurisdiction:
amend. XI

"[W]e reject today the
contrary rationale of

remedial forfeiture
proceeding following
an acquittal on related
criminal charges is not
barred under the
Double Jeopardy
Clause: amend. V

(1918): 28 additional
cases listed at 465 U.S.
89, 109 nn.17-21, 16568 nn.50 &. 52, and
accompanying text

Unittd Statts v. One
Assortmml of 89 Fireanns,
465 u.s. 354 (1984}
(9.0)

Coffey v. Unittd States,
116 u.s. 436 (1886)

Limbcuh v. Howm &
AUison Co., 466 U.S.

Ho011tn & Allison Co. v.
Eva//, 324 U.S. 652

353 (1984) (9-0)

(1945}

Garda v. San Antonio
Mtlro. Transit Auth. 469

National Lea~ of Cities
v. Ustry, 426 U.S. 833

u.s. 528 (1985) (5-4)

Coffey v. Unittd Staus."
465 U.S. at 366.

"Howm I, to the extent focus on validity of ad
it espouses the
[original package]
doctrine, is not to be
regarded as authority
and is overruled." 466
U.S. at 361.

valorem tax on imports
should be on whether
the tax is an "impost"
or a "duty": art. I,
§ 10, cl. 2

"overruled." 469 U.S.
at 557.

determination of state
immunity does not tum
on whether the
government function is
traditional or integral:
art. I, § 8, cl. 3

(1976)

Uniltd States v. Miller,

Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S.
1 (1887)

"to the extent that Bain
stands for the
proposition ••• to
avoid further
confusion, we now
explicitly reject that
proposition." 471 U.S.
at 144.

to drop allegations
unnecessary to an
offense that is clearly
contained within an
indictment is not an
unconstitutional
amendment: amend. V

Danitls v. n7Uiams, 474

Parra// v. Taylor. 451

"overruled." 474 U.S.
at 330.

lack of due care by
state official which
amounts to negligence
does not "deprive" a
person oflife or liberty
and therefore does not
implicate Due Process
Clause; amend. XIV

471 u.s. 130 (1985)
(8-0)

u.s. 327 (1986) (9-0)

1991]

u.s. 527 (1981)
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OVERRULED CASE(S)

OVERTURNING
WNCUAGE

SUBJECT MATTER

u.s. 79 (1986) (7-2)

Batson v. Kentucky, 476

Swain v• .Alabama, 380
u.s. 202 (1965)

"For the reasons that
follow, we reject this
evidentiary formulation
as inconsistent with
standards that have
developed since Swain."
476 U.S. at 93.

defendant may present
a prima facie case of
discriminatory selection
of venire based solely
on prosecutorial
conduct in his case,
which gives rise to an
inference of
unconstitutional
behavior; amend. XIV

Puerto Rico v. Brans/ad,
483 u.s. 219 (1987)
(9-0)

Kentudry v. Dennison, 65
U.S. (24 How.) 66
(1861)

"Kentucky v. Dennison is
the product of another
time ••• We conclude
that it may stand no
longer." 483 U.S. at
230.

federal courts have
authority to compel
performance by asylum
state to deliver fugitive
upon proper demand;
art. IV, § 2, cl. 2

Solorio v. United Stales,
483 u.s. 435 (1987)
(6-3)

0 'Callahan v. Parker,
395 u.s. 258 (1969)

"overruled.'' 483 U.S.
at 436.

jurisdiction of court
martial depends upon
status as a member of
the military and not on
the relationship
between the offense
and service; art. I, § 8,
d. 14

Welch v. Texas Dtp't. of
Highways and Pub.
Transp., 483 U.S. 468
{1987) (5-4)

Parden v. Tmninal Ry.,
377 u.s. 184 (1964)

"overruled.'' 483 U.S.
at478.

if Congress intends to
abrogate the Eleventh
Amendment in
exercising the
Commerce Clause
power, it may do so
expressly in the statute;
amend. XI

South Carolina v. Baker,
485 u.s. 505 (1988)
(6-2)

Pollock v. Fanners • Loan
& Trust Co., 157 U.S.
429 (1895)

"\Ve thus confirm that
subsequent case law
has overruled the
holding in Pollock."
485 U.S. at 524.

state bond interest is
not immune from
nondiscriminatory
federal tax; amend.
XVI

.Alabama v. Smith, 490
u.s. 794 (1989) (8-1)

Simpson v. Rice, 395
u.s. 711 {1969)

"Believing, as we do,
that there is no basis
for a presumption of
vindictiveness where a
second sentence
imposed after a trial is
heavier than a first
sentence imposed after
a guilty pleas, we
overrule Simpson v. Rice
••. to that extent.''
490 U.S. at 803.

sentencing

Healy v. Bttr Inst. Inc.,
491 u.s. 324 (1989)
(6-3)

joseph E. Seagram &
Sons, Inc. v. Hostetler,
384 u.s. 35 (1966)

"to the extent that
Seagram holds that
retrospective
affirmation statutes do
not facially violate the
Commerce Clause, it is
no longer good law.''
491 U.S. at343.

Commerce Clause; art.
1,§8,cl.3

Thornburgh v. .Abbott,
490 u.s. 401 (1989)
(6-3)

PToronier v. Martine:,
416 u.s. 396 (1974)

"overrule.'' 490 U.S. at distinction between
413.
correspondence from
prisoners or
nonprisoners in prison
regulations
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0VERRUUNC CAsE

VoTE OF nt£ CouRT

OVERRULED CAst(s)

Olllins v. Younghlootl,
110 S. CL 2715 (1990)
(9-0)

Kring v. Missouri, 107
u.s. 221 (1883);
Thompson v. Utah, 170
u.s. 343 (1898)

OVERTURNING
l.ANCUACE

SuaJ£cr MATrER

"ovenule.'' 110 S. Ct.
at 2723·24.

E." Post Facto Clause;
art. I, § 10, cl. I

California v. Acevedo, Ill ArAansas v. Sander.s, 442
S. CL 1982 (1991) (6·
u.s. 753 (1979}
3)

"We conclude that is is search and seizure;
better to adopt one
amend. IV
clear-cut rule to govern
automobile searches
and eliminate the
warrant requirement
for closed containers
set forth in Sander.s."
111 S. CL at 1991.

Payne v. Tennessee, Ill
S. Ct. 2597 (1991) (5·
4)

"Reconsidering these
decisions now, we
conclude for the
reasons heretofore
stated, that they were
wrongly decided and
should be, and now
are, overruled."

1991]

South Carolina v. Gathm,
490 u.s. 805 (1989);
Booth v. Maryland, 482
u.s. 496 (1987)

admissibility of victim
impact evidence;
amend. VII
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